International Perspectives of Crime Prevention 2

Contributions from the 2nd Annual International Forum 2008

Eds.

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with contributions from:
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Content

Other content of the congress

Introduction

The **German Congress on Crime Prevention** is an annual event that has taken place since 1995 in different German cities and targets all areas of crime prevention: Administration, the health system, youth welfare, the judiciary, churches, local authorities, the media, politics, the police, crime prevention committees, projects, schools, organisations, associations and science. The desired effect is to present and strengthen crime prevention within a broad societal frame-work. Thus it contributes to crime reduction as well as to the prevention and the reduced risk of becoming a victim as well as fear of crime. The main objectives of the congress are:

1. Presenting and exchanging current and basic questions of crime prevention and its effectiveness.
2. Bringing together partners within the field of crime prevention.
3. Functioning as a forum for the practice, and fostering the exchange of experiences.
4. Helping to get contacts at an international level and to exchange information.
5. Discussing implementation strategies.
6. Developing and disseminating recommendations for practice, politics, administration and research.

The 2008 13th congress took place on the 2nd and 3rd of June 2008 in Leipzig (state of Saxony) and gathered together more than 3000 people from the field of crime prevention. The discus-sion and lectures focused on the main topic 'Dedicated Citizens - Safer Communities'. Besides an exhibition (with over 120 exhibitors), open forum, internet forum, university for children, a poster session, film forum and other events took place.

Since its foundation the German Congress on Crime Prevention has been opened to an inter-national audience with a growing number of non-German speaking participants joining. Because prevention is more than a national concern and should be focused internationally this step seemed crucial. Bringing together not only German scientists and practitioners but also international experts in crime prevention and therefore developing a transnational forum to foster the exchange of knowledge and experience constitutes the main focus of this approach. To give the international guests their own discussion forum, the **Annual International Forum (AIF)** within the German Congress on Crime Prevention was established in 2007. For non-German guests this event offers lectures in English language as well as other activities within the German Congress on Crime Prevention that are translated simultaneously.

International guests are able to play an active role by presenting poster or displaying information within the exhibition.

The programme of the 2nd Annual International Forum 2008 included:
Prof. Dr. Christian Pfeiffer (Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany): *Prevention of Juvenile Violence in Germany*
Valérie Sagant (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime - ICPC, Canada): *International Examples and Developments in Crime Prevention*
Leo Tigges (Conférence Permanente Européenne de la Probation – CEP): *"Probation Meets Prevention" - Presentation of the Summary and Conclusion of the CEP Workshop*
Johanna Schmitz (Kids Company, United Kingdom): *Kids Company and the Principle of "Loving Care"*
C. Berta Kimmich (e.p.a. - european play work association, Germany): *Intercultural Exchanges - A Chance for Young People to De-Learn Violence?*
Roland Ziss (SUM Consult, Germany): *Community Participation for Violence Prevention - Selected Experiences from Latin America and South Africa*

Over the next few years – especially the 10. and 11. May 2010 when the 15th German Congress on Crime Prevention as well as the 4th Annual International Forum takes place in Berlin – we intend to develop this concept further. It is our wish to build an international forum for crime prevention that ensures a competent exchange of ideas, theories and applied approaches.

This book reflects the input and output of the 2nd Annual International Forum in 2008. Firstly lectures of the AIF are printed, followed by contributions from participants of the congress. The articles reflect worldwide views on crime prevention as well as the current status, discussion, research and projects in crime prevention from different countries. Last not least other content of the congress is presented like the results from a workshop within the congress "Probation meets Prevention" or the Leipzig Declaration, a report about the key findings of the congress in 2008.

We hope to find a broad audience, interested in the upcoming events of the Annual International Forum as well as the German Congress on Crime Prevention. For more information visit please visit our homepage at http://www.gcocp.org.

Marc Coester and Erich Marks

Lectures from the 2nd Annual International Forum

Dirk Baier / Christian Pfeiffer*

Turkish Children and Teenagers as Perpetrators and Victims of Violence

1. Introduction

An act of violence committed by two young men on 20 December 2007 and filmed by closed-circuit television cameras dominated the debate on juvenile violence in Germany for a number of weeks. The perpetrators were young immigrants, one of Turkish and the other of Greek origin. Because the film of the extremely violent scene was shown on numerous news programmes for several days, the theory was soon posited that immigrant crime was the key threat to inland security. Young Turks in particular became the focus of political and media attention. At the time, the campaign leading up to the regional elections in the state of Hesse was in full swing and we seized the opportunity to counter the emotionally charged arguments spouted by various politicians with criminological facts and empirical knowledge (Pfeiffer and Baier, 2008). The following thus looks at what comes to light when data analysis focuses on young Turks. Our studies are based on representative surveys conducted with fourth and ninth grade school children carried out in different cities, towns and regions in five German states from 1998 to 2006. The survey data are supplemented by information gleaned from police crime statistics.

2. Violent Behaviour and School Performance Among Turkish Children

In 2005, and for the first time since its inception, the KFN[1] schools survey took in some 5,529 fourth graders (see also Mössle, Kleimann and Rehbein, 2007). With support from the class teachers, data was collected on parents' educational backgrounds and teachers' recommendations regarding the type of senior school each of the fourth graders was suited to attend.

Figure 1 (below) highlights two issues specific to Turkish children. Firstly, when compared with all other ethnic groups, they received the fewest recommendations for *Gymnasium* and the most for *Hauptschule*. Secondly, they committed more acts of violence against other children (hitting, kicking or fighting with another child) than any of their schoolmates.

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* BAIER, D. & PFEIFFER, C. (2008). Türkische Kinder und Jugendliche als Täter und Opfer. Published in: Brumlik, M. (Hrsg.), Ab nach Sibirien? Wie gefährlich ist unsere Jugend? Weinheim: Beltz. S. 62-104. English Translation by Stocks & Stocks, Bonn, 2008.

[1] Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony)

Figure 1: Teacher's recommendations and self-reported acts of violence (hitting/fighting) for fourth graders from various ethnic groups (KFN Schools Survey 2005, in %)



With reference to the comparison of teachers' recommendations regarding senior school type, a longitudinal study of 1,000 children from schools in Berlin conducted by KFN since 2005 has made it possible to compare third graders' (eight year-olds) mathematical skills and performance. Marginal differences were evident between the ethnic groups, with native German children performing slightly better than Turkish or Russian children. The divergence was, however, too small to be of any significance in explaining the gap in school marks at this age. Other factors obviously play an important role. Table 1 (below) shows characteristics identified in the survey of fourth graders that we have concluded are highly relevant to school performance and a readiness to resort to violence.

Table 1: Childhood circumstances for fourth graders from various ethnic groups (KFN Schools Survey 2005, in %)

	German	Turkish	Other
Own room	87.5	26.6	60.8
Games console in room	21.1	40.4	37.7
Computer in room	33.8	43.0	39.5
Television in room	30.3	46.3	48.6
Media consumption on school days (average in hours and minutes)	2 hrs 15 mins	3 hrs 28 mins	2 hrs 54 mins
Media consumption at the weekend (average in hours and minutes)	3 hrs 35 mins	5 hrs 3 mins	4 hrs 31 mins
Films for age 16-18 seen in the past 7 days	16.8	38.2	29.4
Ever played a game for over age 16-18	33.0	55.1	46.7
Experience of parental violence	12.1	19.3	18.3
Percentage of friends of German extraction	90.3	42.8	60.8
Percentage of immigrants in the class	26.5	57.0	43.8
Live in an urban environment (> 30,000 inhabitants)	58.0	87.8	77.9
Parents well educated	41.5	8.0	23.9

What comes to light is that when compared with all other groups, Turkish children are least likely (26.6 percent) to have their own room. It goes without saying that this brings considerable disadvantages because its makes it difficult for them to concentrate on schoolwork if a sibling or an adult pursues other activities in the same

room (listening to music, watching television, talking on the telephone, or talking and playing with friends).

Added to this is the fact that 10 year-old Turkish children are more likely to have a games console and their own computer and rank second among the ethnic groups when it comes to having their own television. Access to their own visual media equipment means that on school days, Turkish fourth graders consume the most media, with 3 hours and 28 minutes. They also lead the field on weekends, with 5 hours and 3 minutes. A similar picture comes to light as regards consumption of films and computer games which due to their extreme violent content are classified for aged 16 or 18 or have been officially listed as suitable for adults only (over 18). This is another area where Turkish children show by far the highest exposure. A key finding in the media impact research we have conducted so far is that the more time children and juveniles spend consuming media and the more brutal the content of the films and computer games they consume, the worse their school performance and marks are (Pfeiffer et al, 2008). The poor performance is not just reflected in the low number of recommendations for *Gymnasium*, but in a comparatively weak average grade in German, science and maths (3.2 on a scale from 1 (top) to 6 (bottom), compared with 2.5 for German children and 2.9 for other children).

Another influencing factor is the experience of violence in the family. It is significant in relation to both school marks and delinquent behaviour of those affected (see Lansford et al, 2007, Smith and Thornberry, 1995). Figure 2 (below) illustrates the responses of 14,301 ninth graders questioned in the 2005 KFN survey regarding the extent to which they were the victims of inner-family violence during their childhood (up to age 12).[2]

[2] Parental violence was documented in terms of the estimated frequency of the following six types of attack: being hit, having an object thrown at them, being held tight or pushed around, being hit with an object, being hit with a fist or kicked, being beaten or severely beaten. When at least three types of attack were rarely experienced, the parental style is described as mild punishment. If these three forms are more frequently use or if the fourth occurs at least rarely, we talk of severe punishment. Mistreatment is deemed to occur when a child is hit with a fist or kicked, beaten or severely beaten.

Figure 2: Parental violence in childhood according to ethnical background, ninth grade (KFN Schools Survey 2005, in %)



This shows that at 16.8 percent, Turkish children are far more vulnerable to mistreatment/abuse compared with all the ethnic groups covered in the survey. Looking at the 10 year-olds, we refrained from asking detailed questions about inner-family violence and merely recorded whether the children had been cuffed around the ear or hit within the last four weeks. But even in this context, the Turkish children were significantly more exposed (19.3 percent) than, say, the native German children (12.1 percent).

Integration is a preventive factor when it comes to immigrant children getting caught up in delinquent groups. The ethnic composition of their peer groups evidently plays an important role (see Rabold and Baier, 2008). We thus asked which ethnic groups the three children belonged to who each respondent had invited to their last birthday party. Of the native German children, an unsurprising 90.3 percent said they had invited German children. This applied to 60.8 percent of the others and 42.8 percent of the Turkish children. Looking at Turkish fourth graders, a pronounced regional divergence came to light. This can be taken as a sign of the considerable regional differences regarding the integration of immigrant children. A comparison between cities showed Turkish children in Oldenburg to be most likely to receive an invitation to a German child's birthday party (92.2 percent). Those in Dortmund were at the other end of the scale, with 35.5 percent. Not surprisingly, a comparison of the rate of violence among Turkish children in the different cities showed a reverse trend. It is highest among Turkish fourth graders in Dortmund (48 percent) and significantly lower in Oldenburg (35.3 percent).

Friendships with German children are primarily founded in nursery school and primary school. The children are thus reliant on structural conditions in their local environment. Against this backdrop, it would appear that the problem lies in the fact that in our survey 9 out of 10 Turkish children grow up in cities with over 30,000 inhabitants and often stick with their own kind because almost three-fifths of their classmates are immigrants themselves. The German children tend to live in small towns and rural

areas, and are far less likely to be in the same class as immigrant children.

In the following, the influence variables outlined earlier as regards school performance and violence-related child delinquency among fourth graders are summarised in a pathway analysis. The figures represent standardised coefficients which can vary between 0 (no correlation) and 1 (perfect correlation). Existing correlation between factors are identified with arrows, with the direction of the arrow showing the assumed effect. Apart from the factors already mentioned, we also took in 'well-educated parents', because school performance research talks of parents' educational backgrounds having a transmission effect (see, for example, Baumert and Schümer, 2001).

Figure 3: Model used to explain violence-related child delinquency and school performance for fourth graders (controlled according to age, gender and regional origin; KFN Schools Survey 2005; weighted data; diagram: standardised pathway coefficients)



A direct pathway from Turkish origin to the variable 'hitting/fighting' no longer exists once other factors have been controlled for. The higher exposure of Turkish children to violent behaviour can largely be apportioned to four factors:

1. Even after controlling for parents' educational background, Turkish children still demonstrate significantly poorer school performance. This goes hand in hand with anger and frustration and increases the risk of violence-related child delinquency.
2. Turkish children consume more development-harming media. This often brings them into contact with violent role models; use of violent computer games has a proven effect on their ability to empathise (Funk et al, 2004), so that a link between their own readiness to resort to violence can be seen (see also Mößle, Kleimann and Rehbein, 207, pp. 31ff). The model also shows that frequent use of such content results in lower average marks.
3. Turkish children have less contact with native German friends. More frequent contact goes hand in hand with lesser readiness to resort to violence and better average marks. The number of German friends is thus related to the number of immigrant children in the class: the higher the number, the fewer native German friends in the network.
4. Turkish children experience greater exposure to parental violence. On the one hand, this fosters their readiness to resort to violence themselves; on the other, children who are punished or mistreated/abused by their parents are less able to perform well at school.

The model shows a very close link between parents' educational background and children's school performance: the better educated parents are, the better the average marks attained by their children. Turkish school children are less likely to have well-educated parents. Parents' educational background has no direct effect on school children's readiness to resort to violence. The fact that Turkish children are generally worse off in this regard therefore provides no direct explanation for the difference in German and Turkish fourth graders' readiness to resort to violence.[3]

3. Police Records on Violent Crime Committed by Turkish Juveniles

Police records have only limited suitability in comparative analysis on the crime rates amongst young foreigners and young Germans. Because police records document the nationality of suspects but not their ethnic origin[4], naturalised Turkish youths are registered as German. Looking at the findings of the KFN schools survey conducted in 2005, this applied to 37.5 percent of 14 to 16 year-old Turks who committed violent

[3] Figure 3 shows a negative relationship between the number of immigrants in the class and average marks. A high proportion of immigrants thus has an ambivalent effect: on the one hand, they are less likely to develop friendships with German children, which in turn increases the risk of violent behaviour and reduces the average marks achieved. On the other, they provide an opportunity to perform better and attain better marks. It can be assumed that in classes with large numbers of immigrants, it is easier for individual pupils to set themselves apart and rise above the generally poor performance levels. This indicates that a high number of immigrants in primary school classes is not actually disadvantageous. Rather, the size of the percentage could be influential, meaning there are thresholds which should not be exceeded.

[4] One exception applies to young repatriated ethnic Germans from former Communist countries in some German states, for whom the fact that they are repatriated ethnic Germans and the country from which they moved to Germany was documented in addition to them being registered as Germans when identified as suspects in police reports (see Pfeiffer et al, 2005).

acts in 2004. At the beginning of 2005, 26.8 percent of the Turkish school children questioned said they had committed at least one violent act in the year before the survey. Of these, 62.5 percent had Turkish nationality. The others were born German because their parents had either already applied for German citizenship before the birth or were naturalised later on.

Consideration must also be given to the fact that according to overlapping findings in several different studies, when compared to native German youths, young foreigners are at greater risk of being reported to the police as a result of violent behaviour and being thus be registered by the police as a suspect. This is especially the case in the frequent constellation of victim and perpetrator belonging to different ethnic groups (see Wilmers et al, 2002, Mansel 2003, Pfeiffer et al, 2005). Longitudinal analyses of police records on violent crime committed by young immigrants and young Germans are made difficult in that the growing group of naturalised young immigrants involves individuals with specific social traits. To gain German citizenship, young immigrants must have parents who are socially well integrated and have no criminal record. This positive selection boosts membership of social fringe groups among foreigners.

Nonetheless, crime statistics are the only source of data that provides information on long-term trends. Figure 4 shows the trend in crime committed by German and non-German juveniles (aged 14 to 17), both for all types of offences and specifically for violent crime based on the number of suspects in relation to population (*Tatverdächtigenbelastungsziffer*, or TVBZ). This figure shows the number of adolescents out of 100,000 in that age group who are thought to have committed a crime. In this process, there is one source of error that cannot be controlled: foreign suspects include tourists, people living in Germany illegally and others who hold a foreign passport and are temporary residents. These are registered by the police but not in the population statistics. The TVBZ figures are thus usually too high in relation to foreigners. This distortion factor is of less importance in the case of juveniles than for adults because the number of 14 to 17 year-olds in this group is relatively low.

Looking first at the trends for all types of offences, these remain the same for German and non-German juveniles until 1999. While the crime rates in both groups rise, the increase among non-German youths (10 percent) is lower than that for Germans (40 percent). After 1999, the TVBZ figure for all types of crime committed by non-German adolescents drops by 21 percent but remains largely constant for Germans (down 6 percent). Consequently, the number of offences committed by non-German youths dropped from 27.6 percent to 16.4 percent. Thus, while in 1993 every fourth juvenile crime recorded by the police was committed by a non-German youth, thirteen years later it was only every sixth.

Figure 4: TVBZ trends for crime/violent crime committed by German and non-German juveniles since 1993 and trends in crime committed by non-German youths since 1993



A similar trend as regards the number of crimes committed by non-German youths can be seen in the figures on violent crime, which include murder/manslaughter, robbery, dangerous/grievous bodily harm and rape. While in 1993 some 30.8 percent of all juvenile violent crime registered by the police was committed by foreign youths, in 2006 it was down to 23.5 percent. Nonetheless, the TVBZ figures show a rise in both groups, although it is slightly weaker as regards non-German than German juveniles. In 1993 the TVBZ for violent crime was 1,604.5 among non-German youths and 486.9 for Germans. In 2006, it was 2,863.6 for non-Germans and 983.9 for Germans. This represents a rise of 78 percent for non-German teenagers compared with a 102 percent increase among German juveniles. One possible cause for the convergence of the two groups could be the growing number of ethnic German youths repatriated from former Communist countries living in Germany who show an above-average readiness to resort to violence – particularly the boys – and are registered as German nationals (Haug, Baraulina, Babka von Gostomski, 2008, p. 20ff; Pfeiffer et al, 2005, p. 45ff).

We are able to determine the TVBZ separately for Turkish youths in 2006 for a cross-sectional comparison.[5] As Figure 5 shows, the figure for overall crime was two-thirds higher than for German youths. For the all non-German group the figures were up by 86 percent compared with that for the German group. The differences are more significant in respect of violent crime, with Turkish youths demonstrating the highest

[5] According to the Federal Statistical Office, 129,888 youths (aged 14 to 18) of Turkish nationality lived in Germany in 2006

TVBZ. This is three and a half times as high as that for German juveniles and 19 percent higher than that for all non-Germans. This means that in 2006, around one in ten juveniles registered by the police as suspected of committing a violent crime were of Turkish nationality. Their share of the population in that age group is only 3.4 percent. The share of all non-Germans among juvenile suspects of violent crime is 23.5 percent compared with a population share of 9.5 percent. Particularly striking is the extremely high number of Turkish juveniles among suspects of robbery and dangerous/grievous bodily harm. With regard to other crimes, Turkish juveniles are lesser in numbers than non-German youths. Plus, in respect of a few specific crimes, the TVBZ figures show only an insignificant divergence between German and non-German youths. This applies, for example, to drug-related crime and wilful damage. In the case of shop-lifting, the TVBZ ranks German and Turkish youths as more or less on a par.

Figure 5: TBVZ for selected crimes involving German, non-German and Turkish teenagers in 2006 and the number of crimes committed by non-German and Turkish youths in 2006



Crime statistics thus show a differentiated picture between Turkish youths in particular and non-German youths in general who are known to the police. Thus, in the last 13 years there has been no disproportionate rise in crime committed by immigrant youths. On the contrary: the TVBZ gaps are gradually closing. Among 100,000 non-German juveniles, considerably fewer crimes were committed in 2006 than in 1993. A rise is however evident among German teenagers. Violent crimes were more frequent in both groups, although the increase was greater among the young Germans. In a cross-section analysis of the figures for 2006, it is evident that when compared to German youths and all non-German youths, Turkish juveniles commit by far the highest number of violent crimes. The picture is quite different, however, as regards

property-related crime. The question as to how these differences might be explained cannot be answered using police crime statistics. We must rely on analyses regarding unreported crime, as this allows inclusion of crimes not reported to the police and also identifies the personal, family and social circumstances that we assume play a role in the occurrence of teenage violence and of juveniles slipping into criminal activity.

4. Turkish Adolescents as Perpetrators and Victims of Violence

4.1 Responses from immigrant juveniles concerning unreported crime

Before we look at the empirical findings of the KFN schools survey, we would first like to see whether this method is at all suited to explain why ethnic minorities are more likely to be involved in violent crime.

The validity of the findings from immigrants' responses is questionable on a number of counts. According to Eisner and Ribeaud (2007), one of the key problems is that immigrants are generally more difficult to reach and are less willing to participate in surveys to begin with. In school surveys, this plays only a subordinate role because nearly all the teenagers in school on the day the interviews are conducted take part. In the KFN survey conducted in 2005, only 1.3 percent of pupils and parents refused an interview. And of the pupils who were absent on the day of the survey (a total of 8.7 percent), teachers said only 23 percent were of non-German origin which mean there were not very many immigrants in that group. School surveys thus appear to be an effective way of interviewing a group that is generally difficult to reach.

Another potential problem is thus linked to the responses of immigrant youths. In their study on reports made by male youths regarding their own delinquency, Köllisch and Oberwittler (2004) show that while doubts as to the validity of immigrants' responses are justified, school surveys conducted at class level deliver more reliable results than other types of surveys such as verbal, face-to-face interviews. This applies both to self-reported delinquency and self-reported contacts with the police (p. 731). Generally, when comparing the youths' own reports and police statistics, the authors find that immigrant juveniles tend to keep quiet about any contacts with the police. When analysing delinquency and dealings with the police, this results in a conservative estimate rather than an over-estimate regarding existing differences.

Our surveys of ninth graders in 2005 and 2006 also allow analysis of the reliability of the responses received. This is possible in that reports of violent behaviour correlate with theoretically plausible causal factors in all the groups questioned. Table 2 (below) illustrates the relationship between the respondents having delinquent friends and resorting to violence themselves. The correlations are significant in all groups[6], with the levels more or less the same among German and Turkish youths. For Russian and Polish children questioned in the survey, friendships with delinquent individuals

[6] See next section on identifying the ethnic origin of the young people questioned

have a great influence because they correlate more with violent behaviour; this is less so in the case of Italian youths. If non-German respondents were to give systematically false reports on their violent behaviour, it would lead to a lower or non-existent correlation with the 'delinquent friends' variable.[7]

Table 2: Selected indicators on the reliability of responses from German and non-German youths (KFN Schools Survey 2005/2006; weighted data)

	German	Turkish	Russian	Yugo-slavian	Polish	Italian	Other
Correlation between 'delinquent friends' and 'committed a violent act' (r)	0.26	0.22	0.36	0.27	0.39	0.16	0.27
Social desirability (mean)	2.04	2.35	2.15	2.14	1.94	2.25	2.10
Correlation between 'social desirability' and 'committed a violent act' (r)	-0.07	-0.11	-0.11	-0.20	-0.12	-0.03	-0.07
No response to 'committed a violent act'	1.0	1.7	2.2	3.2	1.8	1.3	1.6
Correlation between acceptance of violence and 'no response to committed a violent act'	0.05	-0.01	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.02
Not matching responses to 'committed a violent act'	8.1	16.5	15.3	21.7	10.2	10.4	14.1
'committed a violent act' first question	11.8	21.8	18.6	22.5	14.7	17.0	20.3
'committed a violent act' second question	10.6	21.6	14.4	24.4	14.6	18.2	17.7
'committed a violent act' in at least one question	14.8	27.7	22.2	28.9	18.1	18.8	24.3

The reliability of the responses can also be analysed by identifying a single factor which is responsible for a specific response, that of 'social desirability'. Naplava (2002) assumes, for example, "that immigrants with shorter periods of residence tend not to report delinquent behaviour in an attempt to avoid giving the impression that they stray from the norm in their host country" (ibid, p. 19). Immigrant groups who have only been in Germany for a short time must, therefore, demonstrate heightened social desirability which in turn results in them failing to report violent behaviour. To assess social desirability, a short four-item version of a social desirability scale (Crown and Marlow, 1960) was used during the school survey conducted in 2005. Representative responses include: "I always tell the truth" and "I'm always willing to admit when I make a mistake". The respective total index assumes scores of between 0 (no socially desirable response) and 4 (highly socially desirable response). The results shown in Table 2 illustrate that Turkish and Italian teenagers score highest on social desirability, that is the two groups with the longest average residency in Germany (see below). Russian youths score slightly higher than Germans, while Polish youths score slightly lower. As the negative correlations in Table 2 show, all groups showed a lower tendency to give socially desirable responses regarding their own prevalence of violence, i.e. the empirical evidence shows that respondents with high social desirability scores tend to keep quiet about their violent behaviour. Because non-Germans give more socially desirable responses and in almost all non-German groups the rela-

[7] Other factors such as masculinity norms, poor self-control and use of violent media reveal significant links with violent behaviour in all groups, too(see Baier and Pfeiffer 2007).

tionships are more prominent in their self-reports about their own delinquency, it can be assumed that the ethnic differences in violent behaviour should be even greater in reality than the youths questioned would have us believe (for more on the differences in violent behaviour see Table 3 in the following section). This means that school survey data results in ethnic differences being under rather than over-estimated.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the analysis shown in Table 2 on the missing cases: between 1.0 and 3.2 percent of all respondents refused to answer the question (known as 'missings') on whether they had ever committed a violent act. This is more prevalent in non-German than German youths. Missing scores can have a number of causes: it is possible that the juveniles deliberately fail to answer a question because they do not want to give themselves away. Another reason could be that with this section being towards the end of the survey (the questions on committing violent acts are on pages 24 to 27 of the questionnaire), the respondents had already given up due to lack of motivation or lack of understanding due to language barriers. With the exception of the Turkish youths, there is a weak relationship between failure to answer and greater acceptance of violence[8], meaning that it is plausible that those who failed to answer certain questions tended to have committed more violent acts; and because the incidence of missing responses tends to be higher among non-German youths, the ethnic differences would be more evident if all the children and youths surveyed had answered the questions.

An additional evaluation builds on analyses done by Köllisch and Oberwittler (2004) except that the respondents' comments are not compared with official police statistics but with respondents' comments elsewhere in the questionnaire. As part of a school survey conducted in Hanover in 2006, the pupils were asked exactly the same questions in two different sections of the questionnaire (pages 12 and 14). The subsequent evaluation also showed that the answers given by immigrant youths were less reliable in that they were less stable. While 8.1 percent of the German youths questioned gave two different answers to the same question, 16.5 percent of the Turkish group did so. Looking at the differences between the groups, then the picture is more balanced: Turkish and Yugoslavian youths are only slightly more violent than their German counterparts. Among the Russian and other juveniles, the differences in prevalence rates were greater in both answers. Further analyses have revealed that the difference in the answers has less to do with ethnic origin and more with the respondents' educational background (Rabold, Baier and Pfeiffer 2008). In the case of special needs children and Hauptschule pupils, the answers deviate from each other more frequently than those of *Gymnasium* pupils. This analysis also confirms that overall, there are only a few reasons to assume that immigrant juveniles systematically lie about their own violent conduct. There are, however, indications that with few missing cases and when

[8] This was assessed using eleven answers such as "life would be really boring without fights" and "you have to resort to violence because that's the only way to gain respect". The acceptance of violence was located on page 9 of the questionnaire, making motivation and language problems less evident in terms of missing data.

socially desirable answers are excluded, the ethnic differences would be even greater.[9]

Ethnic differences in violent behaviour are thus not a result of impression management by non-German youths who adapt their reported behaviour to specific expectations instead of telling the truth. Consequently, a greater readiness to resort to violence among immigrant juveniles is more a fact than an artefact. This conclusion is justified in that various sources (police crime statistics and surveys on unreported crime) along with a number of studies show comparable results (see among others Babka von Gostomski 2003; Eisner and Ribeaud, 2008; Naplava, 2002; Oberwittler, 2003).

4.2 Turkish youths' responses in a survey on unreported crime

In the following we address the results of the survey on unreported crime conducted among ninth grade school children in 2005 (see Baier and Pfeiffer, 2007).[10] In some areas, comprehensive surveys were carried out, meaning all youths in the ninth grade were questioned. In others, random samples were taken from at least one in three children in all classes in that year. With the exception of special needs pupils and those in the *Berufsvorbereitungsjahr* scheme in which they are given special training to prepare them for entry into the jobs market, and which could include pupils from the age group in question, all types of schools (including private schools) are represented in the survey.[11]

To identify ethnic origin, respondents were asked to state their parents' nationality at the time they were born. If they were Turkish, the child was listed as Turkish. If the parents were Russian, then so the child, and so on. If the father and mother had differing, non-German nationalities, the mother's nationality was the deciding factor. If there was a non-German father and German mother, the child was assigned to the respective non-German group. Where information was lacking on parents' nationality, other data was used such as the youths' own nationalities at the time of their birth or the country of origin of one or other of the parents. This strategy is not always reliable in the case of Russian and Polish respondents, however. Because these are two countries where large numbers of ethnic Germans have been repatriated from, the youths frequently describe themselves and their parents as German. In such cases, classification was aided by an additional question about ethnic German immigration and the country the parents emigrated to. In this way, over 80 different native nationalities were identified. The five biggest groups are Turkish (9.5 percent of respondents), Rus-

[9] The reliability of the statements made by the youths questioned is underlined not least by the following evaluation (see Baier and Pfeiffer, 2007, p. 21f): the youths were not only questioned about whether they had committed a violent act but also whether they had been victims of violence. Pupils who had experienced violence were asked to name the ethnic origin of their attacker in the most recent incident. Four out of ten acts of violence against boys, according to the victims, were committed by German perpetrators; there was a similar number of violent crimes committed by perpetrators of Turkish origin. This means that Turkish youths are far more likely to be among the perpetrators (including in the statements made by the victims) than their numbers among all youths questioned might lead us to expect.

[10] The survey was conducted in the following areas: Dortmund, Kassel, Munich, Oldenburg, Landkreis Peine, Schwäbisch Gmünd, Landkreis Soltau-Fallingbostel, Stuttgart and Lehrte.

[11] In some instances, data is taken from a survey of 3,661 ninth graders in Hanover which was conducted in 2006 using new measurement instruments (see Rabold, Baier and Pfeiffer, 2008).

sian[12] (5.4 percent), Yugoslavian[13] (3.9 percent), Polish (3.5 percent) and Italian (2.2 percent). Another 11.6 percent of all ninth graders in the schools surveyed are of non-German origin. In total, almost a third of respondents have immigrant backgrounds.

The German juveniles were almost all born in Germany and all have German citizenship (see Table 3). Turkish and Russian youths thus form two contrasting groups: while 87 percent of the Turkish teenagers questioned were born in Germany, only 37.7 possess a German passport. Only 10.6 percent of Russian pupils were born here; they largely enjoy German status, however, on account of their ethnic German backgrounds. Over half of the Russian youths involved in the survey have been in Germany for less than 10 years, meaning that their primary socialisation largely took place in Russia or the former Soviet Union. Further analysis has shown that three quarters of the youths listed as Russian moved to Germany after 1992 and are thus mostly of ethnic German origin. More than half of respondents in all the other groups were born in Germany. A large proportion of them have German citizenship; only in the case of Yugoslavian youths is the figure much lower, at 29.1 percent.

Table 3: Indicators for willingness to resort to violence and other circumstances of various ethnic groups (in %; KFN Schools Survey 2005/2006; weighted data)[14]

	German	Turkish	Russian	Yugo-slavian	Polish	Italian	Other
N	9119	1354	766	560	506	308	1663
Born in Germany	99.5	87.0	10.6	58.5	79.2	89.9	75.5
German citizenship	100.0	37.7	85.0	29.1	89.7	57.1	74.4
Committed a violent act	13.6	26.8	23.5	24.9	24.8	21.0	19.0
Five/more violent acts (boys)	4.1	13.2	8.4	11.5	9.1	7.9	7.5
Working towards *Hauptschule* leaving certificate	19.4	53.6	37.6	51.0	25.8	47.6	30.2
Working towards *Abitur* qualification	45.2	14.1	28.9	21.6	33.9	21.7	38.6
Close to poverty	8.1	23.0	29.1	15.7	11.6	13.6	16.6
Experience of childhood abuse	6.3	16.8	11.0	13.9	12.7	11.9	12.0
Acceptance of masculinity norms (boys only)	3.9	23.7	9.2	18.9	8.7	12.9	7.3
Experience of separation/divorce	30.4	15.0	24.4	19.4	25.9	30.5	32.8
Frequent use of violent media	34.8	44.0	42.0	41.1	47.4	38.2	36.6
Sports club membership	64.7	41.4	39.2	39.5	53.6	46.7	54.0
Delinquent friends (mean)	2.6	4.7	3.3	4.9	4.4	3.7	3.5
Proportion of German friends	82.6	24.9	31.5	31.7	57.6	53.2	51.8

[12] Correctly speaking, the category should really be described as 'Russian/former Soviet Union', because the group comprises youths who stem from successor states of the former Soviet Union.

[13] Youths described as Yugoslavian come from the successor republics to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, etc.). This group also includes Albanian juveniles; this appears necessary because in their answers, the pupils have not made a clear distinction between Albanian and Kosova-Albanian.

[14] In this instance, we refrained from showing the significance of the differences between the ethnic groups. Given the relatively large sample and the numerous complete sets of data it contains, extrapolation to the population as a whole can be considered almost error-free. Unless otherwise stated, it can be assumed that at minimum the overall hypothesis regarding the absence of significant differences between the groups can be rejected.

To obtain information on the willingness to resort to violence in the various groups, the pupils were asked whether and if so how often they had committed bodily harm, robbery, blackmail or threatened someone with a weapon in the past 12 months. Table 3 shows that German youths report least on such violence acts: only 13.6 percent of all German youths questioned admitted to such activity, while almost twice as many Turkish teenagers did (26.8 percent). The other groups score far higher in this area than their German counterparts. The prevalence rates among Italian pupils and teenagers of other origin were only one-and-a-half times as high.[15] If only those male youths are assessed who according to their own statements committed five or more violent acts (multiple offenders), the young Turks score the highest: this applies to 13.2 percent of all male Turks in the survey; among the Germans the proportion is only a third as high, at 4.1 percent. The findings derived from police crime statistics are not only confirmed in terms of greater willingness to resort to violence among Turkish youths: when it comes to shop-lifting or wilful damage, there is again no difference between German and Turkish youths. While among the German respondents, 15.2 percent had engaged in shop-lifting and 14 percent had committed wilful damage, of the Turkish youths questioned the figures were 12.4 and 13.6 percent respectively.[16] Thus, despite their construction problems, the crime statistics would appear to provide a reliable illustration of criminal activity.

In the search for possible factors to explain the heightened readiness to resort to violence among Turkish youths, a variety of theoretical assumptions can be drawn upon. The deprivation theory approach focuses on the social structures in which German and non-German youths live. It starts with the assumption that immigrant youths are more disadvantaged because they are less likely to obtain grammar school-level qualifications and tend to work in the low-wage sector. This sector is not only problematic in terms of wage levels but also because the jobs involved are less secure which makes immigrants far more vulnerable to unemployment and dependency on welfare benefit. The disadvantages they face as regards school and working life result in the fact that the cultural goals shared with the majority cannot be achieved via socially provided, institutionalised paths. The discrepancy between goals and opportunities leads to frustration which is compensated for among other things by seeking innovative ways to obtain resources (see Merton 1995). This theory thus assumes that the higher scores achieved by immigrants are due to their fringe status in society. As empirical findings underscore, Turkish youths in particular grow up in such socially marginalised conditions. For this reason, one in seven Turkish youths (14.1 percent) are currently working towards *Abitur* qualifications at *Gymnasium* or *Gesamtschule*; more than half will achieve a Hauptschule school leaving certificate (53.6 percent). As outlined earlier in Section 2, their poor educational integration is due to a range of influencing factors. And there is also evidence that 23 percent of Turkish school

[15] Prevalence rates show the proportion of youths who had committed at least one crime during the study period (e.g. in the last 12 months).

[16] The mutliple offender quota for shop-lifting was 3.3 percent (German) and 3.7 percent (Turkish), and 3.6 percent each for damage to property.

children report that the family's social status is characterised by their dependency on welfare benefits or the head of the household being unemployed. German youths are thus significantly less affected. One in two attends a school that will give them a chance of obtaining *Abitur* qualifications and only one in twelve say that their family is affected by poverty. Among the youths from the other ethnic groups, the situation as regards socio-structural integration is also more positive than that for Turkish youths.

Cultural reasons based on the existence and maintenance of specific habits within immigrant groups broaden the spectrum of possible explanations. In line with sub-culture theory and the theory of cultural conflict, the norms and values of a given society are not always applicable in all social groups. For example, immigrants do not simply reject the cultural beliefs of their countries of origin when they move to Germany. Infact, there is strong support for the theory that immigrants tend all the more to return to tradition in response to lacking social integration and to norms and value-based beliefs that differ from those prevalent in Germany (Enzmann, Brettfeld and Wetzels, 2004, p. 267). Immigrant groups thus form their own learning environment. Children who grow up in such communities are brought up with attitudes and behavioural traits that are not shared by the majority of German society. This provides for a clash of cultures which, especially in teenage years, can take on violent forms.

Empirical confirmation of this type of cultural outlook can be found in Table 3, which once again shows the Turkish group to be particularly affected. Culture influences, among other things, their attitude to the situations in which physical violence should be used. In accordance, there are considerable differences regarding the frequency of domestic violence. Some 16.8 percent of Turkish youths report that they were hit with a fist/kicked or beaten/severely beaten as a child (physical abuse). Among the Germans, this figure was around a third lower (6.3 percent). Of the youths from the other ethnic groups, experience of childhood abuse was also about twice as frequent. The same applies to abuse during the last 12 months prior to the survey and to observations of marital violence between the parents – these influencing factors are not listed separately in Table 3. Turkish teenagers appear to be most frequently affected and their German counterparts least so (physical abuse: Turkish youths 10.3 percent, German youths 3.6 percent; observations of parental violence: Turkish youths 26.1 percent, German youths 6.2 percent).

As numerous studies show, experience of domestic violence significantly increases teenagers' willingness to resort to violence and to use violence as a means of identity and of getting their own way. This is especially so as regards masculinity norms that legitimate the use of violence. To identify these, responses such as "a real man is strong and protects his family" and "if a women betrays her husband, he is entitled to hit her" were used as assessment criteria (see Enzmann, Brettfeld and Wetzels, 2004). More than any others, Turkish youths maintain a "culture of honour" of this kind: 23.7 percent accepted it without restriction, while only 3.9 percent of young Germans

questioned did so. The connection between exposure to domestic violence and attitudes towards using violence (which is responsible for greater readiness to resort to violence) is rarely broken among Turkish youths by their parents separating or divorcing. This is also a culturally-influenced behaviour pattern. Despite the higher scores regarding inter-marital violence observed by Turkish youths, the separation and divorce rate among Turkish parents is only 15 percent. In the case of German teenagers, it would appear that the high divorce and separation rate of 30.4 percent means that inner-family conflict is less frequently fought out through physical violence. That the ending of a marriage which the children are more likely to have experienced as violent can reduce their own readiness to resort to violence became evident especially in relation to Turkish youths (Baier and Pfeiffer, 2007), although the effects were less significant than those of other factors.

The existence of a violence culture is evident not only in relation to parenting styles, but to the use of violent media. When asked how often they watch horror and action films, and play first-person shooter and combat games, 44 percent of Turkish juveniles said they did so frequently. The figure for German adolescents was 10 percentage points lower. Evidence gathered in recent media impact research shows that together with other influencing factors, frequent use of extremely violent computer games increases adolescents' readiness to resort to violence and their acceptance of masculinity norms that legitimate the use of violence (see Anderson et al, 2007; Kuncik and Zipfel, 2004; Mößle, Kleimann and Rehbein, 2007). It can thus be assumed that this aspect also plays an important role in the high levels of violence among Turkish teenagers.

Apart from deprivation theory and cultural explanations, at least one other theoretical standpoint can be drawn upon to explain Turkish adolescents' greater readiness to resort to violence. The theory of differential association used in criminological research has repeatedly shown that contact with people who commit delinquent acts themselves can be one of the strongest influencing factors for violent behaviour (see Baier 2005; Baier and Wetzels, 2006). If, due to their socially marginalised status and their cultural beliefs, immigrant juveniles frequent a violent environment, it would be of key importance to their own acceptance of violence. A standpoint that places social contacts in the spotlight is also highlighted by the findings shown in Table 3.

At first glance, respondents' answers show that non-German adolescents are less frequently involved in structured leisure and recreational activities: while almost two thirds of the German teenagers are members of sports clubs or similar, the same applies to only 44 percent of Turkish respondents – they tend to spend their free time with delinquent friends. When asked how many of their friends had committed one of six delinquent acts (shop-lifting, robbery, bodily harm, car theft, breaking into a car, drug dealing), the Turkish teenagers reported an average 4.7 of such friends, while the German group reported only 2.6. The social networks to which Turkish youths

belong therefore tend to involve more negative role models. And there are significant differences between the groups once the ethnic compositions within those networks are taken into account: in the survey conducted in Hanover in 2006, respondents were asked about the ethnic origins of their five best friends. The Turkish teenagers said only one in four of their friends was of German origin, the Russians said one in three and Polish youngsters reported one in two or more. Personal relations with German youths are a vital form of social capital (see Haug 2003) in that they communicate German norms and values, and on average have better educational qualifications and enjoy higher socio-economic status.

The descriptive evaluations presented here thus provide empirical confirmation of the validity of all three of the theoretical standpoints outlined earlier. Turkish youths suffer socio-structural disadvantages, they have the greatest affinity with a violence-oriented, masculinity culture and their social networks are particularly shaped by delinquent acquaintances and friendships. By way of contrast, this also means that Turkish adolescents who are socially better off and show no specific influences as regards their everyday contacts and exposure to violence should do no worse than German youths with similar traits. This is confirmed in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Violence rates for Turkish and German youths (only *Realschule* pupils with no experience of poverty, no experience of parental violence in childhood and no more than medium acceptance of masculinity norms, in %)



The analysis shown in Figure 6 compares school pupils who attend *Realschule*, whose families are not affected by poverty, were brought up in a non-violent atmosphere and demonstrate average attitudes regarding their acceptance of masculinity norms that legitimise violence. Questioned in this way, German and Turkish youths then show little difference in terms of their readiness to resort to violence. In the year prior to the survey, 12 percent of young Germans and 12.5 percent of Turkish youths had com-

mitted at least once violent act. A comparison between the multiple offenders resulted in 1.9 percent Germans and 1.7 percent Turks. These findings send out a clear message: it is not their Turkish origin that leads youths from this ethnic group to become frequent perpetrators of violence in their teenage years. Rather, the cause lies in the circumstances in which they grow up.

The path analysis depicted below allows conclusions regarding the relationships between the different influence variables and which of them promote readiness to resort to violence.[17] Except for 'self-control', all factors included in the analysis are known. Self-control was used in connection with a volatile temperament (representative statements: "If I'm in an argument with someone, I find it hard to keep my cool" and "It doesn't take much for me to get really angry or lose my temper"; (see Grasmick et al, 1993). Poor self-control is seen as a key cause of delinquent behaviour (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990) because it means that the long-term consequences of such actions are not sufficiently thought through and are pushed to the background in favour of potential short-term benefits.

Figure 7: Model used to explain violent behaviour, ninth graders (controlled for age, gender and regional origin: KFN Schools Survey 2005; weighted data; shows standardised path coefficients)



Overall, these findings show that when compared to their German counterparts, Turkish juveniles are more likely to grow up in families with low socio-economic status.[18] This is, however, largely insignificant in that deprivation theory explanations are not confirmed in this instance. A higher or lower status is rarely linked to other variables in the model, except when it comes to parental educational level, that is: parents with higher socio-economic status tend to provide their children access to higher levels of education.[19] Turkish youths are directly disadvantaged in this regard as far fewer

[17] Paths which although significant due to sample size but may be rated (< .10) are not shown in the figure.

[18] Socio-economic status was described using ISEI 88 values and drawing on the suggestion made by Albrecht et al (2002) when only limited information is available (parents' employment status and school qualifications); parents without work (unemployed, housewife) received a score of 0.

[19] For the level of education measure, information on aimed educational level was translated into years of school attendance (Hauptschule = 9 years, Realschule = 10 years, Gymnasium = 13 years).

of them receive the same opportunities. High education levels in turn comprise an important factor in reducing the propensity to consume violent media and more rarely leads to the formation of masculinity norms that emphasise violence. These are among the most indicative factors in the model: Turkish adolescents tend far more readily than German youths to accept antiquated masculinity norms which legitimate both internal violence (within the family) and external violence (to defend the family). Teenagers with strong masculinity norms thus tend to join delinquent groups and commit more acts of violence. Apart from masculinity norms and educational level, a third key factor is exposure to parental violence. Thus, Turkish youths are far more likely to suffer serious parental violence than their German counterparts.

Other factors used in the model are less decisive as regards ethnic differences in violent behaviour. In general, juveniles who frequently use violent media have a greater affinity to masculinity norms and are more likely to seek contact with delinquent friends. Poor self-control is linked to their own readiness to resort to violence and seek associations with delinquent friends. The greatest influence on violent behaviour stems from inclusion in delinquent peer networks. This is confirmed by data analysis which supplements the schools survey conducted in Hanover in 2006. In this survey, the composition of groups of friends, i.e. the proportion of German friends within the network, was documented separately. The multi-level analysis performed for the purpose by Rabold and Baier (2008) shows the amount of influence the ethnic composition of groups of friends has on the risk of resorting to violent behaviour. When controlled for this trait, youths of Turkish, Russian and other ethnic origin no longer score higher as regards violent influences.

When it comes to violence prevention, the conclusions to be drawn from these findings speak for themselves. Measures targeted at the parenting styles of Turkish parents and the masculinity perceptions they foster in their sons appear just as necessary as better school integration for Turkish children and teenagers. The latter would not only have a dampening effect on the development of a ‘macho’ culture. Of great importance is that attendance at senior schools can lead to changes in youths’ social networks and friendships. A longitudinal study on trends in teenage violence in Munich and Hanover allows empirical evaluation of this assumption. KFN’s first ever representative survey of ninth graders was carried out in Hanover and Munich in 1998. In Munich, the survey data for 2005 was used for comparison purposes. In Hanover, the data collected during the school survey in 2006 was used because no adequate data was collected in the previous year. Figure 8 (below) shows the frequency of self-reported violent acts committed by German and Turkish adolescents in the respective comparison years (see Baier, 2008).

Figure 8: Violent acts in selected years according to ethnic origin in Hanover and Munich (in %; weighted data)



A longitudinal comparison of the 1998 data with 2005/2006 shows that readiness to resort to violence among German and Turkish adolescents in Hanover and Munich has in some respects developed along contradictory paths. In Hanover, teenage violence among both German and Turkish youths dropped significantly, and there was a particularly marked decline in multiple offences committed by Turkish juveniles, from 15.3 percent to 7.2 percent. The gap between violent behaviour in both ethnic groups narrowed from 10.7 percentage points to 4 percentage points. In Munich, by way of contrast, a different trend can be observed for the period 1998 to 2005. While the number of German youths who according to their own reports committed violent acts declined in the course of the seven years in question, the figures for multiple offenders, especially among Turkish adolescents, rose significantly (from 6.0 percent to 12.4 percent). This has resulted in a widening of the gap between violent behaviour in the two ethnic groups, from the original two percentage points to 9.3 percentage points.

In the search for explanations for the trends shown in Figure 8, the influence variables confirmed in the pathway analysis are only of limited assistance because some of them were not included in the 1998 survey (e.g. type and frequency of media use and the composition of networks of friends). In respect of other factors, there is no evidence of a serious difference: both in Munich and in Hanover, for example, domestic or inner-family violence declined in the German and Turkish groups (see Baier 2008, p. 50 f). What stands out, however, are the different trends among Turkish adolescents in their levels of acceptance of masculinity norms that legitimate the use of violence. While a decline is evident in Hanover, acceptance of such norms is on the increase in Munich (Baier 2008, p. 16 f).

When comparing the two cities, very different trends come to light as regards the opportunities available for school-based integration of German and Turkish teenagers.

For the German group, such opportunities have increased in both Hanover and Munich since 1998 in that the chance of obtaining *Abitur* school-leaving qualifications opens the door to highly promising further education and training paths. As Figure 9 shows, *Gymnasium* figures in Munich rose from 46.6 to 49.9 percent and in Hanover from 40.3 to 46.1 percent. In parallel, the number of German teenagers at Hauptschule in Munich dropped from 20.9 to 19.9 percent and from 16.2 to 12.7 percent in Hanover. The trends in Hanover are noticeably stronger than in Munich.

Figure 9: No. of pupils attending Hauptschule and *Gymnasium* in a given period in Hanover and Munich according to ethnic group (in %; weighted data)



Among young Turks, a contradictory trend is evident as regards *Gymnasium* attendance: in Munich the numbers dropped from 18.1 percent to 12.6 percent. This compares with a rise from 8.7 percent to 15.3 percent in Hanover. Further, there is a marked difference in the role played by Hauptschule attendance for Turkish teenagers in both cities. While in Munich, it remained the clearly dominant school type in 2005 despite a slight drop (61.4 percent), in Hanover only just under a third of Turkish youths now attend Hauptschule (2006: 32.5 percent compared with 47.1 percent in 1998). In Hanover, the majority of Turkish adolescents (52.2 percent) have migrated to the mid-level education segment (*Realschule*/*Gesamtschule*), the same applied to only 26.0 percent of young Turks in Munich in 2005.

There are a number of explanations for the serious differences. In the course of the past 10 years in Hanover, starting with the Bürgerstiftung Hannover founded in 1997, a number of clubs and associations and urban district-specific initiatives have set up a range of projects and measures aimed at promoting school-based and social integration of young immigrants and at establishing constructive approaches to conflict mediation in schools. Examples include broad-based mentor programmes and free extra-curricular tuition for primary school children with immigrant backgrounds, training of conflict mediators, projects to provide after school supervision for children

from socially marginalised families, and sport and music programmes.[20] We cannot currently state whether and to what extent similar measures have been taken in Munich. Initial enquiries suggest that civil involvement is particularly strong in Hanover in this regard.

According to the school heads questioned in the survey, the decline in Turkish children attending Hauptschule in Hanover and the marked increase in their numbers at *Realschule* and *Gymnasium* is largely due to the fact that in Lower Saxony, primary school teachers' recommendations for senior school type are not binding. Turkish parents in Hanover obviously make good use of this opportunity. In Bavaria, on the other hand, a recommendation for Hauptschule is binding and parents must accept it. An exception is made for a very small number of children who sit and pass a very difficult special aptitude test and so qualify to attend a *Realschule* or *Gymnasium* despite their primary schools' recommendations.

The problems currently associated with children who attend Hauptschule have already been addressed in detail in two previous reports (Baier and Pfeiffer, 2007a; Pfeiffer and Baier, 2008). For this reason, only the key aspects will be taken up here. In most of the German states in which this type of school exists, Hauptschule pupils belong at an increasing rate to socially marginalised groups. For example, they are three times as likely to be victims of serious inner-family violence than those who attend Gymnasium. Male Hauptschule pupils spend more than six hours a day watching television, playing computer games or using the Internet, and have a greater preference for excessively violent content than their peers at other types of school. Only a minority of them are members of a club compared with the vast majority of Realschule and certainly Gymnasium pupils. Instead, a considerable number of Hauptschule pupils tend to be part of problematic groups and networks. In a comparison between Munich and Hanover, this becomes especially clear: some 27.5 percent of Turkish youths in Munich said they had five or more delinquent friends, while only 19.5 percent of young Turks in Hanover said the same. On the other hand, only 28.8 percent of Turkish adolescents in Munich said they had no delinquent friends compared with 38.8 percent in Hanover. This confirms the city to city comparison that attending Hauptschule under today's conditions promotes entry into delinquent groups and the development of violent careers.

[20] At the recent celebrations marking its tenth anniversary, the Bürgerstiftung Hannover reported that since 1998 it had carried out some 235 projects, most of which involved youth work. These in turn focused on integrating socially marginalised children and teenagers at a cost of 700,000 euros. Also, Mentor e.V., which is responsible for funding help with homework in primary schools, now boasts a membership of over 400 active volunteers. As part of a study to be conducted by KFN in conjunction with a nationwide schools survey involving 50,000 teenagers, a systematic comparison between school-based and social integration measures is planned.

5. Summary and Conclusions

The presented results of different school surveys lead to a unanimous finding: Turkish fourth graders and Turkish ninth graders commit significantly more violent offences than their German counterparts and those from other ethnic groups. But when it comes to other types of childhood and teenage delinquency such as wilful damage and shoplifting, young Turks show no marked differences compared with the other groups. What is also interesting is that when comparing German and Turkish adolescents, the extreme differences in the frequency of teenage violence completely disappear if the analysis is limited to ninth graders who attend *Realschule*, are not affected by poverty, are brought up in a non-violent household and show at most medium acceptance of masculinity norms that legitimise the use of violence.

Also, multivariate analysis methods confirm this finding and offer explanations for the markedly high rate of violence among Turkish children and teenagers. In consequence, and especially as regards Turkish families and young Turks' immediate environment, a combination of mutually reinforcing influencing factors are evident:

1. Particularly high exposure to inner-family violence which promotes children's' and teenagers' readiness to resort to violence and has a harmful effect on character development.
2. Very early access to televisions, games consoles and computers in their bedrooms which leads to a high degree of inappropriate media use during primary school years, especially among Turkish children.
3. Poor integration of young Turks into Germany's three-tier schools system with the outcome that the majority of them attend Hauptschule and thus become caught up in social networks comprising children and teenagers with above-average problems.
4. The tendency for many Turkish youths to focus on culturally shaped masculinity norms (culture of honour) which legitimise the use of violence to achieve certain goals and ambitions.
5. A high number of friends who frequently commit criminal offences coupled with a low number of German friends who belong to other social groups.

These factors are all interlinked. Among young male Turks, excessive use of extremely violent computer games in association with other risk traits promotes their acceptance of masculinity norms that legitimise the use of violence. On the other hand, attending a *Realschule* or a *Gymnasium* is a resource that fosters both entry into positive friendships and social networks and provides excellent opportunities for further education, training and employment. If we take into account that currently 20 percent of young immigrants living in Germany leave school without any qualifications (see Diefenbach 2007, p. 70 f) and that this figure is probably even higher

among young Turks, it becomes clear what prevention measures must focus on to achieve success. The research findings revealed in comparing trends in multiple offences among Turkish adolescents in Hanover and Munich provide clear evidence to this end. But we are well aware that this comparison of the two extreme groups is not sufficient to provide empirical evidence of the interpretation presented regarding the relationship between school-based integration, friendships and violent behaviour. We believe, however, that our theories can be verified using considerably broader-based data resources in future. Using funding providing by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, we are currently conducting representative surveys of 50,000 ninth graders in schools in 61 cities, towns and rural districts throughout Germany. A key aim of this research project is to analyse the impact of differing social and school-based integration opportunities on delinquency rates among young immigrants.

Two findings can however be reported today. We believe the strong decline in violent crime among young Turks in Hanover is a source of ongoing encouragement for those involved in school-based preventive measures to combat teenage violence. Also, it is clear that in the public debate on this issue, we should not generalise about young criminal Turks or foreigners. The fact that at present, young immigrants in Germany commit more crimes than young Germans is not an unconquerable force of nature. If we are to reduce the high rates of violence, we must achieve a balance not just in the conditions in schools, but in circumstances within the families and societal groups in which children grow up.

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Valérie Sagant

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety

I. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime: an Observatory on Crime Prevention and Community Safety

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), created in 1994 and based in Montreal, Canada, is the only non-profit international organisation dedicated exclusively to crime prevention and community safety. It was established to facilitate the emerging consensus on the role of governments, and particularly cities, in ensuring the safety of citizens, by implementing effective and sustainable preventive policies and programmes. ICPC promotes the active participation of national and local governments in coordinated strategies to prevent crime. A wide variety of public and private stakeholders take part in such collaborative strategies, including actors from social, economic, community and academic sectors, as well as civil society organisations.

ICPC was created and developed in close partnership with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), and particularly its *Safer Cities Programme,* as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), both of which are members of the Centre. It is a member of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network, participates actively in the sessions of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, has been involved in an expert capacity in the development of the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (ECOSOC Res. 2002/13), and organised workshops on crime prevention and urban governance issues at the 10th and 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice in 2000 and 2005[1].

A central part of ICPC's activities is also to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience in crime prevention. Since its inception, ICPC has collated, analysed and disseminated information on effective and innovative crime prevention policies and practices, and published a number of compendiums of good practice[2]. It has also undertaken a number of comparative studies on specific issues, such as the role of local authorities, the police and the private sector in crime prevention, the emergence of new professions in the field, youth and women's safety in urban areas, and the management of public space. It has just completed a three year city exchange program-

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[1] See: Shaw Margaret, Travers Kathryn (Eds.) (2007), Strategies and Best Practices in Crime Prevention, in particular in relation to Urban Areas and Youth at Risk, Proceedings of the Workshop held at the 11th UN Congress, Bangkok, 18-25th April 2005. Montreal: ICPC.

[2] Eg. Sansfaçon Daniel, Welsh Brandon (1999), Crime Prevention Digest II: Comparative Analysis of Successful Community Safety. Montreal: ICPC; Gauthier Lily-Ann, Hicks David, Sansfaçon Daniel, Salel Leanne (1999), 100 Crime Prevention Programs to Inspire Action Across the World. Montreal: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (2008), International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices to Inspire Action Across the World. Montreal: ICPC.

me involving the cities of Montreal, Quebec, Liege, Belgium and Bordeaux, France, which resulted in the development of a toolkit for cities to respond to incivilities associated with drugs and prostitution[3].

ICPC regularly organises national and international seminars[4], and an Annual Colloquium aimed at promoting the exchange of knowledge and tools for crime prevention[5]. It offers training sessions, and participates in a variety of international technical assistance programmes, in collaboration with national and international organisations including the Inter-American Development Bank, UNODC, UN-HABITAT and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

ICPC now benefits from a large network of members and partners, and plays a significant role in disseminating crime prevention resources through different national and international networks, and through its web-site and on-line electronic bulletin on crime prevention[6].

Building on all this knowledge and these activities, ICPC has officially launched on September 9th, 2008 its first *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives* and the *International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices to inspire action across the world*. Both the International Report and the Compendium of Practices intend to contribute to a better understanding of prevention on a global scale and to the development and the implementation of effective and sustainable prevention policies.

II. The International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: a summary

1. Introduction

This International Report presents, for the first time, an overview of the main problems linked to crime, safety, and victimisation in the world, and the types of prevention responses they elicit. It is intended to be published every two years, to provide a basis for tracking evolving issues, and emerging trends in prevention and community safety. The 2010 Report will be presented at the 12th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, in Salvador, Brazil, from April 12 to 19, 2010.

[3] Savignac Julie, Lelandais Isabelle, Sagant Valérie (2007), Nuisances publiques liées aux drogues et à la prostitution : Manuel pratique pour l'action locale. Montréal : CIPC.

[4] For example, an international seminar on crime trend observatories organised in Paris, France, December 11-12th 2007. To access the Proceedings of the first International Meeting on crime observatories: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/menu_item.php?code=other_icpc_.

[5] The ICPC Annual Colloquium is hosted by a different member country each year, on a specific topic, and brings together some 250-300 policy makers, practitioners and researchers. Recent colloquia have focused on the role of the private sector (Santiago, Chile, 2005), communities and crime prevention (Canberra, Australia, 2006), the role of the police (Oslo, Norway 2007) and Women's safety (Queretaro, Mexico, 2008).

[6] See: www.crime-prevention-intl.org

Who should read the report?

The report is primarily intended for decision-makers in different jurisdictions, cities, regions, provinces and states and countries, as well as professionals, specialised practitioners, non governmental organisations, and members of civil society engaged in crime prevention. It provides an overall analysis of crime prevention and community safety around the world and looks at innovations, promising practices, and emerging issues in these fields. It hopes to instigate reflection on prevention strategies and evaluation. The report will also be of relevance to international organisations, United Nations agencies, development banks, and other regional organisations. It offers a unique set of information exclusively dedicated to prevention, to assist with examination of normative standards, cooperation, and technical assistance needs. Finally, it provides a considerable amount of international material likely to be useful for specialised researchers.

Methodology, structure and content

This first 2008 International Report was developed by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime between May 2007 and June 2008. It is based on an analysis of international reports and information produced by intergovernmental organisations and specialised networks, and publicly available data from different levels of government, and non governmental organisations dealing with crime prevention and community safety. It also draws on relevant scientific literature. ICPC has privileged material in English, French and Spanish published after the adoption of the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime in 2002. This first edition focuses on the work of countries in North America, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania. The next edition will cover all regions of the world and additional themes.

Based on the broad and multidisciplinary definition of crime prevention adopted in the 2002 UN Guidelines, the 2008 report has two main sections: a thematic analysis of the main crime and community safety problems, chosen on the basis of their relevance and importance in current debates on crime prevention and community safety; and comparative analysis of evolving trends in policies and in the implementation of prevention practices. A general overview introduces each section. Section one begins with a review of the evolution of crime trends internationally and section two with a review of international trends in prevention, six years after the adoption of the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime.

Each chapter includes boxes which provide accounts of a concept, public service, tool, evaluation, or reference in the field of crime prevention. They deal, for example, with the impacts of video surveillance, the emergence of gated communities, or a campaign to prevent violence against immigrant women.

The report benefits from a series of contributions by international experts, who shed light on specific themes such as exploratory walks, interventions with youth gangs, public-private partnerships, or the role of municipal police in urban safety.

Finally, many of the topics presented in this report are illustrated by practical examples in the accompanying International Compendium which presents good and promising practices initiated by national or local governments, public authorities, or non governmental organisations.

2. Issues in community safety: A thematic analysis

Crime: context and international trends

Comparing international crime trends is particularly difficult for a number of reasons, including the lack of reliable and comparable data in some world regions, the absence of standardised data collection practices, and differences in definition of criminal behaviour, which can be considerable. Notwithstanding these limitations, review of information drawn from official statistics, comparative international analyses, and national or international victimisation surveys, suggests a **global trend toward the stabilisation of crime**. Despite marked regional disparities, this trend is evident worldwide with regard to property and drug offences. There are, however, some striking disparities with regard to violent offences (homicide, robbery). Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean still experience very high levels of these types of crime.

Numerous complex factors explain such disparities: **no single factor alone determines crime**. Crime is more prevalent in urban and disadvantaged areas. Urbanisation, poverty, and especially wide income disparities are at issue, not just in themselves, but because they limit access to education, training, employment, and overall services that facilitate personal, economic and social development. Other factors, such as access to firearms, or the use of drugs or alcohol, can also "facilitate" criminal behaviour.

Finally, this brief panorama emphasises issues related to the fear of crime which, while not directly linked to actual crime levels, must be taken into account when developing strategies for promoting community safety.

Women's safety

As with other forms of crime, the extent of violence against women is difficult to measure worldwide. Nevertheless an international victimisation survey suggests that, in the countries included, **between one-third and two-thirds of women claim to have been victims of violence**.

In the face of this persistent problem, women's safety has been the subject of **large-scale international mobilisation**. Nearly all international organisations, whether thematic or geographic, have turned their attention to women's safety, variously developing awareness campaigns, adopting normative standards, or funding technical assistance programmes which aim to change attitudes and behaviour. At a national

level, numerous governments on all continents have established national action plans, and some municipal governments have begun to use an integrated approach that takes account of all aspects of women's safety.

Beyond certain individual factors, women's safety is linked to recognition of their status, their autonomy, their education, and to the equality of the sexes. Empowering them to become more involved in social, political and economic life is central to promoting their safety in numerous regions around the world. In many cases, the role of women in conflict management and in reinforcing community capacity, for example, has allowed them to move from a status of 'victim', or "vulnerable population," to becoming fully participating members of the community.

Youth safety

The notion of "youth" varies considerably from one region of the world to another, but young men of 15 to 24 are the age group with the **highest rate of offending and victimisation** worldwide. Youth offending and victimisation is a very prominent issue in the crime debate. The debate has traditionally been informed by two complementary and often contradictory positions that view youth, on the one hand, as young people who are developing and need protection and on the other, as responsible individuals who must answer for their actions.

These differences are clearly evident in the approaches recommended by international organisations and many of the observed national responses. International organisations emphasise the importance of education, employment and social conditions when analysing youth offending and victimisation. In contrast, for the past fifteen years, public policies at the national level, especially in developed countries, have tended to place greater stress on individual and parental responsibilities.

Nevertheless, **participative approaches** are increasingly being recognised and in numerous regions of the world such approaches have been found to be effective in developing young people's capacities for independence, decision-making, and social integration.

School safety

Encompassing both between concerns about "youth" and issues of safety in public spaces, school safety continues to be an **important issue, especially in developed countries**. This is partly because of the heightened attention given to aggressive student behaviour, especially "bullying", and public and media interest in serious, albeit isolated, school shootings. **In other countries, the provision of education is also a major issue**. Countless children and youth still have only limited access to school and are, therefore, at risk of becoming involved in violence and crime on the streets, but may also experience high risk of violence or sexual assault at school.

The first response to school safety is often a punitive one, targeting "trouble-makers," but other factors are progressively being considered. The overall **climate** of a school, for example, particularly in terms of the quality of supervision, available resources, and the style of administration, is now more widely acknowledged as an important factor in school safety.

In all countries, regardless of wealth, the most innovative prevention and intervention strategies are those which are comprehensive in including not just the school community, but wider **community partnerships that favour initiatives also involving local actors**. These approaches place school at the centre of the community, and assess the needs of all parties, highlighting everyone's role in the functioning of a safe school.

Safety in public spaces and at large-scale sporting events

Disorder and "anti-social behaviour" in public spaces cover a wide variety of behaviours and can increase levels of insecurity beyond the likely incidence of crime, but are of common concern in many regions of the world. In all cases the issue is one of **tensions created by conflicts in, or by the use of, public space**, and the coexistence of a variety of users. There can be misunderstandings, as well as criminal activities or public nuisances. In an increasing number of countries, conflict or insecurity can arise from "informal trading", the activities of sex trade workers, drug traffickers and users, or street children, among others.

Opposing intervention approaches can be clearly distinguished in terms of the use of **inclusive or exclusive approaches and procedures**. The latter aim is to eliminate a problem, or at least make it less visible, by the displacement of populations perceived as, or actually, "disruptive." The former approach seeks to mediate relations and conflicts between different community members without, a priori, excluding any of them. These approaches use a broad range of social and supportive actions as well as urban planning. They also generally rely on strong partnerships, since responsibility for public spaces often lies with a range of practitioners and individuals.

In the past few decades safety in public spaces, stadiums and other sporting event venues has also become a major issue. This includes Europe with the development of football hooliganism, but also Latin America and Africa, and more sporadically in other regions during major sporting events.

The scale of violence and damage committed during soccer matches, for example, has resulted in the implementation of policies aimed at **containing** outbursts and impeding the mobility and capacity of the main instigators to make trouble. For the past few years there have been attempts to use more positive approaches, such as reclaiming the **celebratory nature of these events** by increasing the variety and type of social and civil interaction. Once again those strategies which use a comprehensive and integrated approach, based on local community resources, appear to be the most successful in terms of promoting safety.

3. Crime prevention: Emerging trends

A marked trend towards knowledge-based prevention

For a number of years there has been an increasing use of prevention approaches which have a strong scientific basis. While progress is uneven, the **evaluation of prevention programmes** in some areas has made it possible to identify "what works", what is less effective, and why this is the case. Dissemination of such information, and especially its use by national and local decision-makers, does not always appear to have progressed equally. Greater use of evaluation depends on the willingness of numerous actors to base public policies on rigorous analyses and methodologies; some public policies are still determined by budgetary and political orientations.

At an international level progress is evident, nonetheless, in the sense that **prevention policies are now likely to be based on more reliable data, including that collected and analysed by independent authorities**. Concern about the measurement of crime, resource allocation, or the needs of practitioners involved in prevention and safety, have led to the development of a number of data collection and analysis tools, such as safety audits and observatories on crime and social problems.

Unequal involvement of public authorities

While there is still some resistance, efforts to persuade public authorities in the criminal justice field to integrate prevention more clearly into their working methods, are showing signs of success. **Although the role of the police is not clearly defined, they continue to be perceived as the dominant actors in prevention**. In the past few decades, many reforms of policing services have had positive impacts on prevention, even if this has not been their primary purpose. It appears that police visibility and presence needs to be enhanced, as well as their problem-solving activities, but their precise role in prevention remains somewhat vague. In addition, working with multiple prevention practitioners and partnerships can be difficult to harmonise with the operational goals of police services.

The criminal justice system is less obviously concerned with prevention, even though its formal role is recognised. In many regions, there is a demand for local justice, to make it geographically and financially accessible, as well as intelligible in terms of its procedures and mechanisms. Local justice seems to favour community safety. Likewise, legal interventions tend to privilege **conflict management and dialogue between perpetrators and victims of crime.** Several forms of "*maison de justice*" have been developed in various parts of the world, and the restoration and use of traditional mediation and restorative justice processes is increasingly favoured.

"New" community support services

Public authorities, particularly at a local level, encounter many challenges in dealing with prevention and community safety. A number of innovative approaches have been developed which help to increase safety and a sense of security either through

supporting institutions traditionally assigned to this task (such as the police) or by providing additional social control and mediation services. A number of **innovative approaches** have been developed, such as Community Support Officers, Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers, "*correspondants de nuit*", fan stewards, Neighbourhood wardens, "*Gestores locales de seguridad*," and specialised social mediators.

All these initiatives aim to **improve services to the population** by being more available locally, increasing human presence in the evenings and at night, and promoting understanding and dialogue with authorities.

Local actors want to reinforce their role

The role of local authorities and community actors including the private sector is now more frequently recognised by international and national organisations than in the past. Yet, **actual progress in this area does not appear to live up to the stated goals**.

While local authorities are best placed to be able to identify the needs and potential of the local population, their legal status and financial resources are still largely limited. The participation and involvement of residents and community groups is still often restricted to more or less informal consultation, and is hindered by instability and a lack of sustainable resources. Finally, public sector commitments are often in conflict with the need to integrate non-economic partnerships.

Nevertheless, an **abundance of initiatives** can be seen at a local level, and their role is progressively being consolidated in both international and national work.

4. Conclusions

a) There is marked progress in international crime measurement and prevention standards and norms

International crime data is improving. Significant efforts have been undertaken in recent years to track the evolution of crime in terms of standardising, matching, and comparing data. Despite the absence of shared definitions for offences, the development of "international standards" helps to overcome some of the cultural and legal differences in measuring certain types of crime. However, the lack of reliable data is striking in some regions around the world, and does not enable a precise picture of the international situation to be drawn. At an international level and in each country, further development of new data collection and analysis tools is necessary.

Prevention benefits from a set of international standards and norms and recent normative and practical tools have helped their dissemination (eg. through guides, manuals, compendiums). An examination of prevention policies worldwide clearly suggests that these standards are being applied and are inspiring national prevention strategies. Political, economic, cultural, and social evolution, plus the transition of countries toward democracy, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, has led several governments to develop integrated prevention policies based on these principles, at least with regard to their goals.

An increasing number of **international exchange networks** now highlight innovative prevention policies and programmes from around the world. These various networks are dedicated to observing and analysing crime trends and prevention approaches, or developing evaluation methodologies. They are important platforms for the dissemination and adaptation of good strategies in terms of their **transferability between different contexts**.

b) The criminalisation of behaviours contrasts with international principles

The criminalisation of behaviours is observed in several areas and responds to a strictly criminal justice approach to community safety. There are increasing penalties for violence against women, and creation of specific offences intended to draw attention to the problem although there are some attempts to integrate gender more clearly into crime prevention strategies. In relation to children and youth, there has been an increasing tendency to label behaviour as "disruptive" or "antisocial" and little consideration tends to be given to the fact that only a small minority are involved in serious offending. Disciplinary problems at school can too easily be criminalised, while groups of youth are easily labelled as criminal gangs, and subject to severe sanctions. Finally, in public space, "incivilities" are more frequently considered regulatory and criminal, and subject to police action; yet increased regulations multiply the possibilities for breaking the law. Finally, marginalisation is increasingly treated as a "nuisance" that needs to be managed.

This development **contradicts international standards and norms** that favour a more social and educational approach to deviant behaviour and crime based on their causes, and which advocate more nuanced and diversified responses.

c) The development of integrated or "comprehensive" prevention approaches is based on concrete experience, but remains fragile

The development of integrated approaches to prevention appears limited, in part because such approaches entail a **method rather than a model**. Integrated prevention favours audits, partnerships, and a multidisciplinary analysis of crime. It cannot impose or prescribe a list of adoptable measures valid in all parts of the world. On the other hand, **prevention remains a fragile conceptual notion**: research findings are often contradictory and fragmented, national strategies are often a collection of ill-assorted measures, rather than a well articulated plan, and partnerships can be difficult to develop and sustain, bringing together very different actors with different agendas and whose respective roles are not always well defined.

Yet, this approach has delivered **results in terms of improving community safety and reinforcing the capacities of local actors. It has mobilised communities and favoured collective development.** Supported by police services, urban development agencies, and numerous local actors and components of civil society, the cities of Chicago, Bogotá or Durban have all obtained very significant and successful results

from integrated prevention strategies.

For the future, integrated prevention can be implemented with **well developed and tested tools**. Partnerships can now draw on three decades of local prevention and safety council experience (such as local coalitions, local round tables). Safety audit tools are enhanced by victimisation surveys, observatories, and innovative participatory tools such as exploratory walks, and by technology such as geocoding. Evaluation approaches have diversified, and include more pragmatic action-research methods, and process evaluations.

d) Prevention is increasingly a condition for sustainable development

Crime prevention is essential to sustainable development, as is the prevention of problems linked to poverty, health, education, and urban development. In fact, **vibrant communities** are not possible without safety and social cohesion. This link was been acknowledged more recently by a number of international and donor organisations, and crime prevention is now seen as an integral part of human security.

It is now recognised that crime prevention involves not only the search for a permanent balance between approaches and actions privileged at different government levels, but also takes account of the specific characteristics of each particular context.

This first edition presents a contrasting portrait of crime prevention in the world. We now have more knowledge and tools to develop integrated strategies for prevention. Some countries will use them, while others will continue to rely on tough criminal justice responses. However, a solid foundation has been established at an international level on which new policies can be built. Crime prevention has been the object of numerous innovations in terms of professional practices and citizen mobilisation at community level. Going far beyond a single response to crime, these approaches also contribute to strengthening the rule of law and democratic processes, and promoting human rights, and in so doing place prevention at the heart of issues of governance and development.

C.-Berta Kimmich

Intercultural youth Exchanges: opportunities for young people to prevent and de-learn violence and experience rays of hope

Good morning ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues,

As we are used to a bit more interactive and playful methods may I invite you to join in for a little energizer…

Before I am going to tell you about International Youth Exchanges, please allow me to read a comment

On violence
The headlong stream is termed violent
But the river bed
hemming it in
is termed violent by no one

Bertolt Brecht

I am happy to share a handful of thoughts with you. My contribution has 5 parts:

1. Our young people know violence
2. Prevention comes late anyway …
3. Anti-violence is not enough
4. International Youth exchanges could be a viable access
5. Recommendations and outlook

1. Our young people know violence

Our (and I mean this not in a *possessive* but *related* way) – our young people know violence. Their *violent riverbeds* are Tavola Tonda in Palermo, an orphanage in Bucharest, on the North West of Medellín, Chelas in Lisbon, Recife, La Trinidad in Màlaga, (West-)Belfast, Hamburg St. Pauli, Ein el Hilweh in Saida, Kopcany in Bratislava, … in areas, *bairros, Vierteln*, camps, which are known as socially, culturally, politically and economically deprived communities... areas, where *one* is not supposed to live.

And most of them – if not all – are familiar with what the experts call *structural, personal, domestic* and *street violence*. They might not know these expressions, but they know how violence sounds, how it feels, how it hurts, how it looks. Living on the wrong side of the peace walls or in the streets, being refugee, Roma, black, looking Arabic, infected with HIV, … they know violence not just from the TV, they know community fights, stabbings, shootings, police harassment, they know how *social ex-*

clusion hurts in many and varied ways. They know violence, because they have been and are *victims, witnesses* [1] AND often *perpetrators* themselves.

Tiago, a 17 year old black boy – his family from Angola - living in Chelas in Lisbon told Diogo, who was wearing dental braces: "You would not keep them long at our school – they rob anything, even your aparelhos – your braces!" (The Flamenga community school is not the only one which needs police to guard the school.)

Considering your and our collective knowledge about youth violence here in this room, I'll skip the theories about the reasons, ways of appearance of violence and manifestations of risks young people are confronted with.

2. Prevention comes late anyway…

So facing their background, you will not be surprised, when I say: we cannot *pre*-vent violence in the sense of *pre-venire* – coming before. In the lives of our young people violence always came first!

We don't really want to have our work labelled as *prevention work* – just as we don't want our young people to be stigmatised as potential violent criminals. Neither peace nor violence comes automatically!

Don't worry, this is not yet the end of my paper. I suppose I have been invited because somebody here remembers that we do something about youth violence – whether we call it *pre*-vention, or rather running *after* it, trying to catch, to confine, to protect, to soothe, to resolve, to transform … being well aware that we all have reasons to be modest, facing the enormous dimension of violence and the little we can do.

3. Anti-violence is not enough

Before I share what we can do, I have to make another limiting remark: The enormous impact of war, conflict, and violence on the lives of young people can not be met by enormous campaigns, strategies, and methods of intervention.

I suppose you can guess looking at my grey hair, that I got a touch of the famous seventies, which means that we – my colleagues and I – as young practitioners felt a mission to be *anti*-fascist, *anti*-racist, *anti*-war in our work with young people. The shock of being confronted with kids who showed nasty, brutal, inhuman, behaviour was profound and left us confused, feeling disillusioned and helpless. After all the young people did not seem to understand, let alone appreciate that we wanted to help them!

[1] 39 of 60 young participants in our last International Youth Exchanges stated in our little questionnaire on their social situation that they or someone close to them had experienced domestic violence, and 28 they had had trouble with the police

I will not bore you with details of the quite painful process following this. It took a while until we learnt, that whatever we wanted to do, however we wanted to "educate" these "difficult" young people: Introducing *non-violence* to them, could *not* be taught and passed on the same way, as violence had been taught to them.

Erich Fried, an Austrian poet who had to flee the Nazis to Britain wrote:

A fascist who is a fascist is just a fascist,
but an anti-fascist who is just an anti-fascist
is NOT an anti-fascist.

It was with this daring insight that we were looking for what could be beyond this *anti...* Knowing the theme of my contribution you will not be surprised what we found: International Youth exchanges could be a viable access…

4. International Youth exchanges could be a viable access…

My main work is on a playing field called *e.p.a.* – european play work association [2] –an International Non-Government Youth Organisation with a network of partners in about 40 countries.

In 1986 we started the first multilateral International youth exchange, a pilot project supported by the newly founded Task Force for Human Resources of the EU in Brussels, followed by many of these involving just groups from Europe. 7 years later we *celebrated* (as you say in Spanish) the first Euro-South-American youth exchange with young people from street kids projects and *barrios populares* and in between the first European cleaning women's exchange with some of the mothers of the young people. Since then many of these *encounters* have taken place involving in the meantime some thousand young people and their communities.

Some of you might frown - so what? Haven't the Scouts, the Socialist and Christian Students organised International exchange programmes all through the last century? Yes they did, but hardly ever reached or invited young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. [3]

How can / do International youth exchanges work?

Given the fact that more than 60 young people come together during these youth exchanges from many different countries, one, two or three continents, from difficult violent backgrounds, broken families with enormous experience of being disrespected,

[2] www.go-epa.org

[3] There has been some research done on the long term effects of the participation in International youth exchanges, for instance by Thomas/Chang/Abt published under the title „Experiences that change!". But the young people participating were 96% pupils from grammar schools. With our exchanges these figures are the opposite. (Thomas/Chang/Abt, Erlebnisse die verändern, Langzeitwirkungen der Teilnahme an Internationalen Jugendbgegenungen, Göttingen 2007)

excluded, maltreated, abused ... the potential for insurmountable tensions and violent conflicts is enormous. And we did indeed experience youth violence as a challenge to our International cooperation!

Let Barbaba from Belfast tell you how International Youth exchanges work. She wrote to the EU:

> "I want you to know that these exchanges are very important to me and all my friends from Belfast, because during the wee time we are together I feel so much love and safe from all the violence… I have lived in a world of violence for all my life and it was only when I was on these exchanges I realised that there could be a world without violence and exclusion and that is the kind of life I would like to wish for… that is only for two or three weeks, but I know we all have to start somewhere" (1999)

In many places where young people are suffering from violence and become violent themselves there are people taking initiatives: often local mothers, active citizens (sometimes even priests) and in Northern Europe sometimes paid and trained professionals, crazy enough to work so that violence may not become total.

International youth exchanges offer opportunities for *groups* of young people – aged 13 to 25 from such initiatives and partners in 4-12 different countries to meet and learn about each other's cultures. The groups plan together their programme, activities and workshops around a theme of mutual interest. The actual meeting – for two to three weeks – is a highlight in a year-long process of preparing, organising, looking forward, celebrating, evaluating and valorising. The Young people are actively involved on an individual, group and community level.

The e.p.a. *tool box of intervention* contains an array of methods for intercultural and non formal learning: learning with "discrepancies", using contrasts and methods of de-learning, tools to encourage intercultural understanding, the full participation of young people and to create the conditions for their empowerment. There is the e.p.a. *hug game* with lots of varieties of embraces under the motto: *Hugs my favourite drugs*. Or the e.p.a. Sexopoly: a game to reflect and discuss friendship, love and sexuality. One of the basic tools is *dialectics,* for example the concept of *all different – all equal*, a campaign launched by the Council of Europe, Strasbourg. This is based on equality, justice on the one side, diversity and tolerance on the other. And they only work together!

Intercultural youth exchanges developed by e.p.a. over the past twenty years are creative and caring especially for the needs of young people from deprived areas.

The five Ps

Following the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, intercultural youth exchanges offer the 5 P*s*. **P**rotection, **P**rovision and **P**articipation – the three basic ones – as well as **P**lay and **P**erspectives. You'll probably be familiar with the first three basic P*s*. Let me just add some little remarks…

About **Protection**: People like us here (who have the privilege to travel round the world) will hardly be able to understand what it means for young people to *get the hell out* – out of Medellín, Palermo, Câmara de Lobos … and to feel in a safe place. Protection against immediate violence, which usually forces the young people to defend, re-act, hide or counter attack is probably a precondition to be able to re-flect on what violence does to them and others.

Between protection and provision a little story of Helder (a 15 year old boy from Lisbon and before Angola). After the last International youth exchange in Lisbon, three of the six groups had left already, the two from Málaga and Palermo were at the airport about to leave and there were lots of hugs, smiles and tears. The security people asked what was going on and it was Helder who informed them: "Temos saudade, foi um encontro da paz!" ("We feel sad, it was an exchange of peace!")

Provision: means a bed for each of them – and I am talking about Europe! A breakfast and two warm meals a day are unknown for many of the young people. An International youth exchange provides also a temporary experience of justice and equality, including pocket money. No one is excluded because of lack of financial resources.

Talking about provision: we care for a special *social climate*. I started my studies with a then very famous book that promoted professionalism in the social science of education: "Love is not enough" by Bruno Bettelheim.

If I read the *strategy papers* about *policies for social inclusion* I get the impression the professionals in youth work get closer to military interventions than to the needs and dreams of young people at risk. Is it time now to write a second volume: Professionalism is not enough!?

Anyway I did not mean to talk about others. e.p.a. works according the motto: *All young people need love, especially those who do not deserve it!*

Young people, who through their own experience of violence have become violent, are not usually nice to be with. And they are *street wise* – they have knowledge to defend and attack, understand more of human behaviour than we like to think. They have seen through me and my motives in no time.

And yet, as they often feel lonely and unloved, they need to hide their feelings behind a rough exterior. Maybe it is only our knowledge, empathy and the wish that these

young people may experience *a wee bit of justice* as one of the Belfast young people put it … to provide a second chance… a chance to be heard, to be translated, to be understood! With young people who have suffered violence, are violent or pretty close to becoming violent, our professionalism needs to come in a professional spirit of love – or we may as well forget about it.

Participation: a big word and so much used, that we sometimes forget what it can mean to young people. During our youth exchanges this is not a method, but a pre-condition and a basic right. Whether the young people are hosts or guests – they are involved in the preparation of the programme. They are *protagonistas* – a word used in South America may be translated as "they have the say". To have a say means also: space for expressions, their voices to be heard – not just in discussions, but performing their raps. We had mind blowing sessions with raps, with sharp words criticising politics combined with hip hop from Skopje, Palermo and Medellín. The young people themselves decide on the topic of their workshops and they run the workshops. By the way: the motto of our last exchange in Portugal was "Chances 4 tod@s e ser feliz" ("Opportunities for all and to be happy"). Within this motto three groups had chosen violence for their workshop (bullying at school, in the streets and hassle by the police).

Play: Olga, a Russian colleague once gave us the shortest evaluation we ever heard: She concluded: *Play works!* But how and why?

May I ask – maybe three volunteers – to open the wooden puzzle without violence as a little test? … It's an idea to invite young people playfully to try other ways than force and to start a reflection.

Play works in many ways. Play encourages people to come to different conclusions by *playing around* – trying something unusual and experiencing *swing* to change. One of my favourite German words is *Spielraum* (not to be translated as elbow room!) which means literally a room to play, and in the philosophical sense: space for options, playing with contradictions. The way we play during the youth exchanges is *non competitive*, has nothing to do with gambling (this is for the translation into German), but means creativity, fun, social interaction and provokes many smiles. Play means trying to communicate in surprising ways and discovering a different understanding, as Andy from Bratislava said: "to me the youth exchange helped, because it gives me the opportunity to feel how others feel!"

We know from research that play can have a healing effect for children who have suffered war, conflict and violence. When we play with young people and they play with local children during play activities, these caring, soothing and healing effects also take place. They are obvious in the smiles and often reflected in a different body language. "Play is part of the social fabric of a community and involves a dynamic

learning and developmental exchange between the child and the world they inhabit. In a very real sense, play can return to the children of conflict their lost childhoods." [4]

And once they have arrived there, the youth exchange can work like starting *a leap frog* – jumping over the normal barriers in their own behaviour and giving the swing to look for options to live their lives differently.

The 5th P stands for **Perspectives:** On the little evaluation questionnaire which we ask the young people to fill in after the exchange Valerio from Palermo answered the question "What did you learn?": "Usare la mia testa!" ("I learnt to use my head!")

Would you like to know why we have chosen *P* for Perspectives and not *social inclusion*? Yes of course it wouldn't rhyme… We strongly believe that young people who have suffered the violence of social exclusion do not need *in*-clusion, closing … But opening, opening access, opening windows and doors, … and need to be encouraged to use other means of communication than fists and feet in boots, need conditions for self awareness and confidence – or in the words of Rosa from Recife: "Os encontros dão ao joven … a certeza de que não se deve baixar a cabeça…" ("Exchanges give young people … the certainty that they do not have to bow their head…"). And indeed, might I add: but to look up and beyond!

Looking beyond: The comments by young people themselves often reflect the amazing impact these Intercultural youth exchanges have on their lives. They come from areas where the streets are often "cul-de-sacs" (easier to control by police or paramilitary), they feel like their backs are against the wall and then they experience new outlooks. They have often used the words: *Cambio de via – junctions*, where they discovered there was more than one option, where they found ways out of the vicious circles of violence, where they felt encouraged to cope with problems in non-violent ways, changing themselves, as well as their communities and where they found reasons to enjoy their lives. Young people find it has been an experience that has changed their lives and *they did it themselves!*

5. Recommendations and outlook

For politicians: European and International politics should be persuaded to offer more reliable accessible funding for these youth exchange projects. They should not just be used as accompanying intercultural measures by multinationals. They have proven both to have sustainable effects in not just preventing and dealing with youth violence, but also promoting active citizenship.

Towards researchers: May be someone would like to study the long term effects and accompany our International youth exchanges?

[4] Hyder, Tina (2005): War, Conflict and Play, London, p. 101

Towards professionals – my colleagues here: Meticulous preparation, long years of cooperation, encouragement to participate, a carefully planned thrilling programme, enough space for spontaneity, a wide range of playful methods… all can contribute to a successful youth exchange. Nevertheless whatever moves in the brains and hearts of the young people, their group behaviour and their courage to get involved for their rights cannot be *produced* … it will always be a miracle, a real miracle!

What to do to make such miracles become reality? I have translated a famous phrase by Saint-Exupéry for our theme:

"If you want young people to become interested in non violent action and prevent violence, don't drum them up to train and to coach them, don't assign them tasks and projects. But rather make it possible for them to do a "leap frog" - meet with other young people from other countries. These experiences can wake and nourish their wish "a ser feliz" – to be happy – and their longings for justice, peace and dignity."

Thank you for your attention.

e.p.a • C.-Berta Kimmich • 03.06.2008

Roland Ziss

Community participation in violence prevention – some examples from Latin America and South Africa

Violence prevention – a new area of development cooperation

Violence prevention is a relatively new area of development cooperation. Based on the principle of sustainable development, all development cooperation must ultimately help reduce poverty in a broad multidimensional sense. In 2001, donor and developing countries adopted the Millennium Development Goals to be the basis of development cooperation. The three main focus areas of German development cooperation are: securing peace, combating poverty and shaping globalisation. Violence prevention is key to all these three areas.

According to the definition of the WHO, violence prevention means "to stop acts of interpersonal violence from occurring by intervening to eliminate or reduce the underlying risk factors and shore up protective factors, or to reduce the recurrence of further violence and its ill-effects."[1]

I would like to present experiences from violence prevention projects in three countries, all carried out in cooperation with the German government through KfW:

- Colombia – Proyecto SUR con Bogotá, an urban upgrading project by the Municipality of Bogotá;[2]
- El Salvador – Los Manantiales, a settlement upgrading project by the NGO FUNDASAL;[3]
- South Africa – violence prevention through urban upgrading.

For the presentation of the work experiences in the three countries, first the context and situation of violence which originated the project will be briefly explained. Then the violence prevention measures will be set out, with special consideration given to community involvement. The results and impact achieved will be reported. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn about lessons learnt from the various experiences, especially with regard to a realistic approach to community participation as a *conditio sine qua non* of violence prevention, the limits of community policing, the importance of focusing on working with children and young people, and the role of the state.

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[1] WHO (2004): Handbook for the Documentation of Interpersonal Violence Prevention Programmes, Geneva, S 7

[2] I would like thank Michael Kleinekathöfer, resident adviser, for providing the information on the project.

[3] Thanks to Joanna Kotowski, social development expert of the consulting team, for preparing the information on the project.

Development cooperation in violence prevention is not a one-way street. It is one of those areas where by necessity some developing countries have produced exciting innovations and accumulated more experience than many developed countries. Researchers and practitioners in developed countries are invited to take a careful look at these innovations; they may get insights they never expected.

1. Colombia - violence prevention through urban upgrading in Bogotá

Manifestations of violence in Bogotá

Colombia has a long history of different types of political, economic and social violence which are interrelated and often reinforce each other. Former guerrilla groups which turned into the hard core of a kidnapping industry, paramilitary groups which commit massacres of social cleansing, and the never-ending settling of accounts between drug dealers are just the tip of the iceberg of the manifestations of violence.

The state is part of and, according to some violentologists[4], the single most important contributor to the ubiquitous phenomenon of violence in Colombia. The government armed forces of police and military are responsible for grave and systematic violations of human rights and frequent cases of abusing public power. Since 2002, a hard line towards the insurgency and a number of harsh security measures have been adopted under the new President, Alvaro Uribe Velez. Illegal ties and cooperation between armed forces and paramilitary groups – the number of arbitrary arrests increased dramatically, with more than 1,200 killings and disappearances directly perpetrated by state agents and almost 1,000 illegal executions in the last five years - a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law, and the lack of political will to confront impunity, are just some examples of complicity and the active role played by the state in the production and perpetuation of violence.

Violence is spread throughout the entire country and is directly related to territorial control. There are vast areas given up by the government and under the control of armed groups. They offer employment to young people and often recruit youngsters forcefully. Many families therefore leave the villages and look for a more peaceful way of life in the informal settlements around the large cities.

Bogotá - with its 7 million inhabitants one of the biggest urban agglomerations in South America - is a focal point for the different types of violence in the country. Many families driven out of their villages by violence flock to the informal settlements, mainly in the southern parts of the capital where approximately a third of Bogotá's population lives. Usme and Ciudad Bolívar are considered the main border areas where both paramilitary and guerrilla groups try to control the influx of people.

[4] Violentology is a neologism developed in the nineties in Colombia, standing for a new scientific discipline around the understanding of violence; it is nurtured by contributions from various traditional disciplines incl. medicine, law, political sciences, sociology,ethnology, political economy, urban planning and some others.

In 2004, the overall murder rate in Bogotá was 24 victims per 100,000 inhabitants; however, in the southern parts of Bogotá it was approx. 50. Most of the killings occur during the night, at weekends, and under influence of alcohol. Both victims and perpetrators are predominantly young males aged between 15 and 25. The rate of family violence is alarmingly high: 22% of surveyed adults, mostly females, reported to have personally experienced violence within their families. People do not usually report crimes to the police, either because they fear reprisal or do not trust the police - one of the reasons why most of the crimes remain unpunished.

The visible acts of violence are often geographically associated with certain hot spots: dark areas with little public lighting, overgrown abandoned areas, neglected parks, undefined open areas and around congested bus stations. It is here where most assaults and drug dealing take place, where girls are raped, where street gangs fight for their territories and most murder victims are found. The permanent exposure to high levels of violence and impunity create a "culture of violence", hamper the citizen's capacity for peaceful conflict resolution and generate an atmosphere of fear and insecurity among the people.

Integrated approach to violence prevention through urban upgrading

In the late nineties the Municipality of Bogotá realised the importance of upgrading informal settlements and requested German financial cooperation. *Proyecto SUR* was designed to improve the social fabric and the living conditions in the southern periphery of Bogotá. From the beginning there was a focus on involving the community and promoting joint decision-making among the main stakeholders involved: the local administration, the different departments of the Municipality, private sector companies and the communities.

From 2001 – 2006 Proyecto SUR was successfully implemented as an integrated urban upgrading project in 41 settlements with a total population of approx. 100,000. Total project costs were approx. US$ 50 million, of which 15% was co-financed by German financial cooperation through KfW. The bulk of the costs were financed by the Municipality of Bogotá; major shares were covered by the private sector, mainly through the Chamber of Commerce, and the community. The investments were concentrated in the areas of infrastructure and community facilities, mainly roads and schools, but also in community development and violence prevention activities.

Originally there was no special focus on violence prevention. Only when the individual projects were planned and the community leaders were directly involved in the planning process, did their concern about violence and the lack of safety become apparent. In the basic needs survey and the participatory problem analysis, the residents identified violence, crime and their feeling of insecurity as their major problem; they appealed for suitable strategies of environmental upgrading to reduce the opportunity for crime and for conflict mediation training as their top priorities. Simultaneously

with the design of the construction projects, special projects were designed to improve the community's capacity for handling conflicts, including the following:

- A community safety observation centre, community conflict resolution and reconciliation centres, and special units for training peaceful conflict management in schools in association with the Chamber of Commerce;
- A 'healthy and safer schools' programme, plus adult education about good behaviour in association with the Health Department;
- Development of mechanisms for reporting cases of domestic violence in association with the police and other public institutions;
- Conflict mediation and reconciliation centres, conflict management training, community conflict assessment, training of school and community conflict mediators and family violence centres in association with the Public Security Department and the Chamber of Commerce;
- Redesign and improvement of public spaces, with community participation, as neighbourhood meeting points and locations for sport and leisure activities;
- Programmes for specific vulnerable groups incl. young people, boys, girls and women: e.g. ecological and youth projects in association with the Social Development Department, working with young people at high risk and with violent behaviour, enhancing the protection of vulnerable groups and the care of victims;
- Promotion of social networks between neighbourhood organisations and training of community leaders in conflict management techniques;
- Physical upgrading of hot spots and organising community activities to transform hotspots into lively and peaceful meeting places;
- Improvement of public services like water, sewerage, transportation and schools, and of markets;
- Promotion of income-generating activities;
- Strengthening the capacities and competencies of representative community structures,
- Creation of a social development fund to enhance the decision-making power of community organisations and their project management capacities;Food distribution programme for children and the very poor, directly organised by the Project Management Unit of the Municipal Housing Bank, the project coordinating agency;
- The Football for Peace Project, an initiative of peace education and conflict management, involving more than 2,000 boys and girls and leading to the revival and appropriation of unused or misused public space, usually after physical improvement.

Results and impact achieved

- The social relationships between the community and its leaders were strengthened. They now cooperate better and have created special networks to increase their negotiation power with public authorities.
- Incidences of the killing of political leaders have drastically dropped. Political leaders now usually resolve their conflicts peacefully. Many of them have become proud of their neighbourhood and want to stay there; previously most leaders considered their involvement as a step on the career ladder and would usually move to a more affluent neighbourhood when they had the opportunity to do so.
- More than 6,000 young people and adults were trained in conflict mediation, both in schools and in the neighbourhoods. In the schools they help solve conflicts between pupils and between their classmates and teachers. In the neighbourhoods their advice is appreciated when there is a conflict between neighbours. Various mediation and reconciliation centres are run by different governmental and non-governmental organisations.
- More citizens participate in public affairs than before. They go to community meetings, contribute to the planning of public projects and follow up their implementation. Coordination mechanisms have been established to improve the communication and cooperation between communities and public entities.
- 43 community projects were implemented focusing on empowerment, health and nutrition, employment and environmental protection. They were all based on community initiative and financed with funds from the project's small Social Development Fund. With a total investment of approx. US$ 300,000 they reached more than 8,000 beneficiaries and contributed significantly to improving the management capacity of community organisations.
- People appreciate the improved provision of public services and infrastructure in their neighbourhoods. While previously many of them felt abandoned and marginalised, they now have a stronger sense of citizenship, of belonging to the city of Bogotá. Many of them have improved their employment situation and their income.
- An overall slight reduction in crime and incidences of violence has been observed; in some areas more than in others. Even more important is the change in perception: whereas before most people felt unsafe, now they feel safer and have a better opinion of public institutions.

After completion of this project, the wider scale *Programa Sur de Convivencia* was prepared for implementation from 2008 – 2011, covering an area housing more than 500,000 people. The explicit goal is to reduce violence and to develop both community and local government conflict management structures. The work is organised in four components:

- Conflict mediation and management and working with young people;
- Improvement and better social control of public space;
- Reduction of family violence and
- Inter-institutional cooperation and joint impact assessment.

To facilitate the last component, a special impact monitoring system has been introduced. The point of departure is the logical planning framework of the Programme. The objectives and expected result have been translated into the following 7 impacts: reduction in violence, change of attitudes towards managing conflicts, peaceful use of public space and community facilities, integration of young people into community life, greater awareness about domestic violence, more income opportunities and assistance to vulnerable groups, recognition of local government action, and increased government authority. These impacts are specified by 21 indicators and 66 quantitative variables, most of which are provided by the cooperating institutions. It is expected that by contributing regularly to the system and by jointly analysing the impacts, the participating institutions will better coordinate their activities and the interventions will become more and more cohesive over time.

2. El Salvador - settlement upgrading with a violence prevention focus in San Salvador

Manifestations of violence in El Salvador

El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in Latin America. The Salvadorian homicide rate is among the highest in the world; in 2006, a total of 4,000 people were murdered, i.e. 69 victims per 100,000 inhabitants.



In the 14 years between the 1992 peace treaty and 2006, more than 60,000 people were killed, only slightly fewer than the 75,000 victims of the 12-year civil war from 1980 to 1992. After a decline during the nineties, the homicide rate has been steadily increasing since 2002.



Violence has a long tradition in this Central American country. High murder rates were reported back in the sixties and seventies, mainly caused by authoritarian regimes and social inequalities. Nowadays, social inequalities continue; 40% of Salvadorian families subsist in conditions of poverty. Since the mid nineties, the type of violence has been changing; violence rates are often directly related to the upcoming youth gangs. In those days young people with criminal records had been deported from the United States, many of them members of one of the two big gangs: *Mara Salvatrucha (MS or MS 13)* and *Mara Dieciocho (M 18)*.

Local organisations estimate the current number of gang members in El Salvador at 15,000, around 1% of the population aged between 15 and 24. They practice their own rites, invent their own codes of conduct and are involved in delinquent or criminal activities. Some have contacts with organised crime groups; the international links between *maras* in Central America, Mexico and the USA are increasing.

Although *mara* violence is highly present in Salvadorian life, above all in the media, they are responsible for only 8% - 10% of the homicides, according to forensic medical evidence; some police sources, however, attribute 80% of homicides to *mareros*. Exact data is lacking and only 4% of violent crime is resolved. Violence is concentrated in the poor urban areas of the country, particularly in the slums of the capital San Salvador and of the surrounding municipalities.

Salvador suffers from youth violence: the majority of both crime victims and perpetrators are young men aged between 15 and 29, with one exception - the victims of domestic violence are mainly girls and young women between 5 and 19. Youth violence has many causes, mostly related to *machismo* and the traditionally high levels of violence in the family, the community and society in general. Public institutions in

charge of crime and violence are weak; the state has limited powers to enforce law and justice effectively. Police response is usually characterised by simple repression, thus fuelling the vicious circle of violence. By taking over a substantial part of police jobs, private security companies erode the authority and contribute to legal uncertainty.

Integrated approach to violence prevention through urban upgrading

In the capital of San Salvador, youth gang violence is concentrated in the poor communities, particularly in the eastern parts of the urban agglomeration. The local NGO FUNDASAL (*Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima*) has been supporting community development activities there since the mid nineties and implemented the upgrading project *Los Manantiales* between 2003 and 2006. The project contributed to the improvement of infrastructure, services and public space (water and sewage pipes, public lighting and private electricity connections, road paving, waste disposal, credits for housing improvement) and simultaneously helped build up a democratic community organisation, encouraging particularly women and young people to strive for better economic and social options.

Total project costs were approx. US$ 6 million, of which US$ 4.24 million was funded through German financial cooperation (70%). The other sources of finance were FUNDASAL (10%), the Municipality (5%), the water supply company ANDA (6%), the electric power supply company CAESS (1%), and the beneficiaries themselves through sweat equity and other contributions in kind (7%).

The upgrading area accommodates around 1,500 households, a total of 7,500 people. So the costs amount to US$800 per person or US$4,000 per household. If the surrounding communities which also participated in the social measures are taken into account, the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries almost doubles. More than half of the population is below 25 years of age. There are five people per family on average, but many households have ten or more members. More than half of the households are headed by women.

The two *maras* controlled specific sectors and subdivided the community into very conflict-ridden and less conflict-ridden parts. According to local people, they mainly fought amongst themselves and did not necessarily threaten their neighbours. But uninvolved bystanders often became victims of these fights. Young people who would habitually hang around the streets were attracted by the *maras*. The project offered them options other than no future, delinquency and gangsterism.

FUNDASAL perceives urban upgrading merely as a social and empowerment process. Social workers work closely alongside the communities over a number of years, gain confidence, identify the project together with the beneficiaries, inform them about their new responsibilities and prepare them to contribute their manpower to construction works. FUNDASAL's principle is helping people to help themselves.

The more complex construction works like river-bank reinforcement, retaining walls, or sewage or electricity ducts are the responsibility of specialised construction workers and firms. But trench excavation for water pipes, brick laying for manholes, footpath surfacing, and road paving are organised and carried out by construction brigades drawn from amongst the beneficiaries.

Working in the construction brigades is an essential educational part of urban upgrading. People learn how to structure the work, they feel more responsible for the project, and are able to carry out repairs and maintenance in future. The collective aspect of the work also contributes to dispute resolution and to stress relief. Many neighbours reported knowing each other better after working jointly in the construction brigade. Additionally, FUNDASAL offers assistance and conflict management training, not only to those who are already fighting, but to all interested community members.

Conflict management, organisational support and life skills training are the important elements of working with young people. FUNDASAL initiated this type of youth work in association with the District Municipality, aiming at better integration of young people into the community. The young people learn to identify and analyse their priority needs and to present suggestions to community representatives. They also participate in construction work, supervise younger children's school homework and are involved in local elections.

To summarise, the following activities were carried out to improve social cohesion and the community's capacity for handling conflicts, in addition to the physical improvement of infrastructure, services and housing:

- Organisation of 104 construction brigades and implementation of training and sensitisation workshops with the members of these brigades;
- Strengthening the capacities and competencies of representative community structures;
- Establishment of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms in the area of violence prevention;
- Physical upgrading of abandoned areas and garbage dumps converting them into meeting places, sports fields and playgrounds;
- Education (parent classes) in parental responsibility and behaviour (training courses), together with teachers and municipal social workers;
- Formation of youth leadership, starting from a small seed group;
- Support for young people in the self-assessment of youth-related needs and priorities, elaboration of risk maps together with them;
- Support for young people in their participation in youth camps (for poor and

middle class young people), where training was given in life skills, job skills, HIV/AIDS and violence prevention (in cooperation with GTZ and Scouts El Salvador);

- Organisation of school work groups with primary school children supervised by adolescents and young adults, partly from a middle-income secondary school outside;
- Promotion of income-generating activities, especially for women and young people;
- Creation of a social development fund to enhance the decision-making power of community organisations and their project management capacities;
- Creation of a fund for small-scale youth initiatives to enhance participation of young people in cultural and community activities;
- Assistance to youth and community leaders in formulation of preventive projects and in fund-raising;
- Organisation of food distribution for children, together with the municipal health department;
- Tidiness and cleanliness campaigns with children and young people;
- Participatory evaluation of results and first impacts with youth and community leaders.

Results and impacts achieved

The first impact evaluation was carried out together with members of the youth group and with community representatives. The following results have been achieved so far:

- All inhabitants now have access to safe drinking water compared with only 32% at the beginning of the project; all are connected to a sewage system and almost all to a rainwater drainage system; all have electricity.
- All public paths and streets have been paved with concrete or stones.
- Eight small community centres or meeting rooms were improved and equipped.
- Nineteen larger and smaller public areas were refurnished and converted into meeting points, playgrounds, sports fields or green spaces.
- Almost 100% of the beneficiaries participated in the construction brigades, of which 55% were women and 5% young people (up to 24 years of age).
- More than half of the interviewed families perceive that health conditions improved; there are fewer digestive and respiratory diseases.
- 84% of the interviewees think the project contributed to the improvement of educational levels.

- About half of the beneficiaries think that peaceful co-existence improved due to the project; 75% believe that there is more common identity among the community members and 70% confirm that social relations improved.
- With reference to the violence level, however, 49% of the interviewed families perceive it to be higher now than before; only 32% are convinced that it has been reduced. This apparently contradictory result might be explained by the generally higher violence level in San Salvador as a result of police repression; it could also be attributed to a stronger involvement of the community members in matters of violence: now they talk and know more about these issues, which they did not care about before.
- Social workers observe an increase in the participation of young people in community organisations and community-related activities; a second generation of youth organisations is emerging, many of them drawn from the previous participants in extra-curricular classes.
- People report less vandalism and more tidiness in the area.

3. South Africa - violence prevention through urban upgrading

Context and situation of violence in post-apartheid townships

Some 14 years after the apartheid regime was abolished, South Africa still suffers from severe manifestations of violence and crime. In former townships, annual homicide rates of 50 – 150 and 100 – 150 cases of rape[5] per 100,000 inhabitants are reported. Taxi organisations frequently fight violent turf wars when competing for the custom of commuters. There are numerous incidents of drive-by assassinations, with many innocent passengers and passers-by killed in the crossfire. In May 2008, a wave of violence motivated by xenophobia swept over the townships, leaving 62 people dead, several hundred injured and some 30,000 displaced. Violence has become part of daily life in many townships

There are many underlying structural causes for the high levels of township violence:

- ***Unemployment and economic hardship***. High expectations after the end of apartheid, fuelled by governmental promises, and a widening gap between the economically successful and those who have not managed to integrate themselves into the labour market and to define their place in society exacerbate their socio-economic situation, increasing the pressure and aggravating the feeling of uselessness.
- ***Emasculation***. Changing power relations between men and women conflict with traditional gender roles, in which men are dominant and women are expected to be subordinate. As young men perceive their inability to live up to that role, they

[5] Though the readiness of reporting rape has increased – a positive impact of post-apartheid policy on safety issues - there is still significant under-reporting of gender-based violence.

lose pride and self-respect. The arising frustrations are reinforced by poverty and unemployment.

- ***Traditions unable to cope with new challenges***. Through the challenges of development and modernisation, through changing gender roles and particularly through HIV/AIDS, traditional structures are collapsing and the number of vulnerable members of society increasing. Some traditions impact directly on violence, e.g. the belief that sex with a virgin is a remedy for HIV/AIDS.
- ***Inheritance of apartheid***. The decades spent living as second-class citizens have impacted on self-esteem and social behaviour. Despite all the efforts to dismantle the violent structures and impacts of the apartheid system, the realisation of personal interests by means of force and violence has become a part of the shared consciousness which parents pass on to their children through their behaviour.
- ***Reorientation after apartheid***. The police force of the apartheid regime used violence to stifle opposition and subjugate the masses. In its aftermath, the relationship between the community and the police was tense and strained for a long time. After the legalisation of the ANC and other political organisations in 1990, various political fractions wrestled for ascendancy and tried to stamp their authority on the areas, not least through politically-motivated murders.

In addition to these structural causes, there are risk-triggering factors such as drug and alcohol abuse which loosen human behavioural controls and deficient urban services that provide easy opportunities for crime and convey a general feeling of neglect.

Integrated approach to violence prevention through urban upgrading

Since 2005, the first German development cooperation programme with a clear focus on violence prevention through urban upgrading in South Africa has been undergoing implementation in Khayelitsha, the largest township of the City of Cape Town. Under this programme, three urban sub-centres are being built, small-scale neighbourhood-based projects are being supported by a social development fund, and various types of training are being organised around violence prevention, conflict management and related matters.

A second German development cooperation programme has been planned for implementation in Mdantsane, the largest township of Buffalo City situated between East London and King Williams Town. While most of the investments in the Khayelitsha programme are still concentrated on construction projects, the investments under the Mdantsane programme predominantly address direct violence prevention measures.

The overall goal of the proposed Mdantsane programme is to „improve the living conditions and thus reduce the causes of social conflict and violence in Mdantsane". The programme objective is to develop, test and establish community-based mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution. To achieve this goal, six components have been defined for addressing the different aspects of violence in different ways:

- The ***violence prevention in schools*** component aims to involve both teachers and pupils at around 50 of the 110 schools in Mdantsane in violence prevention activities.
- The ***gender-based violence prevention*** component will focus on domestic violence mitigation, the establishment of at least 3 safe houses for women and their children, the establishment of victim support centres and an emergency hotline and the development of a new role model for men.
- The ***community violence prevention*** component addresses the community as a whole. Awareness will be raised around issues of violence through information campaigns and workshops. A special project will work towards achieving an understanding of alcohol and drug abuse as triggers of violence. Selected community members will be trained in conflict mediation and special centres will be established to provide this service. This component will also mobilise efforts to develop community-based care facilities for the most vulnerable groups, including orphans and elderly people abandoned without the support of their families.
- The projects of the ***sports, culture and economic development*** component ("Soccer for Peace", "Boxing against Violence", martial arts and "Kwaito against Crime") will directly mobilise the young people. Through youth skills training, urban gardening, animal husbandry and business-creation counselling, productive self-employment in areas which tap into the specific potential of Mdantsane will be encouraged.
- The ***public space*** component is intended to improve public safety, e.g. through the installation of closed-circuit TV in daytime crime hotspots, the upgrading of streetlights and taxi facilities, young people's participation in foot patrols around night time hotspots (e.g. around *shebeens* - local pubs where home-brewed beer is served) and regular grass cutting to improve the safety of pedestrians using footpaths. Safety measures are also envisaged for children on their way to and from schools and for pensioners on their way home from pension payout points. One project will promote pride in and identification with various parts of Mdantsane by the development of unique landmarks and the provision of public signs to improve orientation and increase the tourism potential of the area.
- A ***community development fund*** will provide funding for community initiatives which contribute directly or indirectly to violence prevention.

Expected impact

- ***Social development***: The programme will have a strong impact on daily life and community cohesion in Mdantsane. It will strengthen neighbourhoods and help young people to identify with the area, so they will stay and continue developing what their parents have started. It will facilitate the transition from a rural to an urban lifestyle and sharpen the responsibilities of citizens. It will lead to new forms of community involvement in urban life. The more vulnerable members of the community, especially children, women and the aged, will be strengthened; they will also benefit most from direct violence prevention and the expected reduction in domestic violence.
- ***More safety and security***: The programme will strengthen business confidence. In places where crime and violence are related to the concentrated movement of goods and people, overcrowding and lack of orientation, and around taxi ranks, the programme will help channel the flow of these goods and people in order to facilitate self-sustaining control mechanisms. Where crime and violence are related to remote locations and lack of exposure, e.g. in dark corners and bushy areas, and around abandoned structures and *shebeens* at night, the programme will encourage better use and social control of public space.
- ***Local economic development***: The expected reduction in crime and violence will lead to an improved perception of Mdantsane as an area of potential business and will eventually attract direct investments. Business people will appreciate the quick and cost-efficient conflict mediation services. Urban gardening will help complement the income of the poorest. The programme will stimulate the local economy and create new business perspectives, especially for the production of products and services to meet local demand, such as fresh produce, gardening services, car repair and electrical appliances workshops, arts and crafts workshops, childcare and aftercare facilities, internet cafés, computer sales and maintenance facilities.
- ***Institutional development***: The programme will help improve the relationship between the Mdantsane inhabitants and the municipal administration. It will also improve relations with the police and make policing more effective. In fact, perhaps the most important impact will be to collectively harness prevention and enforcement for the improvement of living conditions in Mdantsane. By enhancing the community structures to control violence and providing community-based mechanisms of self-regulation, all public institutions are expected to benefit.
- ***Environment***: As the Mdantsane area becomes progressively more attractive, it will lead to higher residential densities. In the short term this may overstretch the capacity of existing infrastructure networks, especially of the sewers. However, in the long term higher densities are necessary and will provide a practical means of rationalising land use and allowing the sustainable operation and the maintenance of infrastructure networks.

4. Lessons learnt

The following lessons can be learnt from the various experiences of violence prevention in poor urban settlements of developing countries:

Violence prevention through urban upgrading

- Violence prevention through urban upgrading is an appropriate strategy where private investments are seriously hampered by the lack of public safety, repressive strategies are bound to fail and the community is actively involved. Upgrading the living conditions of the poor through a combination of physical and social improvements is a sophisticated strategy for showing local government's commitment to attracting private investments.
- As it is difficult and complex, urban upgrading is not a very easy area for local governments at the outset. Populist leaders tend to prefer new housing projects in which they can cut ribbons rather than upgrading existing settlements. While the introduction and improvement of infrastructure and services is challenging enough in comparison to new development, urban upgrading projects with a violence prevention focus are even more complex.
- Urban upgrading starts to become an interesting approach once urban growth rates show signs of decline. Then political leaders are ready to change their policies and to re-assign funds from developing open land to increasing the value of occupied land. Urban upgrading is a viable financial strategy if the share of public investments triggers a higher share of private investments and, in the end, increases public revenue through taxes and contributions.
- Violence prevention through urban upgrading implies the coordination and cooperation of various municipal departments. Coordination requires a very sensitive management effort and can only be accomplished effectively if the coordinating body maintains a modest profile, rejecting any kind of protagonist approach and referring success to the cooperating partners and the communities.
- While in most countries municipalities take the lead in urban upgrading, it is strategically important to have private organisations as project partners. They are often not only more reliable and better organised than local government departments, but their participation also has a disciplinary effect and makes local government departments work harder.
- The sustainability of the violence prevention through urban upgrading approach depends on active community involvement, institutional back-up, secure financing and political support. The continuity of municipal policies is a must. If violence prevention through urban upgrading is seen as a flagship programme of one particular local government, there is a considerable risk that the fluctuation of staff and changing priorities of the new mayor will jeopardise the sustainability of the approach.

Community participation

- Key to any violence prevention activities in poor urban neighbourhoods is the active participation of the communities in planning and implementation. Necessary community contributions include the identification of hot spots and of violence prevention measures, direct involvement in public safety and violence prevention activities and participation in monitoring sessions and review meetings. It is important that both men and women, as well as the different age groups within the community, and particularly the young people, are represented. Violence prevention measures require age-related and gender-specific design.
- The term community participation is often mythicised. It starts with the notion of community. Usually the settlements of the urban poor are places of conflict with different groups of opposing interests, and with little tradition of democratic decision-making. People are busily struggling to survive and often do not have time to attend meetings or to do community work. They can only be mobilised if they are really interested and the project produces clear benefits for them. It is therefore essential for community mobilisation to spell out the benefits of violence prevention in detail, not only in terms of an expected reduction in crime and violence, but also stressing short-term achievements and the steps to reach the medium-term goal.
- Community participation is easier to achieve when the roles of the project partners are clear and well understood from the very beginning. The community not only represents the target group and the prominent project partner, it is also the owner of the violence prevention project and responsible for its success. Government agencies and the police should support the community in the planning and implementation of its violence prevention project; instead of violence prevention *for* the community government agencies and police would be better advised to organise violence prevention *with* the community.

Community policing

- Community policing is a controversial concept. Where it works, unemployed young people can be mobilised to carry out unarmed foot patrols in hot spots at times when conflicts often turn into violence e.g. on Friday evenings or at weekends or after the local football match. In well-organised and relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods, citizens can increase security in close contact with the police by, for instance, intervening in cases of domestic violence and by reducing petty crime. In these cases, community policing is a manifestation of the civil courage to stand up for one's belief and for neighbours who need help.

- However, in many developing and rapidly industrialising countries with problems of governance, police forces often do not enjoy the confidence of the public and corruption is widespread. Then civic groups assuming police functions sooner or later succumb to the temptation of misusing the assumed power and may turn into vigilante groups, spreading fear and terror.
- The discussions around the concept of community policing help to illustrate the distribution of powers between civil society and the state. They show clearly what citizens expect from the state and under what conditions they respect the monopoly of state power. They also demonstrate what citizens are expected to do to ensure safety and security in their neighbourhoods and where the limits and interfaces of private and public responsibilities are.

Integrated approach to violence prevention

- Violence prevention is a cross-cutting issue of public policy. The promotion of violence prevention should never be allocated to one agency or sector; it should be the common concern of various sectors. It requires multi-agency cooperation and networking between different stakeholders.
- Transparency, credibility and accountability are essential for building up trust and constructive relationships between community and public stakeholders. If the state provides an appropriate framework, ensuring good governance, a reliable legal system and effective law enforcement, the community is usually committed to social control of the neighbourhood. Restoring the lost power monopoly of the state is a long and painful process, as the Colombian example shows, but the only way to sustainable peace development.
- Public investments in violence prevention are economically justified twofold: they help reduce private security expenses and they help attract or leverage private sector investments. Safety and security are among the least tangible and most sensitive elements which determine the investment climate; private companies appreciate these collective goods and public investments to deliver or ensure them.
- There is an unsolved discrepancy between comprehension of the necessity for violence prevention and willingness to finance the corresponding measures. Everybody knows that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but people are reluctant to pay for prevention, and would rather wait until they are obliged to pay for the consequences of no prevention. The governments of countries with emerging economies, as seen in the cases of Colombia and South Africa, seem to be particularly willing to overcome this reluctance and to adopt integrated approaches to violence prevention because they are convinced of the long-term economic and social benefits.

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Contributions from participants of the 2nd Annual International Forum

Gabriela de Freitas Barbosa

Social Capital and Community Participation: Experiences of crime prevention in informal settlements of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

This article is an attempt to identify some of the existing relations between the (in) existence of social capital and levels of community participation in crime prevention initiatives, with a focus on low income informal settlements. It draws mainly from a case study on the role of community participation in crime prevention, conducted in informal settlements of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Governance, Community Participation and Social Capital

Karl Marx, in his Communist Manifesto, proposed a governance system run by the people -where economic activities and governments were managed by local communities - as the appropriate tool to substitute the marketplace and the processes of production driven by capitalistic competition. Discussions about community participation in governance activities are not a recent phenomenon, as illustrated by the example above, although in recent years issues related to urban governance and, more specifically, good urban governance have been occupying a central place in the arena of the urban debate.

A widely discussed concept, governance can be defined as "*The exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences*" UNDP (1997). Systems of governance are present not only in a complex society but also in small communities, comprising all the processes through which collective affairs are managed. Governance activities are diffused through the multiplicity of existing social relations and may take many forms. Therefore, the way responsibilities are distributed between formally-recognised government agencies and other arenas of governance depends on specific geographic and historical contexts (Healey 1997).

UN-Habitat (2000), notes that *"Good urban governance is a situation where citizens are provided with the platform which will allow them to use their talents to the full to improve their social and economic conditions".* According to the UNESCAP (undated) good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. Therefore, good urban governance is not just about providing a range of local services, but also about preserving the life and

liberty of residents, creating space for democratic participation and civic dialogue and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents (Shah 2007). Among all the characteristics of good governance aforementioned, the three most relevant for urban violence and crime prevention are participation, consensus orientation and the rule of law.

Although the concept of social capital is not a new one and was already present in the ideas of Durkheim and Marx, the first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital was produced by Pierre Bourdieu, who defined the concept as *'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition'* (Bourdieu 1985, cited in Portes 1998). Another important definition of social capital comes from Coleman, who defined social capital according to its function as *'a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors - whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure'* (Coleman 1988, cited in Portes 1998). According to Portes (1998:6), *'social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures'*. Whilst economic capital is kept in people's bank accounts and human capital can be found inside their heads, social capital exists in the structure of their relationships.

Narayan (1997) defines social capital as *'the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social structures and society's institutional arrangements, that enables members to achieve their individual and community objectives'*. Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively. It is thus related to social networks, to levels of trust, civil engagement, levels of community participation and organisational membership (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). This definition presents the community - and not individuals, households, or the state - as the primary unit of analysis, but recognizes that individuals and households (as members of a given community) can, however, appropriate social capital, and that the way communities are structured depends largely on their relationship with the state. Weak or indifferent governments have an extremely different effect on community life and development than do governments which respect civil liberties, defend the rule of law and fight corruption. Social capital thus cannot exist in a political vacuum, and the nature and extent of the interactions between communities and institutions, are the key to understanding the possibilities for development in a given society.

There is a tendency of law enforcement in those communities where people are connected by dense networks of engagement and reciprocity, probably because residents tend to be also more confident that others will behave on the same way and do not want to be 'outsiders' in the system. Communities where a diverse stock of social networks and civic organisations can be found are better equipped to confront poverty

and vulnerability, solve conflicts and benefit from new opportunities, and present less economic and civic inequality (Putnam undated). Conversely, the lack of social ties can have an adverse impact. One of the defining features of poverty is the exclusion of certain social networks that could be used to create bridging social capital. When managing risk and vulnerability, social networks are one of the primary resources the poor possess.

Social capital has different dimensions and communities can have more or less access to these dimensions. Poor communities normally present a high level of 'bonding' social capital, which can be used by residents to cope with difficult situations. However, the same communities often lack the more diffuse and extensive "bridging" social capital used by the non-poor to succeed in life. Bonding capital refers to the necessary social support and cohesion within a community that provides the basis for an individual or group to be able to access other resources, known as bridging capital (Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

Social capital is not acquired and does not benefit directly those who abide by laws and regulations or trust their fellows. Social capital is not *what* you know, but *who* you know (ibid). Strengthening social networks, especially in poor communities can help to establish social control which in turn may have an influence in the results of development initiatives that can increase incomes and self-esteem, contributing to reduce the causes of crime and violence. Within communities with high levels of social capital, trust tends to exist because obligations are enforceable, not through recourse to law or violence but through the power of the community. Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative (Putnam 1993). One of the most positive aspects of social capital, when created by tight community networks, is the maintenance of discipline and promotion of compliance among those under the charge of local authorities and institutions. The main result is that formal or overt controls are made unnecessary (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). According to a World Bank study on urban poverty, crime and violence are most prevalent in areas of rapidly increasing population density, and weak or non-existent social and civic networks, such as the periphery of large cities and metropolitan regions (World Bank 2002).

In some cases, social capital is also equated with the quality of a society's political, legal, and economic institutions. Studies show that items such as "generalized trust," "rule of law," "civil liberties," and "bureaucratic quality" are positively associated with economic growth. The so-called 'macro-level social capital' (Grootaert 1998) refers to the social and political environment that enables norms to develop and shapes social structure. In addition to largely informal, local, horizontal and hierarchical relationships, it includes the more formalized institutional relationships and structures, such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties. The importance of macro-level social capital is illustrated dra-

matically in some of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The sudden disappearance of government from many social and economic functions has led to a collapse of trust and forced people to rely on local networks and informal associations (Grootaert 1998).

Social capital has three basic functions, applicable in a variety of contexts: (a) as a source of social control; (b) as a source of family support; (c) as a source of benefits through extra-familial networks (Portes 1998). If, as Robert Putnam (1993) defines, social capital are *'those features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions'*, it becomes clear that community participation is intrinsically linked to the existence of social capital. Therefore, participatory or collaborative planning is not possible, or at least will not produce the best results, where there is lack of social capital. If social capital relates also to rules and regulations of the market place, political institutions and civil society, the trust (or lack of it) in the existing institutions, e.g. the police and local governments can have a direct influence in the existing social capital.

Moser and Shrader (1998) argue that violence can erode social capital in several ways, e.g. it prevents communities from meeting locally and prevents individuals (especially those belonging to vulnerable groups) from going to work and therefore extending their social network. Contrary, crime is strongly negatively impacted by social capital. This is true at the state, community and neighbourhood levels. According to Lederman et al. (2002), there are two basic arguments related to how social capital can reduce the incidence of violent crimes. Firstly, social capital decreases the costs of social transactions, allowing for peaceful resolution of conflicts, both interpersonal and societal. Secondly, communities with stronger ties among its members are better equipped to organize themselves to overcome the problems of collective action, reducing the possibilities for individual opportunistic behaviour, thus diminishing the potential for social conflict. Civic engagement and social trust are thus expected to reduce crime, since they increase formal and informal social control, and strengthen the effectiveness of social norms (Rosenfeld et al. 2001, cited in Buonanno et al. 2006).

While originally the concept of social capital was limited to associations having positive effects on development, recently it has been relaxed to include groups that may have undesirable outcomes as well, such as associations with rent-seeking behaviour (for example, the Mafia in southern Italy) and even militia. The key feature of social capital in this definition is that it facilitates coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of the members of the association (Putnam 1993, cited in Grootaert 1998). Social capital has a beneficial impact in crime reduction when the relationships that form social capital involve all society members. Interestingly, social capital can induce more crime and violence when it is concentrated in particular groups, such as gangs, ethnic clans, and closed neighbourhoods, and is not disseminated throughout society. While society-wide social capital reduces crime and violence, group-specific social capital may promote them (Lederman et al. 2002).

There is consensus that social capital within a community can be examined using several indicators. These include the number of members actively involved in matters of common interest; the intensity or extent of networks and social interactions; the trust that members have in acting as a collective entity and the impacts of social capital in form of mutual agreements and collective activities. Poor communities are more likely to opt for and rely on social capital because they have lower opportunity costs of time and lower stock of financial and physical capital than the affluent (van Bastelaer and Grootaert 2002, cited in Kombe and Kreibich 2006).

Communities are usually defined as groups of people who share a geographical territory or place, as well as an overall culture and institutions. This may include remote or rural indigenous communities, wealthy suburban estates, gated communities, poorer inner-city housing estates, informal settlements and slums (ICPC 2006), and therefore the term community has social and spatial dimensions, as pointed by Hamdi (1997). The concept of a community is based on the belief that a group of people will normally have advantage over a single individual in getting his or her voice heard, especially in the case of poor citizens and communities. A community can also be seen as an entity which derives its mandate and power from collective interests of inhabitants and from roles assigned to it by government organs. It operates according to social relations and interactions and by norms, collective values and functions which it discharges. Furthermore, the connection a community has or can forge with external institutions or actors (bridging capital) is fundamental in activating and mobilising support (Kombe and Kreibich 2006).

Hamdi (1997) defines community participation as a powerful idea which *"refers to the process by which professionals, families, community groups, government officials, and others get together to work something out, preferably in a formal or informal partnership"*. The advocates of community participation believe that it brings many lasting benefits to people instead of only a means of getting things done. Participation can either represent assigning certain decisive roles to the users, where decision-making responsibilities are shared among community members and the traditional power holders, or a process where only the opinion of the user may be considered while making decisions. This is the critical difference between what Arnstein (1969) calls *"the empty ritual of participation"* and what she defines as *"the real power needed to effect the outcome of the process"*.

Contacts among community members are crucial as they promote shared values, increase mutual awareness of common needs and resources, encourage reciprocal assistance and facilitate delivery of assistance. The formation of social networks is time consuming and demands willingness from the part of community members to first recognise and be aware of issues of common concern. Only after that they can contribute with their individual ideas and potentials together and act as a group. This sequence has to be followed if norms and regulations created and action taken by a

community are to reflect shared concerns and decisions (Kombe and Kreibich 2006).

Community participation is a potential generator of social capital, which in turn can largely contribute to the creation of common trust and to law enforcement, therefore potentially reducing urban violence and crime. It is the functioning of an organised community, the nurturing of networks formed, the respect of norms and values and the trust community members have for one another that constitute the social capital required for collective action. Social capital becomes both an input and an output to collective action when it accumulates as a result of its use (van Bastelaer and Grootaert 2002, cited in Kombe and Kreibich 2006).

Violence promotes poverty through the dilapidation of the physical and social capital in affected areas. Although poverty is no longer considered a root cause of urban crime and violence, coupled with inequality it can shape attitudes and perceptions of urban dwellers that may adopt crime as a survival strategy. Some theories try to explain violence through the concepts of deprivation and frustration. They support the idea that deprived citizens' recognition of their less-favoured situation and their consequent frustration due to their incapacity to achieve their final goals would play a major role in the increase of violence and crime (Klineberg 1981).

The pace of urbanization and the size and density of cities are also related to levels of crime and violence. Rapid urban population growth, closely associated with overcrowding, inadequate housing and basic infrastructure provision, has important violence-related consequences, particularly in areas where planning systems are not prepared to deal with this pace of urbanization (Moser and Rodgers 2005). The rate of urbanization is also related to the speed at which people change households which is strongly associated with crime. Rapidly growing urban centres are typically places where there is a high influx of people and where social unity is less stable and 'protective' as in informal social control for criminal behaviour (UN-Habitat 2007; Moser and Rodgers 2005; Klineberg 1981).

Global change processes have also led to two major transformations of political institutions, namely, weakening of the state and the rise of alternative forms of social governance. Many states are increasingly incapable to exercise coherent control over territories and peoples. At the same time, state institutions are increasingly challenged by local-level non-state forms of social governance. Informal institutions such as gangs, vigilantes and unofficial justice systems can emerge to bring order within localised 'governance voids'. As a result of these challenges, states are more and more trying to 'dominate rather than control and survey' (Moser and Rodgers 2005). This is particularly experienced by poor populations which tend to be perceived as primary sources of danger and violence. As a result, these groups tend to be more afraid of the police than to trust them, since the latter are seen as brutal and many times biased.

Community involvement has become an essential factor in all kind of partnerships that seek to prevent crime, which should also involve municipalities, the police, public services and the private sector (ICPC 2006). There has been an emphasis on the role of community participation in ensuring urban security and safety but it is important to understand that this can be done in wide range of possible ways and circumstances (UN-Habitat 2007).

The way urban societies and contexts are seen nowadays differs quite sharply from the perception which existed in the beginning of the 20th Century or even after the Second World War. The idea that societies are a uniform group of people and norms with shared interests and common goals, has been challenged and the intellectual tools used to understand people and their social context have shifted from a scientific rationalistic approach to a phenomenological and interpretive approach (Healey 1997). Castells (1977: 77-8) identifies anonymity, superficiality, the transitory character of urban social relations, anomie and lack of participation as the distinctive features of a system of behaviour which is typical from big cities, where a wider range of individual variation and social differentiation are found. This leads to the loosening of community ties, which are replaced by the mechanisms of formal control and by social competition. Moreover, cohabitation without the possibility of real expansion leads to individual savagery (in order to avoid social control) and, consequently, to aggressiveness.

The diversity, inequality and exclusion generally present in urban environments, being some of the main generators of conflicts, violence and crime in these areas, require the formulation of policies and strategies which include the participation of the multiple stakeholders present in the urban context so that their different perceptions and needs are taken into account. The role of community participation in crime prevention is thus an issue of collaborative planning and social inclusion. The notion of collaborative governance is based on the idea that the formal institutions of government have a role in providing a hard infrastructure of rules and norms to constrain and modify dominant centres of power, and a soft infrastructure of relational-building through which sufficient consensus building and mutual learning can occur to develop social, intellectual and political capital (Healey 1997).

Social capital, collaborative planning and good governance are intrinsically related, for there is no effective and successful participation where social networks and trust do not exist. It is not possible to engage citizens in decision-making processes where there is no trust in local governments and the sense of community and mutual respect and help is absent. Therefore, to analyse the role of community participation in crime prevention (or in any other planning related issue), it is necessary to understand these concepts and identify to what extend they permeate the daily lives of the studied communities and relations between these communities and the existing local and national institutions. The cycle of community participation in crime prevention is depicted in

Figure 1.
Figure 1 – The cycle of community participation in crime prevention

Source: Barbosa 2008

Social Capital and Community Participation in Crime Prevention in Poor Settlements of Dar es Salaam: The Case of Mnazi Mmoja

Tanzania is one of the rapidly urbanizing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and this rapid urbanization has been attributed both to rural-urban migration and to natural growth, leading to the rapid growth of low-income peri-urban and informal settlements. A lack of job opportunities, non-existent infrastructure and a social system in flux in the rural areas, are the main causes of the exodus of people from rural areas to urban centres or urban satellite towns (Stavrou and O'Riordan 2003).

Currently, it is estimated that Dar es Salaam accommodates nearly 30% of the national urban population and so far every ten years the population of Dar es Salaam has doubled (Kombe and Kreibich, cited in Ramadhani 2007). The city is growing at a rate of 8% per annum and it is estimated that approximately 70% of the population is living in informal settlements (URT 1996, cited in Kyessi 2002). At present, informal settlements form the major land use in Dar es Salaam (Kyessi 2002). A particular characteristic of Dar es Salaam informal settlements is the fact that unlike many developing countries, they accommodate a wide range of social and economic groups. In most of these settlements the affluent and poor live side by side and there is neither social nor physical alienation among the informal dwellers and the rest of the city urbanities (Ramadhani 2007).

Mnazi Mmoja is one of the six sub-wards of Manzese Ward, located in Kinondoni Municipality, approximately 7 kilometres from the city centre and 4 kilometres from the Municipal headquarters. Manzese is known to be the largest squatter area in Dar es Salaam city in terms of population and area and, although keeping the same characteristics of different social classes being accommodated side by side, Manzese is predominantly a low-income area. During the 1970s it was notorious for it lawlessness and thus earned itself the name of 'Soweto', reflecting the image of the South African black township, where violence was rife (Kironde 1995, cited in Ramadhani 2007).

Mnazi Mmoja was established around the year 1945 and has since then experienced rapid urbanisation. The total population in the settlement in the year 2002 was 9,189 inhabitants, approximately equally distributed between men and women (NBS 2002). This provides a population density of 353 people per ha. Housing density in the sub-ward in the year 2004 was on average 30 houses per hectare while the average number of households per house was 2.8 (URT 2004). Residential land uses account for about 92% of the total area. Other land uses, mainly three cemeteries and religious buildings, account for only 7.7% and no open spaces of significance are found in the area (URT 2004). The informal sector employs approximately 70% of the local population (Ramadhani 2007).

In the year 2004, the Community Upgrading Infrastructure Programme for the city of Dar es Salaam (CIUP) selected the settlement as one of the areas to be upgraded during its first phase. Through a participatory process, residents were asked to identify their needs and to rank them in order of priority, resulting in the following ranking of priorities: (i) improve drainage to prevent road deterioration; (ii) establish and sustain an adequate solid waste collection service; (iii) improve the local road network to improve accessibility; (iv) improve the sanitation services; (v) provide street lights. Fig. 2 shows the settlement boundaries and the roads recently upgraded.

Figure 2 - Mnazi Mmoja boundaries and the roads recently upgraded



Source: Adapted from URT 2004

Due to the network of upgraded roads, residents do not have to walk more than approximately 200m to reach a road accessible by motorized vehicles. Accessibility in the inner parts of the settlement is, however, still a problem. Due to lack of land use development control, many footpaths have been encroached upon, making transit of pedestrians difficult and creating propitious areas for illegal activities and crime, especially when it is dark at night.

The social infrastructure of the settlement is extremely poor. The area has no primary or secondary schools and students have to use the public schools in the neighbouring sub-wards. There is one private health centre but no public health facilities are available. There is one political institution, the Mtaa Office but no CBOs or NGOs. There are only four community members' groups: two women groups, a youth group and an Arts and Crafts group. Apart from that, the closest to a voluntary organization existing in the area is a *Sungusungu*[1] group, responsible for community policing activities.

[1] Sungusungu is a Kiswahili word used to designate groups of community members who practice self-policing / community policing.

After infrastructure improvements the area has been subject to massive investments in property development, especially along the main roads. Many of the former traditional Swahili houses[2] have been substituted by multi-storey buildings or converted into bars and guest houses. This 'verticalization' has brought about a gentrification process leading to increases in population density and to the over utilization of the available infrastructure services. Moreover, traditional inhabitants have been expelled from the area by real state speculation, with a high turn over of residents as the main result of it. The new buildings are used mainly as hotels, guest houses and shops, which coupled with the increasing number of pubs and local breweries has been faced by residents as one of the main causes of the increase in prostitution and crime in the settlement.

Research Methodology and Key Findings

The case study was conducted in the area of Mnazi Mmoja during the first semester of 2008 and had as its main objective to identify how community participation could contribute to the prevention of crime in poor settlements. Semi-structured interviews and focused group discussions were conducted with 30 key informants, selected among local government representatives, local leaders and common residents. The questions used to guide the interviews and discussions aimed at checking how community members perceived their role in crime prevention, as well as the role of the police and local government. The existence of social capital is one of the prerequisites for effective community participation in local initiatives. Thus, the research tried to check to what extent at least bonding social capital existed in the studied area and if the same type of social capital that leads community members in Tanzania to actively join infrastructure upgrading initiatives could be used to enhance community participation in crime prevention.

More than 60% of the respondents identified the community as the main institution responsible for crime and violence prevention. The easiness to identify criminals residing in the settlement and the fact that residents are their main victims were the main reasons given to justify the choice. These were also the arguments given by respondents to explain the efficiency of the sungusungu group in preventing crime. The government and the police as well are seen as important actors in preventing crime and urban violence, having been mentioned by 36% and 20% of people respectively. Sungusungu are seen by almost 80% of the respondents as a product of community members' initiative. Since they are formed by local residents, the group would be implicit when people cited the community as the main responsible for issues of safety and security. This would explain why only 3 out of 30 respondents mentioned these groups as being directly responsible for crime and violence prevention. Figure 3 depicts the main institutions responsible for crime prevention, according to residents' perceptions.

[2] The traditional Swahili house is composed of several rooms linked by a central corridor, with a veranda in the frontal part and a backyard where some other service rooms are located. The rooms are normally rented out to different people, leading to the co-existence of many households within a single house

Figure 3 - Institutions responsible for crime prevention



The overall relationship between the police and community members is not considered good by more than 90% of the people interviewed. The differences in the levels of community satisfaction with the work of the police and sungusungu are remarkable. Whilst 91% of the people are not satisfied with the performance of the police, 80% of them considered the work of sungusungu satisfactory. The local government is generally perceived as efficient and most residents attend the meetings related to community development issues, organized by Local Government. Interviews conducted with Municipal, Ward and Sub-ward officials revealed a close collaboration between the various levels of local government.

Macro-level social capital could be found in the area, with 75% of respondents saying they trust local government. When in need of help on matters of crime and violence, 43% of the people said they look for the nearest police post, despite the poor relationship between residents and the police. Approximately 30% of respondents mentioned local government representatives, while only 21% of them said they would seek help from their neighbours. Sungusungu groups are not perceived as an institution, but as a common group of community members. Existing distrust among residents may explain why very few interviewees (7%) said they would look for the sungusungu groups when in trouble, as shown in Fig. 4.

Figure 4 - Seeking help on matters of crime and violence



However, the degree of micro-level social capital found in Mnazi Mmoja was lower than expected. Although, according to local authorities, there was active community involvement during the recent infrastructure improvement project, it was found that levels of trust among community members are quite low, with 59% of respondents stating that local people do not trust each other. Locals attribute the situation to high crime rates in the past, with most criminals being community members. This has been worsened by the high population turn over which has happened during recent years, as a result of increases in land price values. Residents are selling their plots and moving out of the settlement, breaking existing social networks and eroding even more social capital.

Another indicator used to measure levels of social capital in Mnazi Mmoja was the number of existing local associations, which was found to be very limited. A women group called *Amani* was formed in 2003 as an income generation alternative for women working with local brew production and selling, which exposed them to dangerous and crime prone situations, since they were working mainly at night, dealing with possible criminals and drunken men. There are also a CCM[3] Women group, a Youth group and an Arts and Crafts group. The only person interviewed who mentioned the last three groups was the Mtaa Chairman, while all the other respondents were not aware of any local association existing in the settlement.

Conclusions

Although community participation in crime prevention exists in poor settlements in Dar es Salaam, initiatives are mainly limited to the creation of sungusungu groups and financial support to it. Community members perceive themselves as responsible for prevention of crime and violence in their communities but lack the knowledge on how to do it. Low levels of social capital, expressed by common distrust, contribute to hinder more effective community participation in crime prevention initiatives, as well as in other local associations.

[3] CCM = Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party. This has been the dominant political party since Tanzanian independence.

The few income generating existing initiatives are ceasing due to lack of capacity and trust, pointing out the extent to what social capital has been eroded and the importance of it in bringing communities into local initiatives. In the specific case of Mnazi Mmoja, social capital has been eroded by previous events of crime, undermining the trust among residents. The existing social capital which leads community members to engage in infrastructure upgrading projects is not the same required to bring residents into crime prevention initiatives. The perception that basic services are fundamental to improve quality of life within an area has not been extended to aspects of safety and security. The referred lack of trust among residents keeps people away from community initiatives which have no clear physical outputs.

The resulting increase in land values in an area which is highly envisaged for commercial uses is promoting a gradual shift in land uses and a gentrification process, causing 'market driven evictions', with locals selling their plots and moving out of the settlement. This has largely contributed to erode even more the already weak social capital in the area, since it brings about a high turnover of residents and social networks are disrupted. Although it can be considered that increases in land values can provide good opportunities for land owners by making some good money of their plots, in many cases instead of improving their lives these people are trapped into a vicious cycle of poverty by selling their plots and moving to other informal settlements where they lack the necessary bonding social capital to survive.

No matter the higher degree of macro-level social capital found in the area, local governments have not made use of it as a tool to increase residents' involvement in crime prevention initiatives. Likewise, education, which should be one of the tools used by local authorities to strengthen social capital among residents and enhance their involvement in local initiatives, is still perceived as being not directly related to social networks creation. The existence of participatory planning tools has proved to be not enough to secure community participation in local initiatives, when social capital is still very low or absent.

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Ruth Linssen / Erich Marks

School shootings - Considerations on prevention in a context of relative ignorance of the phenomenon

On March 11th 2009 at 9.30 a.m., former student of Winnenden Realschule Tim K. returns to,his school near Stuttgart, goes into three classrooms and opens the fire at students and,teachers. He kills that day 16 people including himself.

Again, Germany has become the scene of a school shooting. After the events in Bad-Reichenhall, Meißen, Erfurt and Emsdetten, yet another case within only a couple of years. Is Germany the country of school shootings? If yes, why? What is going wrong? And what can and has to be done from the perspective of crime prevention to prevent further deeds of this kind?

The demand for prevention of these most extreme forms of violence is stronger than ever. Though the discussion in politics and public opinion is still all too often lead by activism rather than factual, scientific based arguments. Of course, at first glance it is plausible to ask for stricter gun control and the prohibition of ego-shooter games. Yet, are these the real solutions to the problem? What could and should an effective prevention policy of school shootings aim at?

What do we know about school shootings?

To be able to formulate goals of prevention and to design effective measures, it is necessary to be able to properly describe a problem and to analyze its potential causes (Meyer/Linssen 2006). Though, the scientific knowledge base on school shootings is poor. Firstly, definitions diverge on what "running amok", a "killing spree" or a "school shooting"[1] actually is. Not everything that is called killing spree in the media would fall in this category from a scientific point of view (see Adler 2000). The understanding of the phenomenon is limited by the small number of incidences and the diversity of circumstances and motives (Lange/Grewe 2002). Moreover, the offender(s) often turn their arms against themselves at the end of a killing spree, which makes ex post investigations very difficult. It is often tried to make up for these deficiencies by referring to research results form other countries, such as the US. Yet, there are limits to these comparisons (Linssen/Bannenberg 2004). Access to firearms for example is regulated very differently in the US compared to Germany, though in both countries access to firearms is used as an explication for the phenomenon (see below). Now, first things first:

[1] Annotation of the translator: In German the general term for these phenomena is „Amoklauf" (running amok). The original text therefore rather uses this term, despite its connotation that would distinguish running amok in English from killing spree or school shooting. As can be seen below, the article precisely wants to show that "school shooting" is a more adequate term, which is also used by the scientific community in Germany.

Following most sources the notion running amok is derived from Malay and means „to attack or kill in blind rage" (Kania, 2007). It was used for attacks in a context of war that were undertaking almost in a state of trance. The Malayan killing spree is part of a specific cultural context that does not have much in common with our today's common understanding of the term. Meticulous planning seems to characterise almost schematically the school shootings in Winnenden and Erfurt. This contradicts the idea of an emotion driven act undertaken "at the heat of the moment" (Vossekuil et al., 2002; Robertz 2004, see below). But what does characterise school shootings today? In the American literature you can find the definition as a killing of at least three persons. Though, defining school shooting by a number of homicides seems unsuitable. In Emsdetten the shooter injured several persons but finally only killed himself (Spiegel 2009). Suicide at the end of a shooting is recurrent but not a defining feature of a killing spree (Adler 2000, Kania 2007). If it happens, it is usually planned. Additionally, it is necessary to distinguish school shootings from other so called "family tragedies", familicides or murder-suicides. In these cases the offender usually kills close family members and then himself.

According to current understanding, a killing spree is undertaken in a state comparable to that of trance with an important loss of the sense of reality, which is coherent with the original Malay definition of the term running amok. It is comparable to a state of inebriation. According to Lempp (2006) and Robertz (2004) this is due to loss of the sense for reality and to having slipped into a parallel reality, in which destruction is the only rational and in which emotions are faded out.

As crime prevention - following public debate - is mainly concentrating on youth, it seems reasonable to follow in this paper Robertz (2004) and to use the term "school shooting". It describes homicides and attempted homicides, which are undertaken by young people at school and which are content-related to the site of crime.

School shootings, as other killing sprees, are almost exclusively undertaken by boys or young men, most of which are individuals acting on their own (single perpetrators) (Robertz 2004). Except for the deed, the perpetrators themselves do not have much in common. US-literature has identified some shared characteristics, though given the very limited number of cases on which they are based, it impossible to generalise these conclusions. Kania (2007) states the following common characteristics for school shooters in Germany: Perpetrators

- do not have uniform demographic characteristics,
- only rarely suffer from severe mental health problems,
- rarely come from broken homes,
- are not exclusively socially isolated lone perpetrators and
- commit school shootings premeditatedly and not impulsively.

These findings already underline that school shooter do not have much in common with the young people targeted by conventional violence and crime prevention programmes, which are usually programmes of secondary and tertiary prevention: These (potential) offenders are marginalised, mostly young men, often with problems of socialisation and even experiences of violence, who grow up in precarious conditions and who show the common signs of social disintegration (Heitmeyer/Imbusch 2005). This relatively large group which is in the focus of very different prevention strategies is not overlapping with the group of school shooters (Linssen/Bannenberg 2004). Therefore the different forms of prevention designed fort them do not work for killing sprees. They would hardly reach the target group, if at all.

The rare findings on school shooters underline above all the absence of reliable attachments and bonds, of proximity and familiarity (Eisenberg 2000; Weilbach 2007). They are also in contrast to the traditional target group of (youth) crime prevention (see above). For them social links are rather developed, their peer groups are important. For school shooters there are only few links to peers and family life can be characterised by "unrelatedness", by coexistence instead of sharing one's lifes (Eisenberg 2000, Kania 2007). Material deprivation is the exception; the social environment is petty bourgeois, middle class. The level of education and intelligence are accordingly between average and high (Linssen/Bannenberg 2004). However, achievements at school stay behind the own expectations or that of others. Prior to the shootings a decline in class performance can sometimes be observed as well as bad behaviour and difficulties with discipline. The media give much attention to the way of life of school shooters, their preference for dark clothing, excessive consumption of media, especially with violent content, and to their provocative and violence accepting role models (Vossekuil, 2002; Robertz 2004). However, all of this is not atypical for adolescents in general. Additionally, the affinity for firearms and the access to weapons are often cited.

All in all, the characteristics listed here are of limited significance and can not be generalised, due to the limited scientific knowledge base.

What are the causes? Attempts to explain

Media like to refer to the mental health and psychological troubles of school shooters. Asmentioned above, psychiatric troubles are rather the exception than the rule. In the same way, conspicuous behavioural traits, as violent behaviour, are exceptional (Vossekuil et al 2002). Füllgrabe (2000) und Robertz (2004) find on the other hand that many perpetrators have underdeveloped coping strategies, which makes solving social problems seem very difficult for them. In their families, problems are "solved" in a patriarchic, aggressive way (Lübbert 2002), which is of no help in the company of peers or teachers. The results are underdeveloped personal relationships with peers at school. School shooters have often experienced a lack of personal attachment since

early childhood, which has subsequentially lead to a personality with low self-esteem, which can easily be hurt, but which is at the same time self-focused and unable to cope with frustration (Füllgrabe 2000). This allows drifting into a parallel reality (Lempp 2006), makes imaginary hideaways attractive, as they are perceived as less scaring and more recognising than reality (Weilbach 2007). Hillbrand (2006) and Robertz (2004) mention signs of pronounced depression and suicidal ideation, which make suicide and homicide become options.

Excessive consumption of violent computer games, so called ego-shooter, are another shared characteristic of the school shootings in Germany, which are often used for explanations. However, current research on the effects of media disagrees with such simple causal connections.[2] Ego-shooter can actual help gain shooting experience and help practice accuracy (Bösche/Geserich, 2007), yet in connection with school shootings they rather seem to be symptom than cause. Millions play regularly ego-shooter games, which makes clear that they cannot be considered a sufficient condition for killing sprees. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that they can reinforce negative predispositions (Bockholt, 2008; BMFSFJ, 2005). It is more likely that these dangers are linked to a process of drifting into a parallel reality, which provides the opportunity to obtain recognition (Lempp 2006). Computer games are therefore only means that could be exchanged by others, such as drugs or others. It is the predisposition not the game that becomes decisive for the action. From a prevention point of view prohibition or stricter control of access to media with violent content as a direct prevention measure of killing sprees do not seem very promising. Additionally, prohibition often has an adverse effect: especially young people are particularly attracted by what is forbidden. Moreover, the possibility to spread and download content through the internet makes it particularly difficult to enforce such a prohibition.

Considering the accumulation of school shootings, it does not seem convincing to exclusively look for reasons at the individual, psychological level. This is particularly true with respect to possible prevention measures. The phenomenon of school shootings also has a societal dimension. The feeling to fail and to have failed, social isolation, retreat in parallel realities, which precede school shooting, all have social causes. Weilbach (2007) for example points to political, socio-cultural and economic causes of running amok. They are at the origin of abasements, psychological scars, experiences of loss at the individual level. Put differently, modern achievement-orientated societies and the social and economic policies weakening community and solidarity which go with them, form a basis for running amok, which should not be underestimated. Social relationships are lost, difficult to create or to be kept alive, though relationships and personal attachments are of crucial importance for deviant behaviour. A sense of justice and respect of norms and rules is developed through (emotional)

[2] Phenomena of imitation and copy cats are important issues in the research on the effects of media (Werther-Effekt). However, as the question of imitation is a general, separate issue of crime prevention, it is left aside in this paper. An introduction to the issue can be fund in Kania 2007.

attachment (Hirschi 1969). Furthermore, immediate and personal attachments make it less attractive to construct one's own parallel reality and make social isolation more difficult. Modern societies with their discontinuities provide less and less opportunities for attachments, and at the same time more and more possibilities for creating one's own reality. (Meulemann 2006). Additionally, coping with insecurity and problems is more and more individualised (Heitmeyer/Imbusch 2005).

Moreover, the requirements of modern achievement-orientated societies put the individual with its needs and interest into the background. Individuals have to unconditionally subordinate to the requirements of the labour market. This does not only apply to children and young adults, but also to their parents who have to face the exigencies of the modern working world, which implies flexibility, mobility, unconditional readiness, and at the same time insecurity with respect to employment and professional future. It is not astonishing, if parents in this context - possibly themselves unable to cope with the situation - start looking the other way and do not want to realise their children's problems. As long as there are no abnormalities that can no longer be denied, they concentrate on the daily existence and "getting along". For a young person this often means too few possibilities for being appreciated and recognised as a human being. He does not find the recognition he needs, neither in the family nor at school nor in the working world do. These experiences add up to existing disorientation and create frustration and a feeling of being distained, with important effects for a troubled personality (Weilbach 2007). The need to (violently) obtain particular attention can almost be understood as re-establishing the recognition that is subjectively perceived as necessary and fair.

Again, it becomes clear: school shootings are not monocausal and cannot be understood only from an individual's psychological perspective. "The phenomenon of running amok is characterised by the interaction between the insecurities and tensions of today's society and individual personalities with difficulties to deal with conflict and at risk for extreme reactions" (Weilbach 2007: 120). It is a mixture of societal and individual factors prevention has to tackle in an interdisciplinary way.

What should be done?

Analysing the causes has shown that it is impossible to prevent school shootings as a specific phenomenon. The answer to the problem of school shootings has to be a combination of different, interdisciplinary and inter-institutional measures. For the measures to be effective strategic coordinated concepts are necessary. Single, independent projects which try to do a little here and a little there don't seem very helpful just like blind activism without any scientific foundation.

Such a scientifically validated concept should tackle the causes not the symptoms. In this sense prohibition of computer games or stricter weapon laws are of secondary importance. Crucial on the other hand is strengthening self-confidence and self-

assurance from a young age on, strengthening social competencies, teaching coping strategies, creating opportunities to experience achievements and success, and last but not least to transmit a view on the imperatives of today's living- and working world, which leaves space for criticism and relativism. Prevention of school shooting is therefore a matter of general prevention programmes, that have a broad approach, and of a new setting for specific and general prevention programmes.

In the context of a school shooting the school appears as the place of mortification and becomes in this way a site of crime, a place to "re-establish" justice and recognition. From a prevention point of view, the school is a very good starting point, as compulsory schooling makes it a place with large scale impact. If possible, kindergartens and day care centres should already be included in prevention programmes. Installing and designing effective prevention measures is contingent on adequate framework conditions (vgl. Linssen 2006). Up to now, teachers are too often limited to their role of transferring knowledge. With respect to school shootings, a particular student often only gets their attention when the above described drop in school performance and disciplinary problems become obvious. It seems that at this stage the decision for such a deed is already taken and preparations under way. The chain of events that leads to school shootings needs to be interrupted at an earlier stage. Though a reliable identification of students that are in danger of running amok (in order to intervene) is quite difficult. Too many who would never even consider such a deed would be accused (see on this point Kania 2007). Therefore first priority comes to primary prevention.

In prevention programmes the school should become a place of bonds and attachments, which applies for teachers as well as peers. School should not only be conceptualised as a place for the transfer of knowledge, but (still more) as a social place. Teachers are important references persons for children and give them orientation. More attention should thereby be drawn to inconspicuous students. They, too, need to experience success and recognition. Strengthening strengths and giving at the same time orientation should be the guiding principal. At the same time the framework conditions of modern societies should be critically reviewed with students and action should not be unilaterally individualised.

Integrated multi-level concepts, which are not only aiming at the cognitive level but also including learning processes based on experiences, are successful (Lösel, 2006). Another important point is to intervene early with prevention measures and assure their continuity (Scheithauer et al., 2008). Examples are multilevel concepts by Olweus (Olweus 1993), or by Papilio (Scheithauer/Mayer 2008) or the „PAC" („prevention as a chance") programme of the state criminal police in Lower Saxony (www.pac-programm.de)). These concepts also include parents and can help this way to foster the attention given to children and to improve the bonds between parents and children. It is a precondition for the success of these concepts that parents are familiar with them and that they can support them in everyday life. Moreover, by including

parents it is possible to identify problems at an earlier stage, many seeming inconspicuous from outside.

Concerning the question which political conclusions should be drawn from dramatic event as in Erfurt or Winnenden, we would like to refer to passages of the speeches the German presidents Johannes Rau and Horst Köhler held at the commemorations in 2002 and 2009. They underline to which degrees these events are (still) incomprehensive to us and how carefully and thoroughly we should strive for a better understanding. In the future attention should be paid that prevention does not only mean specifically avoiding undesired states or situations, but that it always also leads to new social dialogue, how we wish to live together in the future and which conjectural and preventive measures we should take to come as close as possible to these goals and wishes.

„We are perplexed. We have not thought that it was possible that something like this could happen (in our country). We should not try to cover up our helplessness with apparently obvious explanations. We should admit: We do not understand this deed. And that in the end, we will never be able to fully explain it. Certainly, we wish to understand, what has driven the shooter, what has seduced him, what has made him loose any sense of humanity. We are looking for causes and responsibilities. We would like to know quickly, which consequences should be drawn, in order to prevent that something like this will ever happen again."[3]

„Every child is borne innocent. When a child dies, then hope and future die with it. This is why the news of violence against children horrifies us that much. Though, what if a child itself becomes a murderer? The same questions bother us over and over: How could this happen? How can a human being do such a thing? Weren't there any signals of alarm, no signs, on which one could have reacted? Some will also ask, how God could allow such a thing. And many family members ask. How should life go on now?"[4]

There is not THE answer to these questions. This is precisely why school shooting cannot be prevented. There are no reliable and quick solutions, no nostrum. Nonetheless, school shootings are not (only) the expression of individual problems of particular students. They are rather an extreme alarm signal for a general imbalance in our society. These alarm signs are unfortunately only occasionally noticed. The impact of such an eruption of violence is shocking. Yet, this is precisely why the reactions to these alarm signs need to be well considered and thought for the long-run. Hasty reactions and political activism are rather harmful then useful. Once one can show that there was a reaction, it is possible to go back to business as usual. This however

[3] Speech of president Johannes Rau in front of Erfurt Cathedral Mai 3rd 2002 in commemoration of the victims of the assassinations in a High School in Erfurt

[4] Speech of president Horst Köhler on March 21st 2009 at the commemoration ceremony for the victims of the spree killing in Winnenden und Wendlingen.

would be fatal and would mean ignoring the societal factors that lead to young school shooters. At the end of the day, we are all responsible for what has happened and for what will still happen. This requires political debate and discussion about how to shape the future.

What does all this mean for crime prevention?

The above considerations and explanations take the authors to the following conclusions:

1. It is impossible to prevent school shooting as a specific phenomenon.
2. Stricter gun control/weapon laws or a prohibition of relevant computer games as a prevention strategy do not tackle the causes of shootings, are difficult to implement and will probably lead to unintended secondary effects (illegality).
3. Measures in the area of youth (media) protection, measures to foster media competency as well as those for the prevention of violence need to be further developed, proposed and evaluated. Yet, it should be omitted to pocket these measure in the name of a rash, simplifying prevention strategy for school shootings.
4. School shooters cannot be compared with violent children and young adults or those with behavioural disorders. Consequentially, specific prevention programmes for this target group are hardly promising for school shooters.
5. Prevention programmes that start in school or kindergarten seem reasonable, if not for anything but their coverage. Giving orientation, strengthening self-confidence, allowing children to experience a sense of achievement are important components of such a strategy.
6. It is necessary to develop new approaches and new links between approaches for general and specific prevention programmes.
7. Prevention must not end at school: Integrating parents is crucial.
8. Teachers and educators have to see themselves (even more) an attachment figure, as psychological parents rather than providers of knowledge.
9. It is important to create the framework conditions for teachers to be able to care and to look after their students instead of providing simply school services.
10. It should be standard procedure to take evaluated prevention experiences and knowledge from different disciplines of prevention research into account at all levels of planning and action.
11. Police and schools should develop in close cooperation emergency plans and update and further develop them.
12. The development and the use of possible leaking-concepts and of risk analysis of potential dangers of school shootings should be undertaken without precipitation and closely following the general idea of close cooperation and interdisciplinarity.

13. The press and the media should use opportunities to reflect with the help prevention experts, media scholars and other experts on their role in school shooting, their coverage of these events and possibilities to improve their work.
14. Academic studies, research and practical experiences of crime prevention are only at the beginning of a necessary long-term analysis of the complex phenomenon which is school shooting. To gain insights into this rather recent phenomenon interdisciplinary cooperation and professionalism seem even more important than they are generally for crime prevention.
15. Specialised organisations in the field of crime prevention at all levels (local to international) should participate actively in the above describe discourses and processes. They can in this way contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon as well as to a better presentation, communication and a more rational way to deal with this issue.

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ALACs (Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres). An Innovative Instrument of Transparency International for the Promotion of Participation and Citizenship in Europe and the Significance of the Co-operation between Non-Governmental Organisations and Social Science[2]

1. Transparency International and the ALACs (Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres)

1.1 A brief overview of the guiding principles and goals of Transparency International[3]

The so-called "anti-corruption coalition" Transparency International (TI) is a non-profit, non-partisan organisation. The basic principles of TI are integrity, accountability, transparency and civil society participation. Effective and enduring means of fighting and containing corruption are only possible when the state, commerce and civil society work together and form a coalition:

- to increase the public awareness of the harmful consequences of corruption and
- to strengthen national and international systems of integrity

TI defines corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private use or gain. In the 90s, various forms and developments of corruption in the public domain were at the centre of the debates, e.g., bribery and corruptibility in public administration, in the preparation of legislation and regulations, or in influencing political decisions. TI addresses these issues concerning corruption, in which the private sector has since taken on the leading roll, e.g., corruption between companies ("private-to-private") and money laundering. TI is concerned with public as well as private sectors, which give with one hand but taken with another. TI does not work in a confrontational manner; rather, it seeks out coalitions with governments, administrations, and politicians, with business, and with civil society groups that represent a trustworthy, transparent, value-oriented and civil democratic political culture. Democracy implies equal access to political decisions and requires equal and free access to crucial information. The democratic form of government can only survive as a non-corrupt democracy. Its

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[2] This article is based on a presentation held on June 2, 2008 by the authors in the frame of the "13. Deutscher Präventionstag" on „Engagierte Bürger - sichere Gesellschaft" in Leipzig, Germany.

[3] For more information see www.transparency.org and www.transparency.de

basic principles—transparency, rule of law and freedom of opinion—must therefore remain tangible for the individual.

Transparency International was founded in 1993 by Dr. Peter Eigen and friends from the North and South in London and Berlin. The international secretariat of TI supports the global work of the organisation. It supports and coordinates the work of the national chapters that are active in nearly 100 countries. The national chapters participate fully in decision-making at the international level. TI works together with many national and international organisations—including the European Union, the United Nations, the OECD, the World Bank, the regional development banks and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. TI also supports the secretariat of the International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC), which take place every two years with large international attendance. TI is based on an international advisory council comprised of many prominent individuals from all other the worlds, including the former presidents Richard von Weizsäcker, Jimmy Carter and Oscar Arais Sanchaz of Costa Rica. Important representatives from the economic, political and civil society sectors are members of the advisory council.

The individual goals of Transparency International:

- Formation of collations against corruption; no persecution of individual cases. Participating in and monitoring the implementation of the OECD convention to fight international bribery through the German administration and jurisdiction
- Expansion of the OECD conventions with necessary back-up measures such as obligations for affiliates, effective corruption prevention in export credit agencies, integration of off-shore finance centres, fighting bribery of political parties, more transparency in accounting, more intense auditing procedures, etc.
- Expansion and strengthening of corruption prevention in public administration, in particular in the area of public procurement (Example: central registry for corrupt organisations that are therefore excluded from procurement)
- Development of the “Integrity Pact”, a TI model for the containment of corruption in the procurement of public contracts, in privatisation processes and in the procurement of national licenses (such as for telecommunications or the use of natural resources)
- Strengthening of rights regarding access to information records at the national, regional and local levels (freedom of information rights)
- Support and protection of whistle blowers (persons who are unable to find redress for their grievances from the responsible authorities and therefore turn to a third party or go public)
- Reduction of corruption and strengthening of transparency in the health care system

- Anchoring of the topic corruption in research and teaching at universities, colleges, technical colleges and national academies
- Providing assistance to the German economy, which must correspond to the changed legal situation regarding the bribery of foreign public officials

The "Corruption Perceptions Index" (CPI) lists countries according to the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The index is an aggregated index that takes various surveys and studies conducted by nine independent institutions into account. Business professionals as well as national analysts were surveyed; interviews with citizens, domestic and abroad, were also included.[4] The Transparency International "Bride Payers Index" (BPI) lists the leading export states with regard to their businesses' willingness to bribe high-ranking public officials in the emerging markets abroad. The countries represented in the BPI are listed according to the average value obtained from respondents' answers to the following survey question: "In the business sectors with which you are most familiar, please indicate how likely companies from the following countries are to pay or offer bribes to win or retain business in this country?"[5] "The Global Corruption Barometer" attempts to assess the consequences of corruption in various areas of life, to convey the expectations with regards to corruption and to enquire into the priorities of the fight against corruption. Unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), differences between the individual areas are able to be taken into account: for example, political, private and familial or economic. Whereas the CPI exclusively interviews experts and decision makers, the Corruption Barometer is based on the average assessment by the population.[6]

1.2 The ALACs (Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres) as an instrument for the fight against corruption and a platform for citizen participation [7]

Transparency International's Legal Advice Centres (ALACs) are regarded as independent, cohesive, and successive instruments for fighting corruption. Their numbers continue to grow, as more national chapters of TI continue to be founded. The centres conform to the anti-corruption guidelines drafted by TI, namely, to enable engagement in civil society to fight corruption. The ALACs represent the advancement of the original generation of anti-corruption mechanisms, known as "Resource Centres". Although the ALACs have retained certain traits of their forerunners, they however differ in their approaches. They work not only with specific cases, but also are further engaged in the areas of institutional and legal citizen consultation. In terms of their operability, they have shown to be a flexible mechanism at the national level. For this reason, the ALACs are known within the TI movement as a *sui generis* approach to

[4] More information at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

[5] More information at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi

[6] More information at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb

[7] Detailed information and data on the ALACs can be found at: http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/alacs

fighting corruption rather than a fixed anti-corruption methodology. This perspective essentially reflects two matters of fact: 1. A culture of "cross-learning" exists within TI that has lead to a noticeable diversity of national chapters. 2. The aim, as defined by the TI secretariat in Berlin, is for knowledge management to apply ever-developing and innovating instruments in the praxis of fighting corruption. Currently, 22 ALACs in 14 different countries exist, whose origins can be traced back to the first three ALACs in the countries of Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYR Macedonia. Today, ALACs are represented in numerous Balkan States, in the Caucasus Region and in Eastern Europe.

The core of the ALACs as a mechanism for citizen engagement against corruption comprises three main interrelated goals:

1.2.1 Provide assistance to citizens who have been victims or witnesses of cor ruption who wish to articulate their complaints

This goal is achieved through concrete information and legal support in order to give citizens the possibility to follow up on cases of corruption where they have been the victim or even simply the witness. Not only will work be done in terms of educating the public opinion but concrete assistant will also be offered in formulating these offences together with the appropriate state institutions. Furthermore, and depending on the specific case, other NGOs and the media will be worked with in close cooperation.

1.2.2 Improvement of institutional efforts in order to more effectively perceive and act upon complaints of corruption

This goal is realised through constructive cooperation with public authorities, whereby their capacities are further developed and the necessity of effectively following up on complains of corruption is made clear. The ultimate goal in this area of the ALCACs' engagement is to articulate to the public sphere that a degree of citizen trust in the institutions should be achieved such that intervention by the ALACs eventually becomes unnecessary.

1.2.3 Contribute to the systematic optimisation of the fight against corruption in legal, administrative, and institutional areas

Through the analysis of cases that are brought to and filed with the ALACs, "weak points" in the system that promote corruption are attempted to be localised. This could be, for example, individual loopholes or legal "backdoors" that have been identified in a number of cases. By doing so, the ALACs are able to take specific action in the area of legal counsel, which is able to direct citizen complaints towards systematic change. The ALACs are thus a mechanism of direct as well as representative citizen participation.

The current ALAC “tool kit” contains the following individual elements:

1. Elements regarding direct citizen engagement in the fight against corruption:

- A public “portal” for active citizens. In most cases, this will be accomplished with a toll-free telephone hotline. In other cases, one can directly visit the ALAC offices or a mobile ALAC team in individual communities will be arranged in other counties.
- A website that explains the role and objective of the ALACs and provides practical information on pursuing cases of corruption.
- So-called “Citizen’s Guides’, which explain what corruption is and provide practical information to the average citizen in a way intelligible to all. These guides are easy to use and mainly inform citizens about the steps to be taken if they suspect corruption. Some ALACs have developed a general guide, while others have published specific guides for particular types of corruption, such as public announcements, land and property rights, justice, etc. These fields represent the individual fields in which the most corruption complains arise.
- Library: In each ALAC office there is a small collection of important writings on corruptions as well as on the relevant legal steps. These texts are intended for internal (ALAC personnel) as well as external (citizens) use.
- Database: As soon as a citizen complaint is received, the ALACs enter all data into a specifically developed database on which whose basis statistics can be generated and general trends can be interpreted. A combined database is supported by the TI secretariat in Berlin; the individual country databases, however, can be quite different from one another.

2. Elements regarding representative citizen participation against corruption:

- So-called “Memoranda of Understanding” with the relevant public institutions
- Cooperation and mutual declarations with other non-profit organisations
- Press releases that present statistical analyses of corruption complaints and call attention to specific institutional and legal deficits
- Creation of dialogue with the relevant institutions with the goal of providing them with suggestions for improvement
- Formal consultation and legal advice in various forms, ranging from public petitions to suggestions for legal changes to be submitted to parliamentary committees

2. Aspects of cooperation between civil society and social science in fighting corruption

2.1 Sociology's understanding of corruption and fighting corruption: A socio-cultural perspective

The subsequent introductory thoughts on sociology's understanding of corruption and the fight against it, as viewed from a socio-cultural perspective, are based on the research project "Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and in the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom" (Short title: "Crime and Culture"), supported by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission.

In the following a generally understandable summary of the basic assumptions of the research project is outlined:[8]

There is absolutely no doubt that corruption is costly, inefficient and particularly harmful to democracy due to the hidden power aspects. With regards to the phenomenon of corruption, the perspective is however altered in the research project "Crime and Culture". The preventative programmes developed and implemented by the EU and the individual states have, up until now, been legal, administrative as well as police measures. Generally, the definition of corruption, as developed by political and administrative institutions, is implemented in a "top-down" procedure. However, it has been repeatedly shown that actions and efforts in this regard are frequently meaningless. This is a disaster, especially for potential EU candidate countries that must fulfil strict requirements (examples include Bulgaria and Romania).

In this research project, what corruption is and what it is not will not be determined from above. Normally, armchair lawyers define what corruption is. Clearly, this is not functioning. The project introduced here does not enquire into corruption *per se* as an objective fact; rather, it investigates perceptions of corruption specific to regions and cultures.

[8] See also: Expedition ins Schattenreich der Korruption, in: Die Welt: http://www.welt.de/wissenschaft/article1190831/Expedition_ins_Schattenreich_der_Korruption.html

Structure of the Research Project 'Crime and Culture'

Present Condition	Goals (Target Condition)	Measures
Data generation and interpretation of culturally determined patterns of perception of corruption on the basis of documents and in-depth expert interviews in accordance with a qualitative computer-based content analysis Establishment of the practical relevance of culturally determined patterns of perception.	Optimise corruption prevention through designing measures effective in the face of culturally determined patterns of the perception of corruption 1. Eliminate friction losses in the application of anti-corruption programmes 'from the top-down' (experts) 2. Integration of a 'bottom-up' perspective (laypersons) 3. Realignment of communication between laypersons and experts	1. Evaluation: strength-weakness analysis of existing preventative programmes on the basis of sociological data and analysis of present conditions 2. Implementation: Conference enabling interaction between scholars and policy-making experts: 2.1 Presentation of study results 2.2 Co-operative discussion and evaluation of results 2.3 Co-operative development of an innovative approach to corruption prevention

An example from Eastern Europe: Up until the political transition in 1989, people frequently survived through barter trade. Even companies knowingly did business bypassing the inefficient state requirements. Basic survival was otherwise simply not possible. After the fall of communism, people simply continued to barter; however, then came the Western Europeans who hastily asserted that such activity was criminal. That which one country persecutes as corruption is considered as familial bonds in another. (See for example southern Italy.) Such dissimilar notions of corruption certainly hinder the fight against it. From a socio-cultural perspective, one must therefore first ask the local people what they even consider corruption to be. With regards to the ALACs' anti-corruption efforts, the relevant decisive question is: Why do people report some occurrences of corruption and not others? In the following, this question will be addressed in further detail. The extremely different "mentality-specific" perceptions of corruption, as is the general thesis of this project, have a significant influence on the awareness of the problem and therefore also on the success of preventative measure. For this reason, the project investigates the correlation between "institutionalised" prevention and the "everyday, practical" understanding as well as the handling of corruption that results in select EU candidate countries. Lastly, this correlation in the individual countries will be presented according to specific possibilities of readjustment. The research of the project is not only concentrated on Eastern and Southern Europe. The experience that we have gained up until now is that especially German observers have been particularly well-received by the members of the German research group. For them, scholarship and the media are clearly linked, as politics unfortunately does not always promote education. We regard public openness and education as one of the most effective weapons against corruption[9]

[9] The German team of the research project was given the opportunity to present a detailed description of the fundamental idea of the project as well as the initial results in a contribution to the edited volume "International Perspectives of Crime Prevention", in: Marc Coester/Erich Marks (Eds.): International Perspectives of Crime Prevention. Contributions from the 1st Annual International Forum. Mönchengladbach 2008, pp. 99-124. Mr. Erich Marks is the executive director of the "Deutscher Präventionstag". Dr. Marc Coester is the

2.2 Civil society, social science and the fight against corruption

In light of this basic research activity and the approaches developed to the problem of corruption, the question then arises as to how cooperation between civil society and academia, specifically with regards to instruments to fight corruption, can be arranged—such as between the ALACs and sociology. Above, another question, with regards to the work of the ALACs in the field of fighting corruption, was asked: Why do people in some countries report some occurrences of corruption and not others? The answer to this question is very much dependent on the success or failure of anti-corruption mechanisms intended to promote citizen participation and engagement, such as the ALACs.

In general, there is a direct connection between theory and practice in a knowledge-based society. The efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities is becoming increasingly linked to well-founded knowledge management. In addition their practical competence and professionalism, practitioners must also be able to reflect upon the societal conditions within which they work. For this reason, cooperation between civil society organisations and academics is a practical necessity in a knowledge-based society. In the case of the ALACs, it is clear that we are dealing with a civil society instrument for fighting corruption that must come to terms with two effectively opposing qualities: One the one hand, it is a "management tool"; on the other, it is an instrument to strengthen citizen participation in the fight against corruption. Apart from this structural "tension", it is more important to mention that the ALACs, as organisational units, must take the different and changing societal and cultural contexts in which they operate into consideration if they wish to be successful. It is precisely this problem that challenges the cooperation between practitioners and academic research in increasing the appreciation for citizen participation and in finding an answer to the question: Why do people in some countries report some occurrences of corruption and not others?

While academics are interested in generating knowledge through their research activities, practitioners are interested rather in how to apply this knowledge. To a lesser extent, they are also interested in professionalizing their organisational structure and making them more effective. Normally, however, it seems that academic research results are only applied once the research has been completed. Particularly with regards to civil society organisations, it would be much more interesting and effective to establish a simultaneous and reciprocate learning relationship between practitioners and academics. With such an interaction, the partners would retain their own roles as practitioners and academics but would expand their own goals by continuously acknowledging the other's perspective. From the academic side, the success of such cooperation calls for experience with bottom up approaches in ethnographic field re-

coordinator of international contacts.

search—research that is not about the pure collection of data, but is rather understood as an interactive process between practitioners and academics.

Unlike participant observation where the researcher keeps a certain distance, the researchers do not *imaginarily* take the place of the practitioner and do not attempt to tackle their problem definition; rather, both sides enter into *real* interaction and exchange without blurring their role identities or losing their standpoints, views or problem perceptions. The practitioners learn to look at themselves from an external point of view and to expand the perspective of their problem perception; the researchers have the chance to get closer to the reality they act in, as defined by the practitioners in terms of problem solving. Of particular relevance for the ALACs is the fact that accompanying academic research alone would not fully serve the optimisation of the activities of the ALACs. It is furthermore a challenge for the successful practical implication, in that data must be collected in the various countries, which must ensure an adaptation of the ALACs' general programme to the cultural specifics of the countries in which they operate. We have thus come full circle: Fighting corruption does not only imply an *extensive* knowledge of the scope of the phenomenon of corruption, but also an *intensive* knowledge of how the phenomenon of corruption is perceived.

3. The ALACs-project (Seventh Framework Programme of the European Commission): an innovative frame of cooperation between civil society and social science

3.1 The ALACs-project: a short description

This chapter is dedicated to a short description of the ALACs-project to be funded as of August 2009 by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Commission. It represents a concrete and innovative means of cooperation between a civil society organisation, i.e. Transparency International and research performers, i.e. social scientists.

Structure of ALACs-project

Present Condition	Goals (Target Condition)	Measures
Evaluation of the structure and mechanisms of existing ALACs on two levels: (1) analysis of ALACs' databases (i.e. analysis of citizen participation in the fight against corruption), and (2) interviews with members of ALACs' staff and users (i.e. assessment of how the ALACs concept has been put into effect) on the basis of a qualitative computer-based content analysis. .	1. Optimise corruption prevention mechanisms of ALACs and increase methodology of citizen participation through the improvement of ALAC structure by designing measures effective in the face of specific cultural peculiarities in the countries involved. 2. Implementation of improved structures and mechanisms by both already existing and new ALACs (to be established in four EU member states). 3. Anti-corruption policy formulation and respective initiatives on national and EU level.	1. Evaluation: Strength-weakness analysis of existing ALACs' structures and mechanisms on the basis of sociological analysis of present conditions. 2. Implementation: 2.1 Presentation of research results and training activities for ALAC staff. 2.2 Co-operative development of an improved model of anti-corruption and citizen participation in EU and non-EU countries. 2.3 Cross-fertilisation meetings between researchers and practitioners. 3. Advocacy.

The ALAC project is a unique *joint venture* founded by three types of social actors with different but corresponding interests, competencies and objectives: 1. The civil society activists from the National Chapters of Transparency International, who seek democratic development in their societies through enhanced citizen participation; 2. The Transparency International Secretariat, which is interested in improving its organisational structure by implementing new techniques of knowledge management (incl. a database) in its ALAC network Europe- and worldwide; 3. The RTD performers, who aim at enhancing knowledge about the cultural conditions necessary for the implementation of anti-corruption policies by establishing an innovative *action research* approach. Conducted by practitioners, professionals and academics, this approach will result in the formulation of a pioneering and empirically-grounded theory of the practice of TI as a global anti-corruption coalition. The main objectives of the ALAC research project are therefore: 1. To understand the nature of interaction between loose coupled network practitioners and professionals from Transparency International, and 2. To analyse the cultural conditions necessary for implementing a specific management method and a mechanism to increase citizen participation in the countries participating in the project. These countries are: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Romania and United Kingdom.

3.2 Operationalisation of the objectives

Citizen participation is *the* crucial component in the culture of tackling corruption because integrity, accountability and transparency must take hold socially and systemically if they are to uproot corrupt practices. TI's ALACs reject the notion that people are apathetic in the face of corruption. The centres demonstrate that people do become actively involved in the fight against corruption when they are provided with *simple*,

credible and *viable* citizen participation mechanisms to do so. The ALACs provide victims and/or witnesses of corruption with practical assistance to pursue complaints and address their grievances. The ALAC is an effective citizen participation tool that links the public interest with private incentives for action on the part of the individual. The proposed project aims at building comprehensive knowledge about citizen participation in a European context.

The ALACs-project is a necessary preliminary step for the implementation of a new management tool and a new citizen participation tool. The results of the project will increase the probability of a successful adaptation and efficient application of the ALAC approach in different European and non-European countries. The admission of a non-European country in the project (Azerbaijan) has the methodical function of a comparative and control case.

In the first phase of the research, an analytical framework on European citizen participation in the context of combating corruption will be created, and the four existing ALACs will be evaluated using this framework. The goal will be to examine how the ALAC methodology has been adapted to the distinct historical, socio-economic and cultural conditions in four separate countries. Moreover, both scientists and practitioners involved in the project will intensify their understanding of how politico-cultural differences in the exercise of citizenship are determined by different patterns of perception. This will consequently help them better determine the restrictions and possibilities of implementing the management/citizen participation tool in a concrete situation. Creating a framework of analysis and evaluation of the existing ALACs is thus a necessary precondition of successful modification and application of the management tool in those countries where it will be introduced during the project. The second phase of implementation will then be carried out as a simultaneous process of interaction between science and practice, which, as explained above, will help optimise results. In short, the project itself will be a permanent process of evaluation of citizens' participation under changing conditions.

It is envisaged:
by the research performers:

- to assess the concept and practice of citizen participation in Europe and in conjunction with European law.
- to analyse how citizens approach their governing institutions and how they make use of mediating civil society institutions to do so (specifically in the context of anti-corruption), as well as what their participation in civic life reveals about the norms and rules that govern their expectations and behaviours.
- to derive a framework of analysis that identifies particular conditioning factors for European citizen participation in the context of combating corruption.
- to apply this framework in an evaluative mode to four existing ALACs and to

develop conditional recommendations on how to improve the ALAC mechanism.

- to study, identify and assess politico-cultural conditioning factors in the four new ALAC host environments that relate to citizen participation in the context of combating corruption.
- to monitor the implementation of the recommendations in four new ALACs and to derive further understanding of factors that affect the exercise of citizenship.
- to organise cross-fertilization meetings between researchers and practitioners, which will provide ongoing gains in knowledge about best practice in terms of citizen participation in an anti-corruption context.

by Transparency International Secretariat (TIS):

- to develop a monitoring and quality assurance framework that facilitates the comparative operational analysis of ALACs.
- to devise and test a more advanced empirical database for the collection and analysis of statistics from all eight ALAC countries, i including information both on direct citizen participation and on representative citizen activities (i.e. institutional engagement, policy advocacy, etc.).
- to support the establishment of new well-functioning ALACs in Europe and the development of advocacy capacity in both existing and new ALACs (e.g. sound and professional research and policy papers that will improve TI's ability to advocate for policy changes at that national level and to formulate anti-corruption initiatives at the EU level).

by TI National Chapters with existing ALACs (4):

- to provide situation analyses of the operations of the ALAC citizen participation mechanism in four countries.
- to provide a research interface for the project RTD performers.

by TI National Chapters with newly established ALACs (4):

- to apply recommendations, results and insights from the research conducted during the first project phase in the design of the new ALACs (informed by evidence on national factors affecting exercise of citizenship).
- to provide a research and monitoring interface for the project RTD performers.

by all partners:

- to critically review and validate the RTD performers' recommendations for improved ALAC methodology.
- to contribute to learning and dissemination of learning on the role of citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts.
- to assess citizen participation concepts and practices in Europe and in conjunction with European law.

3.3 EU-level policy and institutional recommendations

In addition to advocacy at the national level, it is essential to also advocate for systemic change at the EU level because that is where most of the anti-corruption laws and policies within the European Union are formulated. Throughout the course of EU integration, member states have entrusted EU-level decision-makers with vast competencies in the areas of criminal law, judicial cooperation, money laundering, trade policy, procurement rules, enlargement, development cooperation and accounting standards. The result has been that European law and policies increasingly determine the everyday life of ordinary citizens, often even more than does national legislation. Approximately 70% of the relevant anti-corruption laws are initiated and drafted in Brussels. For that reason, the EU is an important advocacy target group. As legislator and political actor, the EU has the power to apply decisions that affect the fight against corruption to all EU member states and EU accession candidate countries. It is assumed that improved European legislation and policies reflecting citizen needs will help build up an active citizenry in Europe. Enhance citizen participation is important because the EU is currently working on a reform treaty that will make the enlarged EU more efficient and democratically legitimated. Among the key improvements envisioned is a more democratic and open EU for both citizens and national parliaments with lawmaking discussions increasingly open to public scrutiny. Accordingly, Europeans will further be given the opportunity to influence proposed EU laws.

During this phase of the project, the Warwick University partner (Dr. Ralf Rogowski) will evaluate the EU's anti-corruption legal framework, highlighting those aspects that should be given special consideration in view of the project's goal – namely, the formulation of anti-corruption policy recommendations at the EU level. The evaluation will also take the national-level recommendations into consideration, paying close attention to areas of overlapping or confluent policy and institutional mandates. Where such areas exist, the "national" recommendations then also be advocated at the EU level. Policy and institutional recommendations only become useful if they are effectively advocated; an interface between research and decision-making must, in other words, be created. TIS will use its Brussels office as base of project operations during the third project phase in order to increase the effectiveness of EU advocacy planning, dialogue and impact. Similarly, advocacy pressure will be Brussels-based due to the city's prominent role in international politics and high media visibility. Mrs. Jana Mittermaier, Senior Programme Co-ordinator of TI will be responsible for this advocacy support, serving as TI EU Advocacy Coordinator. To this end, she will co-operate closely with the research performers from both Warwick and Konstanz University. Research performers at Konstanz University will finally coordinate and support production of a last report on EU policy and institutional recommendations arising out of the legal and action research of this Project.

Structure of work plan of ALACs-project

Activity	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
1. Research on factors affecting citizen participation concepts in eight countries; research on practices and perceptions on the basis of existing ALAC mechanisms in four countries and creation of conditional framework of analysis on European citizen participation in the context of combating corruption.			
2. Situation analysis of four ALACs in operation; development of monitoring and quality assessment framework.			
3. Evaluation and recommendations to improve the methodology of ALAC citizen participation tool; joint validation by researchers and practitioners.			
4. Implementation, monitoring and assessment of improved ALAC methodology in four new ALACs in EU member states.			
5. Improvement of policy formulation and implementation at national and EU level through evidence-based recommendations from TIS and TI National Chapters.			
6. Organisation of cross-fertilisation research meetings between researchers (Konstanz University research team) and practitioners (Transparency International); dissemination of knowledge.			

3.4 Impact of the project and contribution of the expected results at the Euro pean level

Through the development, dissemination and use of project results, the project aims at achieving the following:

a) to advance the TI/ALAC as citizen participation mechanism in four existing ALACs, two operating in EU member states (e.g. Czech Republic and Romania), one operating in a a potential EU candidate county (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) and one operating in a country participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the European Commission (e.g. Azerbaijan), as well as in four new ALACs in the EU member states Finland, Ireland, Hungary and Lithuania;

b) to increase awareness and information for the formulation or implementation of European anti-corruption advocacy initiatives;

c) to set up a strategy to involve Transparency International, the leading global coalition against corruption, in the making and/or diffusion of research work; and

d) to contribute to the formulation, development and implementation of anti-corruption policy at the national and EU levels.

More specifically, research on and enhancement of the ALAC as an anti-corruption tool aims at generating scientific knowledge designed to serve mainly three purposes:

- Through targeted publicity campaigns and mechanisms, to *raise public awareness* on citizen rights related to corruption issues, thus promoting civil activism.
- To *enhance the civil society role* of the ALAC, developing it into *a*) a public interface, *b*) a direct and structured means of citizen empowerment, and *c*) a bottom-up driver of change.
- To *provide impetus* for policy advocacy and institutional reform by linking the work of ALACs with media, civil society and public pressure in order to achieve greater public accountability for anti-corruption policies and practices.

Given these overall impact objectives, the research project is designed in such way as to meet the following set of criteria/factors that form an interlinked continuum:

- *Educative*. The research results will flow into strengthening the capacity of the ALACs to provide information and build public awareness so that citizens not only become aware of their rights with regard to corruption, but also feel empowered to demand their rights.
- *Curative*. The results will also contribute to the exercising of citizens rights in terms of the competent investigation and resolution by public authorities or state sanctioned anti-corruption mechanisms of cases where citizen rights have been violated.
- *Preventive*. Satisfying the first two factors means providing a knowledge-sustained basis for legal and institutional reform designed to prevent or minimize corruption mainly through new laws, regulations or mechanisms, and/or modifications to or improved compliance with existing legislation.

In this way, the project's research and analysis of citizenship and citizen participation purports to assist and scientifically bolster the "grassroots" work of the ALACs in helping them to go beyond the narrowly-conceived mandate of advising citizens of their rights and advocating on their behalf. Exploring cultural mentalities and societal stances towards the legal framework and especially towards the anti-corruption legislation will help *link* the advisory and advocacy efforts for individual citizens to wider civil education, engagement and legal reform initiatives, thus unifying the educative, curative and preventing dimensions of fighting corruption. This, in turn, means raising the degree and effectiveness of citizen participation and consequently promoting the anchoring of the values of dignity, integrity, accountability and transparency in civil society.

In view of the objectives aimed at and the factors to be considered, the ALACs project is a pilot research undertaking for the establishment of a *professional management system* in a grassroots organisation that started as a more or less spontaneous movement without strict organisational structures and leadership. Therefore, it will have an immediate and far-reaching impact on the work of the ALACs and the national chapters of Transparency International for it shall:

- *raise* the quality of the human resources (highly competent personnel, e.g. ALAC coordinator, legal experts, volunteers) involved both in the existing centres and the ones to be set up;
- *strengthen* the support of the TI national chapters (appropriate management, professional support and oversight from TI staff);
- *widen* the radius of groups (for example youth, migrants, women) that can see the work of the ALACs as effective encouragement of their wish for active social engagement and civil society participation;
- *enhance* the reputation/influence of TI chapters, which is an important factor when it comes to support from the public as well as media, civil society and pro-reform public sector stakeholders;
- and lastly, through the development of the ALACs as professional management tools, *promote and consolidate* credibility, trust and respect – all essential factors for enhancing the prospects of leveraging support for complaint resolution and anti-corruption reforms in relation to key state authorities.

The results of the project are furthermore intended to function as sustainable know-how for the successful *adaptation and efficient application* of the management tool to the socio-cultural conditions in various *European and non-European countries*. One of the keys to maximising ALAC effectiveness is to be flexible and iterative in order to make the Centres relevant to local circumstances. Thus *a*) researchers will focus on the local socio-cultural bearings of corruption (e.g. perceptions, stances, behavioural patterns, institutional attitudes, etc.) and *b*) on the basis of the results achieved in the framework of the EU-supported project "Crime and Culture. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention" (Sixth Framework Programme), the research group will:

- *assess* the relative weight to be conferred on the three functions (educative, curative and preventive) underlying the work of the ALACs in each particular social-cultural context. Determining factors for this assessment shall be citizens' attitudes towards the legal framework of anti-corruption, forms of participation in civil life and norms/rules governing behaviour;
- *design* the modification and application of the management tool for the ALACs to be set up in four EU member states based on the results of the analysis of how

the existing ALACs have responded to their socio-cultural surroundings. To this end, the research group will draw upon both the results of the research on corruption as cultural phenomenon ("Crime and Culture") and the insights gained from the co-operation between CSO participants and RTD performers in the first phase of the project;

- *evaluate* the extent to which the analysis of the cultural preconditions of fighting corruption can help estimate whether a higher degree of cross-fertilisation among the ALACs will prove to be beneficial and cost-effective. The cross-national comparison of the embeddedness of the ALACs in the various cultural contexts of corruption perceptions will also utilise the end results of "Crime and Culture" discussed with policy makers, national and international experts and European and international anti-corruption organisations;
- thus *develop* the capacity of the ALACs (e.g. through sound and professional research and policy papers) to improve the contribution of TI to advocate for policy changes at national levels and to formulate anti-corruption initiatives at the EU level. The research-based development of the capacity of the ALACs to generate forms of a more active participation and citizen ownership at the European level can also be beneficial to other CSOs.

Sebastian Sperber

Citizen participation – a cornerstone for urban safety and the prevention of criminality

Safety is everybody's business. This idea was central to the founding fathers of the European Forum for Urban Safety, a network bringing together 300 local and regional authorities from all around Europe. Working on crime prevention issues since 1988, the European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS), has been underlining the importance of citizen participation for the prevention of criminality and in the combat for urban safety against crime. This vision of safety as a public good, which requires the active participation of citizens is most clearly expressed in the 'Saragossa Manifesto', where the member cities of the Forum have summarised the principles and values guiding their efforts in the prevention of criminality:

"Safety is an essential public good, closely linked to other public goods such as social inclusion and the right to work, to health care, education and culture. Every strategy using fear is to be rejected in favour of policies furthering active citizenship, an appropriation of the city's territory and the development of collective life. Access to other rights also favours the right to security (Art1)

…the participants wish to see effective integrated global policies set up, aimed at fighting the effects of crime as well as its causes such as social exclusion, discrimination in rights, and economic inequalities.

…our commitment as administrators and representatives of our communities is to create a place for dialogue and encounter between populations of different origins, and an alliance between civilisations (Art 4)…By developing integrated, multisectoral approaches, and with the support of regional, national and European authorities, urban policies are innovative if they do not put security solely in the hands of justice and the police. (Art 9)…

It is the role of local councillors, to encourage bringing together all inhabitants of their city regardless of philosophical or sexual orientation, ethnic, cultural and religious group or legal situation. This role is ensured by the vigilant respect for the equality of all in access to city services…

The Police must exercise their authority in close collaboration with citizens… (and) base their acts and the preventive vision, first of all complete and balanced, of citizens' problems, from proximity and collaboration with the citizen…" (Security, Democracy and Cities – the Saragossa Manifesto, 2006).

The European Forum for Urban Safety stands for a participative approach to crime prevention. It aims at decreasing the distance between citizens and public authorities in prevention activities and encourages an active local participation.

This approach counting on the involvement of citizen is not unique to the EFUS, but is widely recognised and used by other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe or the European Union.

Why should citizens participate?

One can argue that participation has an intrinsic value: it is good that people are actively involved as citizens in decision making in their communities. Their care for the community and their fellow citizens is what makes a society cohesive. A cohesive society, in which people are and feel included, scores well on primary prevention by reducing risk factors. Where there is trust among citizens fear of crime is low and where people watch out for each other there is less space for criminal activity.

More directly, participation is crucial in helping to sustain the legitimacy of decisions and deliver accountability. It could be argued that local authorities would not be able to act as effective community leaders if they lacked a base of popular support, especially when it comes to safety policies.

Likewise, without the participation of citizens in prevention measures and policies there is an information problem. Governments do not have all the information necessary to formulate good policies and services that fit the safety needs, the fears of and dangers for their citizens.

The debate around citizen participation in public decision-making started in the 70's as a theoretical issue and as an answer to the deficiencies of the representative dmocracy. Despite the different reflections on participative democracy, initiated by theoreticians like Pateman (1970), Macpherson (1977) and Poulantzas (1980), the general idea is to find new ways of access, beyond national and local elections, to the public decision-making (David Held, 1987), both at local and national level. The common idea of what we actually consider as participative democracy is the citizens' right to directly participate in the resolution of public problems in order to improve everyday life. Among the conditions for achieving participation is an open system of information, transparency and communication towards citizens before, during and after the decision-making process.

However, the meaning of citizen participation has evolved since and it is more explicit both in theoretical and practical use. Nowadays it is used quite differently than the term of participative democracy. The term citizen participation refers mostly to the notion of shared responsibility, otherwise called, co-responsibility and it is based on the liberal principle that not only the state but also individuals have responsibilities for society's well-being.

This citizens' right to participate is sometimes laid out as a duty and used to argue for less involvement of the state; however, a participative approach and the idea of shared responsibility should not be reduced to a retreat of the state. Guaranteeing the safety of its citizens is still one of the most prominent tasks of the State and remains a central reason why States exist. These responsibilities of the State are essential, what changes with a participative approach is the manner in which the State fulfils them.

According to the Council of Europe, co-responsibility is one of the tools for achieving social cohesion[1]. That includes the sharing among citizens of a global objective for the society's welfare.

In practice, this shared responsibility can be translated into associative approaches. That means that the actors' roles and responsibilities are defined through the development of interpersonal or inter-institutional relations based on "free and open communication".

The associative approach aims to eliminate certain control procedures in the interests of greater transparency, the mutual recognition of the responsibilities of the various actors or services, the clarification of their respective roles, improvements in co-operation, involvement in the assessment of benefits, etc. This approach makes it possible to lay the foundations of a system that involves the actors' assuming joint responsibility for social cohesion, and thus safety.

As underlined by the European Forum for Urban Safety, this approach goes beyond information of citizens and occasional consultation, but aims at the implication of citizens in all stages of policy or a measure so they can actually influence everyday life. Citizen participation can add value through-out a cycle of policy making: at the beginning (in a diagnosis of the status quo), during policy formulation and in the aftermath in the evaluation of policies and measures.

Clarifying the sharing of responsibilities and the involvement of the people concerned in the process of reflecting on the measures to be taken, is essential for several reasons: it facilitates the link with the action by involving those for whom it is primarily intended; it helps improve the quality of the exercise; it provides a better response to the objectives of social cohesion in terms of participation, citizenship and better mutual understanding; it makes for a better sharing out of objectives and greater effectiveness as regards the action plans and programmes. The public authorities therefore need to build bridges with their citizens.

The Council of Europe has shown itself the importance of this approach precisely for safety questions. A recent publication[2] shows that policies to deal with difficul-

[1] Council of Europe, Concerted development for social cohesion indicators, Methodological guide, 2005 (www.coe.int)

[2] Council of Europe, Guide to new approaches to policies for young people from lower-income neighbour-

ties with young people from disadvantaged urban areas are often ineffective because they are not designed with the concerned populations. This results in policies that are based on wrong assumptions and stereotypes, which in the end are unable to solve the problem, because they have missed the actual target. Preventive measures have to take into account stakeholders and need to give them a voice. The question is how this can be done.

Methods to involve citizens

The European Forum for Urban Safety encourages its members to always take into account the advantages of involving citizens into their preventive measures and policies. **It is known that p**eople participate when they have the capacity - the resources, skills and knowledge- necessary to do so. People participate when they feel part of a group or community: they like to participate if it is important to their sense of identity; when they are enabled to do so by an infrastructure of civic networks and organisations; when they are directly asked for their opinion. Finally, people participate when they experience the system they are seeking to influence as responsive.[3] Local authorities can use these five factors to encourage citizens to participate, especially in the way they ask and involve them directly.

To offer citizens' opportunities for participation, local authorities can draw on a variety of instruments:

- *consultation instruments*,[4] to find out the citizens concerns,
- *deliberative methods,* to reflect on an issue in order to come to a judgment about an issue,
- *co-governance mechanisms* to give citizens significant influence during the process of decision making
- *direct democracy* allowing citizen to set an agenda and to make or recall decisions
- *e-democracy* to propose new forms of joint deliberation and decision making

They allow for different levels of implication[5]:

- *Information*: in this case, citizens usually receive one-way information- newsletters, media coverage of audit plan, statistics, studies and emerging results-.
- *Consultation*: in addition to 'information', communities can share their ideas or comments to public authorities by the means of interviews, written submissions,

hoods, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2006.

[3] See Council of Europe, "CLEAR - A self-assessment tool for citizen participation at the local level", Strasbourg 2008

[4] EFUS, Local Democracy, Social Cohesion & Security, 2007 (electronic version)

[5] categorisation of the International Association for Public Participation, see for example EFUS, Guidance on Local Safety Audit, Paris 2008

surveys, meetings with community groups for data analysis or feedback on audit report.

- *Involvement*: here, public authorities work directly with communities by taking into consideration their aspirations. There is an interaction with community groups to discuss issues and explore viewpoints, for instance, joint workshops or discussion of draft report before publication.
- *Collaboration*: public authorities partner with communities in each aspect of the decision: community representatives are members of the planning group and leaders of audit work in certain areas. They influence in the selection of priorities and the audit report is usually written in common with public local authorities.
- *Empowerment*: the final decision making is placed in the hands of community bodies. That means that community representatives chair the Steering Group of the project, they decide the priorities and the content of the final report.

In the context of safety questions, *consultation of inhabitants* is most common and often an integral part of the crime prevention process. Consultation can be done by surveys, which give a representative overview, but also on a more permanent basis. The member cities of the European Forum for Urban for Safety organise their prevention work in local partnerships bringing together police, justice, education, housing services, social services and other partners like the civil society associations (NGOs, specialized organizations that represent community groups) and the private sector.

In their partnership work arrangement, cities can provide a permanent citizen commission that works regularly with the players of the *"Safety Service"* in the implementation of the prevention strategy. This citizen commission does not meet exclusively for exchanging questions and information; it also has a technical role and makes proposals. It is for this reason that it brings together technicians and inhabitants rather than elected officials. Here, the consulting of inhabitants falls within a more complex strategy of joint work that aims at enriching the debate and the development of local action.

Consultation of inhabitants can also be implemented for specific projects or important events. In the case of important events, and in consideration of the primordial involvement of the inhabitants, consultation becomes a fundamental strategic instrument for the elected officials who decide to favour the citizens' role and call them to work concretely on a particular initiative.

The same applies to particular situations, such as crisis, which generally oblige the mayor to give a rapid and clear response and inform the inhabitants on the way the municipality decides to intervene. This situation exposes the officials to the immediate judgement of the inhabitants who, finding themselves in a position of insecurity, demand solutions. In these particular situations, the pressure of the inhabitants, com-

bined with the fear of committing errors, often pushes officials to rapidly organise a consultation to identify key concerns and provide adequate responses afterwards.

A particular challenge for any measure is to obtain a certain degree of citizens' representativity and in particular to reach those who are in socio-economically disadvantaged situations. As argued above, these populations are less likely to get involved, though they are usually the one in most in need: Crime is not only a problem for the well-off population, but usually hits the hardest those who are in the least favourable situation. Involving citizens in safety and prevention measures requires a proactive strategy reaching out to these vulnerable populations.

Different methods of associating citizens to measures for urban safety are also necessary in different situations, depending on the stage of the policy making process, on the input that is decisive and of course local and situational circumstances.

Citizens participation in crime prevention

The European Forum for Urban Safety tries to mainstream a participative approach for the prevention of criminality. Activities in various fields of urban safety make use of it.

One of the most prominent examples for citizen participation are *local safety audits*. They provide a clear picture and understanding of crime and victimization, which is the foundation to targeted action to reduce crime and increase security, and consequently social cohesion.In order to be comprehensive, the audit process has to involve many actors and stakeholders, including citizens and communities. Indeed involving communities improves the quality of audit results, including a better understanding of problems, the development of more appropriate responses and a higher level of community interest and ownership.

As explained in the guidebook on local safety audits of the European Forum for Urban Safety groups of people who share any interest or attribute that gives them a particular perspective on crime or its prevention, otherwise called 'communities of interests', should be actively involved. This includes, for example, women, ethnic minorities, young people, homeless people and businesses. These communities of interest are often strongly represented by civil society. They form the voluntary organisations and institutions in a city including charities, non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, business associations, coalitions, advocacy groups and many others. A commitment to this should be one of the principles underpinning not just the safety audit, but all work relating to the crime prevention strategy.

The guide showed that citizen participation practices differ from city to city. For this reason, each city's needs to decide how to translate its commitment to a participative approach into practice.

The creation of participative institutions by local authorities does not necessarily prove active citizen participation. Elected local officials should not be content with participative approaches alone, but on the contrary, they should always be aware of preserving them in the best possible way: satisfying material needs, supporting meetings with local and national elected etc. Creating participative approaches is one issue but preserving them and improving them according to society's demands is a great democratic challenge both for local communities and national governors.

Other examples for participations on the ground have been brought together at the EFUS conference precisely on *local safety strategies* and participation of citizen which took place in Gliwice, Poland, in 2006:

- Cities ask citizens to contribute to safety by doing their share, which means watching out for others and not to look away, calling authorities and proposing themselves as witnesses, doing what they can to improve situational prevention at their homes, cars, etc.
- Some cities use websites on which citizens can report to the appropriate public authorities any public problem in their neighbourhood including safety issues. The demands are registered and treated by local authorities which, if needed, intervene in the field and provide a response to citizens.
- Some cities invite citizens to participate in workshops to drafting of safety projects and in the evaluation of practices,
- Some cities give individual citizens the possibility to assist at the local safety council. This cornerstone of concertation at the local level is very often only open to representatives of institutions or civil society organisation.
- Other go as far as to encourage their citizens to be themselves part of safety patrols in their neighbourhoods. Associating citizens to this type of "policing" measures is a quite delicate undertaking. Experiences show that to be successful they need to follow a clear set of rules and ethical standards and especially have to be accepted and supported by the whole population. This kind of measure could potentially be dangerous for volunteers as well as for the general population as they are not specially trained.
- Cities propose proximity services in close coordination with citizens' initiatives and associations on the spot open to the public.

Citizen participation is not only valuable in traditional safety issues but also question such as drug abuse, as the EFUS-Project Democracy, Cities and Drugs has shown. Its aim was precisely to reinforce the capacity of the civil society (NGOs, health,

criminal and justice services, communities, including visible minority ones, and drug service users) and their cooperation with the local policy makers to promote a better health and care for drug users. One innovation is that inhabitants of a particular area of a city are also associated to the effort. Understanding the mutual situation of residents and drug addicts making use of specialised services can make a significant contribution to a peace in a particular neighbourhood of a city and to reduce the feeling of insecurity. Citizens and neighbourhood councils are associated to the initiative and can contribute to it. They can also be part of efforts to perpetuate the monitoring over time though collaboration committees.

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These different examples from the members of the EFUS network, show that citizens participation can be very valuable in all areas of crime prevention. The European Forum for Urban Safety therefore promotes this participative approach as an underlying principle for prevention activities. Many cities know about the value of citizen participation in their effort for urban safety and their measures to prevent criminality. EFUS supports them in optimizing their policies and methods with an exchange of experiences and practices. Active citizen participation is never acquired once and for all. If participation is actually only about informing, if citizen have the impression they are only asked before elections and that their view is not really taken into account, a participative approach becomes an empty shell. Keeping a dialogue with citizen on safety issues and measure is a permanent investment. Though, it is an investment which pays off in terms of greater safety. 21 years after its foundation of the EFUS, Gilbert Bonnemaison's words are particularly timely: safety is still everybody's business.

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In war as in peace: youth violence – a challenge for international co-operation[1]

Drug crime in Rio, racist offences against immigrants, shootings at schools, harassment in Belfast's neighbourhoods, killing brothers and sisters in Ramallah, kids traumatized by war in Bosnia or in the Congo – the involvement of children and adolescents in political and criminal acts of violence in mega-cities, as well as in (post-) conflict zones of recent wars, is an increasingly disturbing phenomenon. But youth violence is neither a new phenomenon nor a specific problem of developing societies.[2] While traditionally-structured societies have been able to deal with and socially controll the problems of youth violence in various ways in the past, it has come to be a major challenge in the wake of rapid social change, featuring urbanization, migration and alienation accelerated by globalization.

The many and diverse problems of societies undergoing processes of transition leave their mark on adolescents, in particular on the verge of adulthood, at the start of both their social and professional lives. The manner in which any young generation experiences life against the background of demographic structures determines to a large extent its political and societal socialization and ability to act. According to the World Bank (World Development Report 2007) some 1.5 bn individuals have currently reached the age of between 12 and 24 years, of whom some 1.2 bn are living in developing societies of the South. To tackle these problems of the youth and their future prospects is a challenge to the various actors of international cooperation in the fields of foreign, development and security policies. Priority needs to be given to workable analysis to be carried out with respect to the specific causes of violence in order to contribute to the prevention of physical force and to indicate a better way of dealing with it.

The question of how adolescents and youth become involved in the organization of political and criminal violence is being discussed with greater urgency in the context of the so-called „new wars". The building-up of networks, milieus and sub-cultures with an inclination to use force, and the emerging macro and microstructures of violence play a key role in current inter-ethnic or inter-religious processes of radicalization; at the same time they draw attention to the general political conditions under

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[1] This is the introduction to Loccumer Protokolle 65/07, proceedings of the international conference "In War as in Peace: Youth Violence – A Challenge for International Co-operation", held at the Evangelische Akademie Loccum from 14 to 16 November, 2007. The volume can be ordered via the book seller or the Academy´s homepage, online shop: http://www.loccum.de/protokoll/inhalt/inh0765.html. It holds the ISBN 978-3-8172-6507-7, 420 pages, and costs 16,00 Euro €. Following the introduction, we are also reprinting the then conference programme.

[2] There is no ubiquitous definition of youth, as there are differences according to history, culture and context (e.g. in penal justice systems or citizenship). The United Nations General Assembly defines youth as the age cohort between 15 and 24 years, the World Development Report (World Bank 2006) includes young people between age 12 and 24. As basic status passages from childhood to adulthood differ according to historical and cultural patterns a definition based exclusively on age is of limited use.

which force is being used and which can be experienced collectively. However, political concepts for stabilization and peace-building in post-war societies have so far paid scant attention to the question of how to involve youth in these processes.

Social science research on youth violence in industrial centres of the North – with an emphasis on individual life experience – is increasingly being supplemented by comparative supra-regional and partly historical studies examining the causes of youth violence, its various forms of organization and how societies deal with this in the USA, Europe, Japan or Latin America and, more recently, in Africa. The academic discussion on youth violence is shaped by the specific contexts of academic disciplines (most of all psychology, sociology and criminology). The explanations for youth violence focus on the interrelation between societal contexts and the individual or collective perceptions and handling of these contexts. Three causal relations are being discussed:

1. Individual or personal experience of violence in the family or the immediate environment (school, neighborhoods, community);
2. Societal frameworks, such as inclusion into peer groups or other collective forms of organization, both civilian and (para)military
3. Political, economic and social developments that shape young peoples' perspectives for their personal future (e.g. availability of education, work and employment situation, social mobility etc.).

The mainstream of the discussion focuses either on the relation between individual experiences and collective organizations, or on individual experiences and perspectives for the future (see Daiute et al. 2006). Most of these debates look at developments in the big cities of the developed world, since the 1960s research in the US has been at the forefront. Recently these discussions have opened up to a more comparative approach and to the political, economic and, last but not least, the cultural aspects of globalization.[3]

Political science, peace and development research have only just begun to address the issue of youth and youth violence. Two perceptions are dominant here: During the last years the thesis of the youth bulge – formulated among others by Samuel Huntington in his book on the "Clash of Civilisations" – became prominent beyond academic discussions. The main argument is that societies with a large age cohort of young males that lack perspectives for the future are more conflict prone than others. While the lack of integration and perspective is an important factor for violence in general and youth violence in particular the thesis reduces the challenges that are caused by rapid social change to the demographic variable. Hence it is not surprising that quantitative studies testing the youth bulge theses have come to much more sophisticated results. (see Steffen Kröhnert in this book).

[3] See. Hagedorn 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, Klein 2001, Klein/Maxson 2006,Watts 1998.

The perception of youth as a security threat even reached the UN High Level Panel on Security of 2004 stating: "While it may not reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the developing world" (UN 2004:24). The security related discussion mainly refers to wars in Western Africa, the threat of terrorism and violent Islamic groups as well as the phenomenon of violent youth gangs and organised crime (the Balkans, Central America).[4] (see Nick Idoko, José Luis Rocha in this book).

A rather different notion of youth dominates the discourse in the field of human rights where youth are perceived as victims of conflict and violence. This perception is presented in the UN Reports of the UN General Secretary's expert Graça Machel (1996, 2001) and other reports on the effects of violence from national and international NGOs. This discussion is closely linked to the discussion on children and armed violence and tends to focus on the age cohort under the age of 18 which is the threshold between children and adults for most international treaties and conventions for the protection of children.[5]

Only recently a new approach which aims at overcoming the dichotomy of youth as being either victims or perpetrators has emerged in the debate. Here youth are seen as autonomous actors whose behavior is shaped by differing context variables. A series of qualitative studies on youth and violent conflict have shown that young people dispose over a relatively high level of resilience towards conflict and violence and that they have a high capacity of adaptability and resistance (see UNDP 2006, Sommers 2006). War and violence change existing structures of power, access to resources and hierarchy; and thus may ironically offer opportunities for youth (as well as for women) not available during peace times. This has consequences not only for the analysis of youth in armed conflict but for peace-building strategies, as well. The mainstream of peace-building literature and peace-building initiatives have only begun to address these questions and to include youth as an important actor.[6] (see Siobhan McEvoy-Levy). But this discourse is rarely linked to the debate on youth gangs and youth violence.

Trying to avoid any form of scandalization it appears sensible to carry out an in-depth analysis of the various existing – and possibly comparable – societal contexts and forms of youth violence, in war, post-war and non-war situations. We may find common structural features resulting from the following general factors: poverty, educa-

[4] See UN (2004), Mainwaring 2005 among others.

[5] At the same time youth in conflict is a gendered issue. While young males are seen mostly as perpetrators, girls and young women are mostly perceived in their role as victims. This is a quite fractured view of reality where young males are the main perpetrators as well as the main victims of youth violence.

[6] See McEvoy-Levy 2006, UNDP 2006, Sommers 2006, Daiute 2006, Kemper (2005). On youth in war Abbink/van Kessel (2005), Brett/Specht (2004). Dowdney (2005) addresses the issue of the participation of children and youth in organized armed violence, recently the World Bank (2005) has begun to do some research on youth in post-conflict contexts.

tional deprivation and marginalization forming the background for the willingness to act violently; group formation and incentives to enrich oneself at the expense of others through illicit economic activities; previous experience of violence in social, private-familial or political-public environments as offers and options for young people to form their identities.

It appears imperative to us to distinguish between the different contexts because context is a key determinant for the manner in which both society and international actors deal with youth violence (see Kurtenbach). While measures of demobilization, re-integration and social, mental and economic rehabilitation are the first choice in war and post-war times, violence used in non-war situations is largely addressed by criminological or social-educational measures. Yet, in the last few years numerous phenomena related to youth violence have increasingly emerged in a „grey" area in which neither war nor peace prevail, thus contributing not only to the scandalization of youth violence, but in parts to the development of new enemy stereotypes in the form of „urban rebel movements". Young people are increasingly being perceived as a threat.

In this realm the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) and the Evangelische Akademie Loccum, from 14 - 16 November 2007, organized an international conference to discuss the problems of youth violence in the different contexts of war, post-war and non-war situations, and the strategies of dealing with youth violence in these contexts, accordingly. For both, the context analysis and the strategic issues, the conference offered a cross-regional comparative approach.

Presenting analysis of case studies from Central America, West Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the US – Brazil, Nicaragua, Nigeria, DR Congo, Afghanistan, Palestine, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, France, Germany and US cities – the conference discussed, systematically and typologically, the causes, forms and structures of violence, to assess their significance in society and to develop exit strategies.

More specifically, the conference centered around the following questions:

I. What are the causes and objectives of youth violence in different societal, cultural and historical contexts? What are the regional differences?
   - in global metropolitan areas (migration, extremism, racism)
   - in connection with conflicts over resources (for example, Africa, Latin America)
   - in contexts marked by religion (for example, Middle East)
   - in connection with ethnicity (for example, Africa)
   - in processes of social exclusion (Latin America, Europe).

II. How can a line be drawn between different forms of violence – political violence, social violence, personal enrichment, ritualized violence, situational violence? What is youth-specific about these forms of violence?

III. How do societies deal with youth or young people who are inclined to use violence? What are the alternative options? What can and should be done through international cooperation? At what levels does it take place?

- youth as addressees of peacebuilding (demobilization, re-integration, economic prospects)
- role of school and general education
- youth projects against violence/youth exchanges
- youth as part of international peace missions
- specific transnational features (USA-Latin America; Europe-Africa.)
- cooperation in research and policy-making

After two days of intensive and fruitful discussions among experts from various disciplines and backgrounds no concluding results could be stated, however, numerous interesting findings were elaborated of which we want to highlight the following:

First: The topic of youth and youth violence is a central topic independent of the differring contexts. It touches on interrelated dimensions and „grey areas“ concerning the development perspective, the issues of peace and conflict resolution as well as social and welfare policies. Youth are not just victims or perpetrators but “key connectors” that shape the future of their societies. Social exclusion, marginalisation or stigmatization of young people is thus not only politically short sighted and morally condemnable but can also become dangerous.

Second: The specific context is highly relevant for the mechanisms and processes in which youth violence and its organisational features may occur. In this field a lot of comparative research and systematization still needs to be done, especially on the significance of cultural and historical contexts as well as on the influence of political regimes and economic orders.

Third: Political strategies towards youth and youth violence need to find an, at least, twofold balance. On the one hand cultural sensitive approaches must be adapted to needs for change and transformation which is often at the core of youth organisations. On the other hand, synergies are to be developed between top-down, middle level and bottom-up approaches. In doing so strategies should not be limited to solely working with the youth, but moreover it is about bringing change to the affected societies as a whole in a way which allows to acknowledge youth as a key potential rather than a source of irritation.

The conference indicated important and fascinating fields for further research and practice. The different areas of academic analysis and political practice hold a huge potential for follow-up conferences but also for future networking and co-operation.

The authors of the book have based their contributions on the many excellent presentations of the Loccum conference. The structure of the conference has been maintained for the outline of the book. The first chapter introduces the topic of youth violence in the globalized world addressing, the different contexts (Kurtenbach) and the social circumstances of young people living in crises and conflicts. (Blumör). This is complemented with a discussion of demographic developments (Kröhnert) and an overview on the main topics of research on youth violence in developing countries (Imbusch).

The chapter "Causes and Contexts of Youth Violence" deals with the relevance of processes of urbanization, social change and exclusion for youth violence in different contexts. Subchapter I documents the results on these issues in non-war situations with a reconsideration of gangs (Hagedorn), the possibilities to integrate youth at the communal level (Huguet), a case study on the complex situations youth face in Nigeria (Idoko) and urban riots in France (Keller). Subchapter II addresses the related problems for war and post-war contexts: The problems of ethnicity and identity are addressed with respect to Israel and Palestine (Clauss), the transformation process from war to post-war contexts with a focus on Northern Ireland (Jarman) and Afghanistan (Hayes).

The chapter "Strategies for Dealing with Youth Violence" is directed to state and non-state approaches addressing and coping with youth violence in different contexts. Subchapter I on non-war constellations discusses the possibilities of development co-operation (Sohr), strategies departing from a public health approach (Concha-Eastman), intercultural youth exchanges (Kimmich) and street work (Balzer). In subchapter II on war and post-war contexts the linkages of development and peace-building programs are addressed with a focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Fischer), and a detailed overview on youth related peace-building needs (McEvoy-Levy). Challenges for the demobilization of child soldiers and young people are explained with a focus on Eastern Congo (Koch), and the different experiences with strategies addressing post-war youth violence in Central America (Rocha).

Each chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings by the rapporteurs of the conference (Imbusch, Lock, Grimm, Kurtenbach).

Globalization of culture and its relations with youth violence (such as featured in Hip Hop and Rap, music and film) is the theme of Katrin Lock's paper.

The two final papers reflect and summarize the challenges for international co-operation from an EU practitioners' perspective (Däuble, Lyamouri-Bajja).

With this book, we again want to thank all paper givers and panellists, as well as the participants for contributing to a highly stimulating conference. We ask the readers for understanding that due to scarce financial resources we had to decide on an editing mode which included both English and German papers in parallel.

We are very grateful to the German Development Agency, GTZ, (Sector Project Youth and Education) and Swiss Development Cooperation (DEZA) for their generous funding of the conference.

We hope that this volume will foster the insights in the issues of the conference with those who attended, and beyond.

Loccum, September 2008

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Other content of the congress

Jürgen Mutz

Welcome Speech for the Workshop „Probation meets Prevention“ within the German Congress on Crime Prevention

Dear Participants,
dear Secretary General Leo Tigges,
dear Professor Kerner!

First of all I would like to thank the Mayor of Leipzig to let us use his town hall to start our workshop. It will be a pleasure to stay in this attractive city and I think the stimulating atmosphere will have a positive influence on our capacity for work.

It’s a great honour for me and a pleasure as well to welcome you all to this workshop on behalf of the German Congress on Crime Prevention. And I take the chance to combine my welcome with my thanks to the CEP that this important internationally working organization has accepted the offer of the congress organizers to arrange this workshop.

The CEP believes that a society built on the principles of social inclusion provides the best protection from the harm and distress caused by crime. Preventing (re-)offending is an important concern of the CEP.

The desired effect of the German Congress on Crime Prevention is to present and strengthen crime prevention within a broad societal framework. Thus it contributes to crime reduction as well as to the prevention and the decrease of becoming a victim and of fear of crime.

The targets’ intersection of the two associations suggested itself to organize a joint meeting to the benefits of the organizations and those who work in the field whether as professionals or as volunteers.

I am sure you will benefit not only from this workshop but also from the wide range of other interesting events of the German Prevention Day. For it belongs to the main objectives of the congress

- to present and exchange current and basic questions of crime prevention and its effectiveness
- to bring together partners within the field of crime prevention
- to function as a forum for the practice and to foster exchange of experiences
- to help to get into contact at the international level
- to discuss implementation strategies
- to develop recommendations for the practice, politics, administration and research.

Ladies and gentlemen, in my opinion probation means more than drawing up social investigation reports, supervision, help and control. An outstanding aim of probation is to prevent further crimes - with other words: Crime prevention!

My demand is: The probation officer should not restrict his efforts to the individual case. Probation officers are experts in analyzing criminal behavior. They know from their many supervised probationers the personal, social and economic circumstances which encourage the development of offending. The senior management of the probation services should give a certain priority that the great wealth of experience and knowledge of probation officers should be made useful beyond the case work. For instance:

- Probation officers could and should take on lessons in schools and youth centres. They can talk about the effects of a group dynamic process and how to escape a negative influence. They can describe the fate of addicts and show ways out of the dilemma. They can report on the positive influence of useful leisure activities. In short: They can inform, clarify and warn about offences and their consequences.
- Probation officers could and should advise local administration and parish councils how to handle social problems in the community; they know about the effects of bad housing and missing leisure facilities.
- Probation officers could and should contribute actively in local committees on crime prevention, making use of their professional expertise.
- Probation officers – as fighters for internal safety - could and should make convincing public relation work.
- I would like to add a last point: Probation manager and probation officer should be anxious to arouse the awareness of politicians that probation work is a part, an important part of crime prevention work, which is necessary for the protection of the public. This will make it easier for members of parliament to include in their political programme the demand for a high-quality probation service in satisfying quantity and they will be more likely prepared to spend money for it.

Ladies and gentlemen, please understand that I left the frame of a welcome address and started already to speak about the topic of our workshop. But probation and prevention are very close to my heart – particularly as I was president of the CEP for some years and since many years I am the chairman of the board of trustees in the German foundation for crime prevention and offenders' support, a foundation which is the organizing body of the congress in the background.

I wish you a successful workshop, pleasant days in Leipzig and before parting the satisfying feeling that you have made the right decision to join this meeting.

Jürgen Mutz

CEP - The European Organisation for Probation

Declaration of the workshop „Probation meets Prevention“

“CEP and its members are enthusiastic about being able to participate at this congress on prevention. The reason is that probation promotes crime prevention as part of its core work. The main emphasis of probation however is on tertiary prevention. Next to the traditional distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention we have also looked into the distinction between situation orientated, victim orientated and offender orientated prevention. The distinction which is quite often used in child protection work seems also to have a strong appeal to probation work. In this child protection framework we distinguish between general interventions, interventions on defined target groups indicated high risk prevention and clinical prevention. We feel very much at home in clinical prevention or offender orientated prevention. Probation may have a part to play in the other prevention fields like in primary and secondary crime prevention but mostly this is a by-product, be it an important one. For example, successful work with domestic violence perpetrators may also have a beneficiary effect on younger family members, especially as we all know that violence in the family and domestic violence tend to lead into inter-generational crime and domestic violence. Of course the probation officers will not work with the children or with the family as a whole, but probation has a role to play in warning the child protection system, and the police, and to play its role in the containment of the unwanted behaviour of the offender. The supervision might offer a wonderful stick behind the door to use when the offender is not living up to his obligations under the supervision contract.

The ultimate goal of probation is the prevention of re-offending but total elimination of risk when offenders are being managed in the community is not possible. We have to be clear about that. Although the supervision might be intense, the probation is not 24 hours a day behind the back of the offender.

Success may be defined as the total prevention of re-offending, but in a lot of cases this is unrealistic in the short term. Success may also be defined as a reduction in the frequency of re-offending and a reduction in the harm caused. A longer period between crimes and less serious crimes also denote success.

It is good to stress that crime reduction is not only a probation job. It is every one’s responsibility –communities as well as the other statutory agencies working in criminal justice.

What is the special role probation officers have to play in crime prevention? Their contribution is their skill in assessing and managing the risk offenders pose. But communities must acknowledge that there is a risk in having offenders in their midst.

Much of probation work is focused on evidence-based practice – the What Works system of interventions. But this is only successful within a system of good quality supervision, carried out by professional workers. They know how to motivate offenders to change. This is a key factor in probation work. It is also important that probation intervenes at an early stage in the criminal justice process. Not only can than the motivation work start, but the probation can also advise the public prosecutor on the best possible way of bringing about change, giving due attention to the risk the offender pose and the unrest or indignation that his crime may have caused.

Probation's relationship with the community is vital. The service needs community acceptance to carry out its work. Partnerships are key to this work; probation officers must have close contact with the social networks in the community. They can offer new circles to the offenders in which that might experiencing new meaningful ties and opportunities for work, accommodation and social welfare benefits. In this way probation likes to think of itself as a land of opportunity to offenders. Mentoring projects and lay supervisors also play an important part.

There is a constant need for scientific research into what constitutes good probation work and resources should not be wasted on programmes which have been proved not to work.

We must not oversell what we can achieve but equally we must not undersell ourselves. It is important that we communicate our results to the public, to partners, to other agencies and to each other.

Working in the justice system and working with the community are essential and interlinked. CEP and its members are great protagonists of prevention, and we are and feel part of the prevention approach. CEP and its members would like to be active in the whole spectre of prevention. At the same time we would not like to thin out or to distribute all our energy on this whole spectrum. Our strength is tertiary prevention in working with the offender, the justice system and the community. As probation people we have to become even stronger in this field to be effective and more successful in reintegrating the offender into the society and finally in reducing recidivism."

Wiebke Steffen

The Leipzig Statement of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention

Committed citizens – a safe society

The quality of a society is also measured by the extent to which its citizens get involved in public activities and are willing to make a voluntary commitment. Civic commitment also makes an important – indeed indispensable – contribution to the safety of a society and the feeling of safety of the population.

The 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention (in Leipzig from 2 to 3 June 2008) therefore focuses on this commitment under the motto 'Committed citizens – a safe society' in the speeches, consultations and discussions and the expert report 'Civic commitment in crime prevention' by Dr. Wiebke Steffen.

On the basis of this expert report, the German Congress on Crime Prevention, its permanent event partners and this year's hosting event partners state as follows:

Civic commitment is widespread in Germany.

- In Germany, almost **70% of the population** 14+ years old takes part in public life through clubs, organisations, groups and institutions for purposes other than their private and professional life. About half of them (36% of the population) are committed in a voluntary sense in that they assume certain long-term tasks within these social groups.
- In addition to these more than 23 million people who are already voluntarily committed, there is a great potential for the expansion and intensification of civic commitment.
- Furthermore, civic commitment does not just mean the 'classic honorary post' or a person's regular voluntary work or involvement in public life – i.e. not just the commitment of the aforementioned 70% of the population but also all the other forms that reflect commitment like for example civil courage, donations, the participation in a civic foundation.
- The range of the commitment covers almost all areas of society. Many of them depend on this commitment; some would perhaps cease to exist without it.
- However, a significant **structural change** in civic commitment has been noticeable for the last decades**:** Civic commitment is now more seldom a 'lifetime commitment' than before, people do not just want to get involved in an association or a club but also in new, informal structures and thus organise their field of activity themselves, have co-determination and co-organisation opportunities; what is needed is new access to active participation opportunities that harmonise

the individual commitment offer and the social commitment requirement.

Civic commitment is the social capital of our society; it can prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime.

- When so many citizens are publicly active in Germany, then this is also an indicator for a high degree of **social capital,** social solidarity and social quality of the German society.
- Civic commitment is not just a component of this social capital, it also creates social capital: the solidarity and the understanding between the members of a society, the reliability of shared rules, standards and values and last but not least the confidence in the institutions of the country.
- It therefore also has a positive effect on the **safety** of a society and the **feeling of safety** of its citizens – and that applies in general without citizens actually getting specifically involved in crime control.

Successful crime prevention is not possible without civic commitment

- Crime prevention is deemed to be generally understood as a task, of the whole of society, in which also and especially committed citizens can get involved.
- The fact that citizens cannot only get involved in crime prevention but should and even must if crimes are to be prevented or mitigated in their consequences and the safety situation and the feeling of safety are to be improved can be illustrated by the civic commitment to crime prevention through civil courage, the willingness to help and report, through victim aid, delinquent assistance and probation assistance and through networks for safety at municipal level.
- These examples show that civic commitment is established in crime prevention and has positive effects on safety and the feeling of safety. A safe society would not be possible without committed citizens.

Using commitment potentials for crime prevention

- The commitment level however is still relatively low compared to other social areas and the commitment potential has not been fully exhausted by far. There are therefore great opportunities – and also necessities – for the extension and intensification of civic commitment to crime prevention. For this, it is particularly necessary to
- take into account the **structural change** in civic commitment, that fits in well with civic commitment to crime prevention, in which the incident-related and problem-related cooperation is needed rather than a life-time commitment and in which new informal structures have occurred.

- develop a **culture of recognition** that suits the variety and difference of the commitment types in crime prevention and credibly makes clear to those committed that they are really indispensable for making things happen. The culture of recognition also includes the training and further training of committed citizens and the evaluation of crime-preventive measures and projects.

Committed citizens – a safe society

The German Congress on Crime Prevention calls on those responsible in politics, clubs, associations and other civil groups at municipal, state and national levels

- to exploit all opportunities to present, show, recognise and appreciate crime-preventive commitment in public and particularly in the media,
- to especially counter the still existing prejudices against people who are committed to safety through crime-preventive action,
- to open up new commitment opportunities and to establish a more civic-oriented culture of planning and decision-making in the public areas relevant for crime prevention,
- to meet the need of those committed for self-determination and co-organisation, to further develop existing qualification offers and measures and introduce additional ones, to evaluate projects and measures and to build networks and infrastructures,
- to strengthen and promote the crime-preventive commitment by companies and company employees.

The German Congress on Crime Prevention strongly supports

- the report 'Civic commitment on its way to a sustainable civil society' by the Commission of Inquiry assigned by the lower house of German Parliament and encourages a permanent observation of civil commitment, also especially in crime prevention,
- the continuation of the 'volunteer surveys' commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Family Matters, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and encourages a more in-depth and differentiated recording of voluntary commitment in the crime prevention area.

Leipzig, 3 June 2008

Erich Marks / Karla Schmitz

An overview of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention 2008

The annual German Congress on Crime Prevention (GCOCP) aims to present, discuss and strengthen the interdisciplinary character of crime prevention in a broad societal context. This text offers an overview about the structure and numerous topics, sections and forums of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention that took place on the 2nd and 3rd of June 2008 at the Congress Centre Leipzig.

Mission statement of the German Congress on Crime Prevention

The German Congress on Crime Prevention was established in 1995 as a national annual convention focusing especially on the field of crime prevention. Since the beginning it aims to present, discuss and strengthen the interdisciplinary and cross-departmental character of crime prevention within a broad societal context. By degrees the GCOCP opened for institutions, projects, methods, issues and knowledge from other fields of prevention that are more or less connected to each other.

Even though crime prevention is the centre of attention during the congress, the broaden spectrum of topics varies from prevention of drug addiction, traffic prevention to different aspects of prevention concerning health care.

The congress addresses itself in particular to all actors and people being in charge of prevention such as administration, municipalities, districts, health care, youth welfare, justice, church, media, politics, police, prevention committees, projects, schools, sport, associations and organisations, research etc.

As a national annual convention, the German Congress on Crime Prevention aims to:

- impart knowledge and exchange about current and fundamental issues of different spheres of crime prevention and their effectiveness
- bring together partners of crime prevention
- offer a forum for practitioners and enable the exchange of experience
- establish international ties and support the exchange of information
- discuss strategies of implementation
- develop and give recommendations to practitioners, politics, administration and research

Program advisory board

For the preparation of each German Congress on Crime Prevention a program advisory board is set up where the organiser as well as the hosting and permanent partners

are represented. The advisory board is responsible for the content of the upcoming congress as well as for prearrangements of prospect conventions. As already practised during previous years, a request for the submission of speech topics has been published in advance and received positive feedback. The number of submitted proposals and applications exceeded the limited quantity of lecture units available.

Partners

The commitment and bonds of the congress partners are a central component for the success of the congress. We would like to thank all involved decision-makers and representatives for their commitment. Altogether 34 organisations and institution have contributed in various forms and roles as an official partner of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention with their logo, reputation as well as personal and financial resources.

In the same way we want to thank the German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth for the sponsorship of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention.

Research expertise

In advance of the congress a highly valued research expertise by Dr. Wiebke Steffen has been published via internet and the congress catalogue in order to provide a basis for the debates about the congress' main focus topic "Dedicated Citizens - Safer Communities".

Lectures to the main theme

The main focus of the 13th German Congress on Crime Prevention, "Dedicated Citizens - Safer Communities", has been discussed by 37 speakers in 20 individual topics. The thematic choice of the individual topics aimed to complete the research expertise of Dr.Wiebke Steffen, so as to cover the broad range aspects of the main topic systematically.

Lectures to the main theme

- Prof. Dr. Dieter Hermann
  Social capital and security – About the effects of civic commitment
- Thomas Krüger
  Political education, prevention and social cohesion
- Heiko Rosenthal
  Civic commitment „Motor of the city community" – Preventive strategies, networks and projects aiming at increasing the sense of security of the citizens of Leipzig
- Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Heitmeyer / Sandra Hüpping / Julia Marth
  Social environment and group-related misanthropy: New approaches for

strengthening the civil society

- Norbert Friedrich / Jörg Seedorf
  „Courage against Violence – A manual for moral courage" as a guideline for prevention projects
- Reinhold Hepp
  In the name of mute victims – Promotion of witness and assistant behaviour in case of child abuse
- Hermann Groß / Prof. Dr. Arthur Kreuzer
  Voluntary police as a link between citizens and police? An evaluation of the Hessian Voluntary Police Service
- Prof. Dr. Hans-Dieter Schwind
  Moral Courage –When do people help and when rather not?
- Frank Goldberg
  Thinking global, acting local: crime preventive civic participation while considering participation, transparency and efficiency
- Dieter Meißner / Rainer Mollik
  Advisor in youth criminal proceedings Dresden – An exemplary project of voluntary civic commitment
- Elke Hannuschka
  "… Civic participation has to take place, but not in crime prevention councils…" – Results of quantitative and qualitative research study about communal crime prevention councils in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
- Susanne Kirchhoff / Dr. Kati Zenk
  More security through a new culture of conflict management? – Options and chances of mediators in crime prevention
- Siegfried Bayer / Hans-Alfred Blumenstein / Prof. Dr. Günter Rieger
  The honorary post at non-profit organisations of victim and delinquent assistance
- Kornelia Kamla
  Civic commitment for the social rehabilitation and recidivism – voluntary work in the field of probation assistance

Lectures in the Open Forum

The Open Forum offered space for speeches and presentations that where not directly linked to the main topic of the congress but still covered current issues of crime prevention in the broader or narrower context. Abstracts about all presentations, information about speakers, written versions of presentations and even Power Point presentations of the Open Forum are available at the homepage of the German Congress on Crime Prevention.

Lectures in the Open Forum

- Prof. Dr. Georg Ruhrmann & Dr. Denise Sommer
  Inmmigration policy in 1:30 – A comparing study about the effects of TV news and their implications about the inner security of Germany
- Michael Herschelmann
  Sexist German Gangsta-Rap – Does it lead to sexual violence?
- Andreas Riedel
  „With Brain against Violence" – A project initiative aiming at territorial networking
- Reinhard Koch
  Rightning extremist youth: Access between prevention and repression
- Ilona Adler / Farzin Akbari Kenari / Svetlana Rafalson
  Migrants as volunteers: IKUSH – Intercultural health care and drug addiction assistance for migrants, offered by migrants in Leipzig, field report
- Paul Scholz
  Reorientation of crime prevention activities by the Police of the Free State of Saxony
- Dr. Marc Coester / Dr. Anja Meyer / Thomas Müller / Prof. Dr. Jochen-Thomas Werner
  Knowledge is power: The Beccaria project - Quality management in crime prevention
- Cathleen Kappes
  Effects of violence prevention at school
- Klaus Stüllenberg
  The future of communal crime prevention
- Prof. Dr. Robert Pütz / Verena Schreiber / Christian Schwedes
  Crime prevention at schools in Germany: Fields of action and spatial implications
- Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Pott
  Prevention of alcohol abuse of teenagers
- Bastian Finke / Dr. Bodo Lippl
  Homophobic violence in public spaces – Victim assistance and prevention
- Brigitte Komescher / Sibylle Völker
  Cross-generational crime prevention using the example of mediation at schools through the „Seniorpartner in School"
- Prof. Dr. Adolf Windorfer
  Visiting care through family midwifes for at risk families during pregnancy and baby care = Ideal prevention of child neglect?

- Michael Breitschwerdt
  Overall responsible security and crime prevention management using the example of antibullying
- Bernd Holthusen / Dr. Christian Lüders
  Youth with migrational background – A challenge for crime prevention?
- Dr. Isabell Götz
  Violence against partner, children and senior citizens - Options of arrangement by family courts
- Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Heckmann
  Drug policy as city management – A European comparison
- Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus Beier
  The Berlin model of the prevention of sexual child abuse of unreported cases
- Prof. Dr. Britta Bannenberg
  Evaluation of crime prevention projects in Germany – A practice overview

Internet Forum

(Crime) prevention and the internet have several points of contacts and intersections regarding its content.

Since positive experience during the 12th GCOCP (2007), the congress offers a forum where the broad range of the internet, its chances and risks, can be observed and discussed. Besides a general debate, internet specific crimes, net-based consulting, crime preventive information services and databases or methodical issues of media competence are topics dealt with.

Within the Internet Forum in Leipzig 5 lectures were given:

- Rolf Grimmer
  Cybercrime 2008 – risks-measures-contact points
- Stefanie Krauel / Dorothea Schulz
  „Preventive measures protecting youth from harmful media – Secure chats using the example of the moderated children chat of " Seitenstark"
- Annette Cieslinski / Emily Engelhardt
  Professional online counselling by volunteers - A field report
- Judith Hilgers
  „Happy Slapping" – Nature and motives. Empirical results and suggestions for prevention
- Walter Staufer
  What is my child doing online? In what kind of danger is it when it uses the internet? Hints for media education, media recommendations and assistance offers

2nd Annual International Forum (AIF)[1]

Within the 13th GCOCP, the 2nd Annual International Forum (AIF) took place where 5 lectures of international experts in the field of crime prevention were presented and an accompanying program was held.

- Prof. Dr. Christian Pfeiffer
  Prevention of Juvenile Violence in Germany
- Valérie Sagant
  International examples and developments in crime prevention
- Leo Tigges
  "Probation meets Prevention" - Presentation of the Summary and Conclusion of the CEP-Workshop within the 2nd Annual International Forum of the German Congress on Crime Prevention
- Johanna Schmitz
  Kids Company and the principle of "loving care"
- Christa-Berta Kimmich
  Intercultural Exchanges - a chance for young people to de-learn violence?
- Roland Ziss
  Community participation for violence prevention - selected experience from Latin America and South Africa

Besides a high number of participants from Germany, over 70 colleagues from 33 countries participated at the 13th GCOCP and 2nd AIF where English was the official language.

GCOCP-University

The GCOCP-University 2008 was subdivided into two lectures of the children university, a film show with a following debate within the youth university as well as two contributions of the senior university which was held for the first time.

The events of the GCOCP-university were visited by numerous attendees and 1.700 additional guests of the particular target group.

Children University

- Uwe Matthias
  „How to catch a criminal?"

Youth University

- Elena Buck / Florian Heßdörfer
  „Palestinian headdress at H&M, Thor Steinar in the city centre?" – Remarks

[1] For more information on the AIF visit http: //www.aif-prevention.org

about the changeful relation of fashion and politics

- „The table" – Lived moral courage – A movie with a following discussion Roman Schulz (moderation)

Senior University

- Crime prevention theatre of the Police of Berlin
  "It Stops at the door of the flat"
- Police orchestra of Saxony
  „Secure through Saxony with your police"

Accompanying exhibition and workshop

Within the accompanying exhibition of the 13th GCOCP 127 information desks, 3 special exhibitions, 5 mobile information systems and 14 poster presentations were presented.

In the Film Forum of the 13th GCOCP 9 movies have been shown and discussed. Furthermore 3 performances on the GCOCP stage were visited by 600 additional guests of the particular target groups.

In line with the 13th GCOCP, the following additional events have been held

- European Workshop „Probation meets Prevention"
- Internal Forum „Civic Commitment in Crime Prevention"[2]
- Award show „School of Tolerance"
- Multiplicator seminar „Violence – Realizing– Helping"

[2] A special documentation was developed with the support of the German Forum for Crime Prevention (DFK) and is available as a download on www.praeventionstag.de

Participants and Visitors

The numeric development of congress participants of the previous years can be seen in the following chart:

	Registered congress participants	Registered visitors of the GCOCP stage and the GCOCP University	Total number of registered participants and visitors
5.GCOCP, Hoyerswerda, 1999	610	-	610
6. GCOCP, Düsseldorf, 2000	1.214	-	1.214
7. GCOCP, Düsseldorf, 2001	1.226	-	1.226
8. GCOCP, Hannover, 2003	1.219	50	1.269
9. GCOCP, Stuttgart, 2004	1.235	750	1.985
10. GCOCP, Hannover, 2005	1.907	1.550	3.457
11. GCOCP, Nürnberg, 2006	1.442	780	2.222
12. GCOCP, Wiesbaden, 2007	1.901	1.624	3.525
13. GCOCP, Leipzig, 2008	1.744	2.400	4.144

Documentation

The overall documentation of programs and single presentations is basically carried out on the internet. Contributions to the main theme are additionally published in a printed version. Central agenda highlights and articles of previous GCOCPs are documented and available as downloads on www.praeventionstag.de. This internet-based system of documentation is constantly updated and offers a user-friendly database.

Since the 5th GCOCP in 1999 congress catalogues, containing abstracts to all presentations and agenda highlights, are printed.

Up to now the 4th (1998) and the 11th GCOCP have been documented in books whereas since the 12th edition of the GCOCP (2007) an annual anthology about the particular main theme is published.

Programme of the 2nd Annual International Forum

German Congress on Crime Prevention. June 02 and 03 2008. Leipzig
Quick Programme for International Guests

Monday, June 02. 2008

9:00 - 10:30
Entrance Hall
"Reception for international Guests"

Please use the counter for international guests to check in the congress. We welcome you there and provide you with all the important information for your stay. There you'll also receive the headphones for translation etc.

11:00 - 12:30
CCL / Level 1 / Hall 1
"Opening Plenum" (German with sim. English translation)

Greetings
Erich Marks
Manager of the German Congress on Crime Prevention

Opening Adress of the Congress President
Professor Dr. Hans-Jürgen Kerner
Chairman of the German Foundation for Crime Prevention and Offender Support (DVS)

Greetings
Burkhard Jung
Lord Major of the City of Leipzig

Greetings
Dr. Albrecht Buttolo
Minister of the Interior of the State of Saxony

Prevention through Civil Engagement
Professor Dr. Christian Pfeiffer
Director of the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony

13:00 - 14:30
Meeting at 13:00 in the entrance hall at the check in for international guests
"Guided Walkabout of the Exhibition" (English language)

Our guests from abroad will be guided through the exhibition, where over 120 institutions from the field of prevention will provide information about their work, projects and concepts. You'll have the opportunity to meet and network with interesting partners in the field of crime prevention. You can also bring flyers and other information from your work area and share them with them.

15:00 - 16:00 & 17:00 - 18:00
CCL Level 2 / Room 11
"Lectures within the 2nd Annual International Forum" (English language)

Prevention of Juvenile Violence in Germany
Prof. Dr. Christian Pfeiffer
Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany

International Examples and Developments in Crime Prevention
Valérie Sagant
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime - ICPC, Canada

19:00 - Open End
New City Hall Leipzig (Martin-Luther-Ring 4-6, 04109 Leipzig)
"Evening Reception"

If you don't want to find it by yourself: We meet at 18:15 at the counter for international guests (entrance hall).

German Congress on Crime Prevention. June 02 and 03 2008. Leipzig
Quick Programme for International Guests

Tuesday, June 03. 2008

9:00 - 10:00 & 11:00 - 12:00
CCL Level 2 / Room 11
"Lectures within the 2nd Annual International Forum" (English language)

"Probation Meets Prevention" - Presentation of the Summary and Conclusion of the CEP Workshop
Leo Tigges
Conférence Permanente Européenne
de la Probation (CEP), The Netherlands

Kids Company and the Principle of "Loving Care"
Johanna Schmitz
Kids Company, United Kingdom
Intercultural Exchanges - A Chance for Young People to De-Learn Violence?
C.Berta Kimmich
e.p.a. - european play work association, Germany

12:30 - 13:30
Meeting at 13:00 in the entrance hall at the check in for international guests
"Guided Walkabout of the Exhibition" (English language)

Our guests from abroad will be guided through the exhibition, where over 120 institutions from the field of prevention will provide information about their work, projects and concepts. You'll have the opportunity to meet and network with interesting partners in the field of crime prevention. You can also bring flyers and other information from your work area and share them with them.

14:00 - 15:00
CCL Level 2 / Room 11
"Lecture within the 2nd Annual International Forum" (English language)

Community Participation for Violence Prevention - Selected Experiences from Latin America and South Africa
Roland Ziss
SUM Consult, Germany

15:00 - 16:00
CCL / Level 1 / Hall 1
"Closing Plenum" (German with sim. English translation)

Closing Speech of the Congress President
Professor Dr. Hans-Jürgen Kerner

The Leipzig Declaration of the GCOCP and his partners
Dr. Wiebke Steffen
State Office of Criminal Investigation of Bavaria

Prevention from Neuro-Biological Perspective
Professor Dr. Gerald Hüther
University of Göttingen

Outlook and Farewell
Erich Marks
Manager of the German Congress on Crime Prevention

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